FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

JANUARY 1959

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Published quarterly by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed at 10 McGovern Ave., Lancaster, Pa. Editorial and Business Offices, 58 East 68 Street, New York 21, N. Y. Cable address, Foraffairs, New York. Subscriptions, $6.00 a year, post free to any address. The Editors will consider manuscripts submitted, but assume no responsibility regarding them.

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

GEORGE F. KENNAN, of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton; former U. S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union and head of the Policy Planning Staff in the Department of State; author of "Realities of American Foreign Policy" and "Russia, the Atom and the West" * * * *ALBERT WOHLSTETTER*, member of the staff of the RAND Corporation * * * *LEOPOLD H. HAIMSON*, Professor of History, University of Chicago; former member of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University; author of "The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism" * * * *CHARLES BURTON MARSHALL*, Adviser to Prime Ministers of Pakistan, 1955–57; now Visiting Research Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; author of "The Limits of Foreign Policy" * * * *MILDRED ADAMS*, a student of Spanish affairs for many years; correspondent for *The Economist* of London; author of "Britain's Road to Recovery" * * * *BRUNO KREISKY*, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the Federal Chancellery, Vienna; member of the Austrian delegation to negotiate a treaty with the Soviet Union * * * *HERBERT FEIS*, former Economic Adviser in the Department of State; author of "The Road to Pearl Harbor," "The China Tangle," "Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin" and other works * * * *JOHN MICHAEL MONTIAS*, Assistant Professor of Economics, Yale University; in Poland as a Ford Foundation Fellow, 1956–57; recently on a study trip in Jugoslavia; co-author of "Institutional Changes in the Postwar Economy of Poland" * * * *PANAYOTIS PIPINELIS*, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, 1950; former Minister to Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland and former Under-Secretary of State; Delegate to the NATO Council, 1952–56 * * * *FRANK N. TRAGER*, Professor of International Relations and acting Director of the Center of International Affairs and Development, New York University; formerly Point Four Director in Burma; author of "Building a Welfare State in Burma" and other works * * * *ROBERT A. RUPEN*, of the Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, recently returned from a visit to Outer Mongolia.

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 37 JANUARY 1959 No. 2

DISENGAGEMENT REVISITED

By George F. Kennan

IT has long been clear that the post-blockade arrangements governing the city of Berlin were unstable and provisional. The recent Soviet move in the Berlin situation is a clear signal that, from the standpoint of Moscow's interests, time has now run out.

The reasons are not hard to perceive. The type of obedience and conformity which are required for the successful imposition of the kind of rule favored by Moscow demands that every possibility and hope of an alternative be denied the subject people. So long as a free Berlin exists, this denial cannot be exerted against the people of Eastern Germany, and the effort to impose on them a régime of the Soviet pattern must, accordingly, remain only partially successful. In Moscow's eyes this constitutes a real danger. It weakens throughout Eastern Europe that belief in the unalterable success of Communist purposes which constitutes the center of the Communist political appeal. It prejudices any further political success in Germany itself. It could, in certain circumstances, have consequences threatening to the security of Soviet rule at home.

Obviously, Moscow was not disposed to tolerate any longer than necessary a situation so unfavorable to her own interests. So long as there seemed some possibility that the situation might eventually be alleviated as a result of negotiations in the wider sphere of German unification and troop withdrawal—by agreements, that is, acceptable to Soviet interests on a broader scale—a grudging patience could be shown. As it became apparent, however, that prospects for agreement along these lines were deteriorating, that the division of the continent was tending to deepen and congeal, and that this was being accepted in the West with considerable equanimity, if not with actual relief, the basis for this patience became exhausted. Nothing remained for Moscow but to

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tackle the problem of eliminating Western support for the free people of Berlin or to endure for an indefinite further period a state of affairs which it must have found almost intolerably frustrating.

Whether Mr. Khrushchev wished, in raising the question of Berlin itself, to re-activate the wider German question as well is doubtful. He, too, may have his reasons for preferring the divided Germany of today to any united one that seems within the realm of practical possibility. But that he *has* re-activated the wider problem as well seems inescapable. It is practically impossible to conceive of any promising solution of Berlin's difficulties which would not involve some change in the broader arrangements governing the status of Germany as a whole. It must be assumed that the Western governments will have no choice in this coming period but to search their souls once more amidst the tangled problems of German unification and disengagement, to traverse once more the well-trodden ground of controversy by which these problems have been surrounded, to review—on what may prove to be the last useful occasion—the basic assumptions on which their policy toward the German question has rested in recent years.

A year ago, these assumptions were the subject of a far-flung and intensive public debate in the Western countries.[1] Had this debate led to a more general clarification of views and to the formulation of a more positive and flexible Western position, the Western chanceries would be in a better position today to deal with the immensely difficult and dangerous questions that Mr. Khrushchev has raised. The fact that this recent debate ended somewhat inconclusively, that there were residual disagreements and misunderstandings among considerable segments of Western

[1] *Editor's Note:* In his Reith Lectures, which did so much to foster that debate a year ago, Mr. Kennan said: "Let me stress particularly this question of Berlin. There is a stubborn tendency in our two countries to forget about the Berlin situation so long as it gives us no trouble and to assume that everything will somehow work out for the best. May I point out that the Western position in Berlin is by no means a sound or safe one; and it is being rendered daily more uncertain by the ominous tendency of the Soviet Government to thrust forward the East German régime as its spokesman in these matters. Moscow's purpose in this manœuvre is obviously to divest itself of responsibility for the future development of the Berlin situation. It hopes by this means to place itself in a position where it can remain serenely aloof while the East German régime proceeds to make the Western position in the city an impossible one. This is a sure portent of trouble. The future of Berlin is vital to the future of Germany as a whole: the needs of its people and the extreme insecurity of the western position there would alone constitute reasons why no one in the West should view the present division of Germany as a satisfactory permanent solution, even if no other factors were involved at all." (*The Listener*, London, November 28, 1957, p. 868.)

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opinion, shows that while the discussion went deep, it did not go deep enough. There is still room for reflection on some of the wider assumptions of Western policy which are bound to underlie our response to the Russian move in Berlin. A reconsideration of some of these assumptions may therefore still be in order.

II

One of the first arguments with which one is met is the flat assertion that "the Russians don't want any agreement on Germany;" therefore there is nothing to be gained by any re-examination of the Western position in an effort to see whether it could not be brought closer to meeting Russian requirements. The evidence usually cited to support this statement is that the Soviet Government has shown no serious interest in any of the Western proposals of recent years. This, one is told, plainly reflects the fact that the Soviet Government could not afford to remove its troops from any of the areas in which they are at present stationed in Eastern or Central Europe because that would lead to immediate revolt against the Communist régimes there and, accordingly, to a general collapse of Soviet prestige and influence in those areas. The events of 1953 in Eastern Germany and of 1956 in Hungary and Poland are cited as evidence for this assumption.

No one would question the seriousness of the problem which has recently faced Moscow in the political attitudes of the peoples of these three countries, or the unfortunate bearing of all this on the prospects for a removal of Europe's present division. But none of the three examples just cited warrants the sweeping conclusion that at no time in the foreseeable future, and in no circumstances, could Soviet forces ever be withdrawn from these areas without drawing down upon Moscow's head wholly unacceptable consequences. There is, first, the fact that Moscow has unquestionably consolidated its political position in all of these areas since the sensational events of 1953 and 1956. But beyond this it must be remembered that each of these crises arose against the background of the membership of Western Germany in NATO, of the presence of American forces in Germany, and of the absence of any over-all European security framework to include states which might detach themselves from the Soviet military and political orbit. The sharpness of the challenge which was presented to Soviet interests by all three situations was heightened by the fact that any Soviet withdrawal in the face of the respective pressures

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would have had the nature of a forced unilateral retreat unattended by any comparable concessions, or indeed by any concessions at all, on the Western side. Not only would a yielding to pressures of this sort have been immediately humiliating, but there was the further danger, against which Moscow had no visible protection, that territories thus released from participation in the Warsaw Pact might end up by joining the Atlantic Alliance, thus effecting a major alteration in the world balance of power.

Surely there could conceivably be forms of readjustment in the lines of military responsibility in Europe, and a re-definition of the zones in which foreign troops might be stationed, which would not necessarily involve all these same dangers and disadvantages from the standpoint of Soviet political interests. Any mutual withdrawal would have implications quite different from a unilateral one. Beyond that, there are various possibilities for gradual, or partial, withdrawal which would present less danger of political embarrassment to Moscow than would a sudden and sweeping one. Obviously, any reduction or relocation or retirement of the Soviet garrisons in Central and Eastern Europe which had an element of gradualness, which was carried out as part of a general international agreement and which was accompanied—as this would surely be—by a major relaxation of political tensions generally, would have political connotations entirely different from those that would attend a Soviet retirement forced by defiant local revolt and without assurance that territories evacuated might not end up in military alliance with the United States.

Let us not forget that thoughtful people in Eastern Europe, both of Communist and of non-Communist persuasion, would have an interest in assuring the success of any scheme that held real prospects for changing, if only slowly and gradually, the abnormal situation that has prevailed there in recent years. The problem is to provide these people with an alternative somewhere between the extremes of a continued slavish and hopeless subordination to Soviet power and a sharp, defiant break with the "socialist camp." They themselves are fully aware of this problem and willing to help where they can. It was not by accident that the Rapacki plan originated in Warsaw; and one may well ask whether it was wise or necessary that this initiative should be so cavalierly rejected as it was in the Western chanceries.

The question is not whether the Soviet Government could afford to get out of Eastern Europe tomorrow. The question is

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whether the various constructive impulses and initiatives which attempt to meet this problem must always be so gruffly and timidly received by the major Western governments—whether there, too, one could not welcome, and join in, the search for solutions less dangerous and less obviously unacceptable to Soviet interests than the simple unilateral Soviet retirement from Eastern Europe which the present Western position appears to demand.

It is said that Moscow can never permit the peoples of this area to abandon the "achievements of socialism." To this one can only reply by asking whether it is necessary for the question to be put that way. If the experiences of recent years have proved anything in the realm of economic and political theory, it is that ownership of the means of production is a far less important question than the Marxists have considered it to be, and represents a feature of national economy in which the differences between "socialism" and "capitalism" are of steadily diminishing significance. It would not really be so drastic a transition today from the institutions of contemporary Poland to those of the more extreme examples of the Western welfare state. The West can afford to be relatively relaxed about the name by which the social and economic institutions of the East European peoples are described. What is immediately important is that development of national life there should not be impeded by abnormal military strictures, that the very real dangers of the Berlin situation be in some way removed, and that some progress should become possible in the creation of the prerequisites of a true European community. That these prospects would be improved if at least the military deadlock in Central Europe could be loosened seems obvious.

III

Ranged alongside those who dispute the political feasibility of a relaxation of the Soviet military hold on Eastern Europe—and yet in curious contradiction to them—are those who question its value from the standpoint of Western interests.

In part, the question is raised on straight military grounds. Little importance is apparently attached by the protagonists of this view to the significance of Eastern Germany as an area of deployment and possible point of departure for Soviet forces in the heart of Europe. For them, a Soviet retirement of a mere 550 miles seems small compensation for such concessions as the Western powers might be expected to make in return, and particularly for

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the general American withdrawal from Europe which many of them insist on regarding as the only possible alternative. They see Soviet forces accomplishing with ease, in the space of a few hours (12 to 18, if we accept Mr. Dean Acheson's figure), the re-passage of the area from which they might have been withdrawn. They perceive no political factors that might inhibit the Soviet Government from suddenly making such a move. From this, they argue that the political effects of a Soviet withdrawal would also be unsubstantial: the continued proximity of Soviet armed forces and the attendant fear of their imminent return would paralyze independent policy in the Eastern European countries; and in the absence of a compensatory proximity of American forces, or of any American guarantee of the independence of these countries, Soviet domination would be, if anything, more real and more binding than it is today.

In the shaping of this view, the experience of Hungary seems to have played a prominent part. Many commentators, in assessing the significance of the Hungarian uprising, seem unaware that Soviet forces were already in Hungary, on a treaty basis, when the Hungarian uprising began. Nor does it seem to have occurred to many of them that the continued presence of United States forces in Western Germany, or the lack of any assurance that a Hungary released from the Warsaw Pact would not promptly join the Atlantic one, could have had any influence on Soviet policy in the Hungarian crisis. The Soviet action is portrayed as a simple act of aggression. From this it is adduced that any country from which Soviet forces might in future be withdrawn either would continue, out of sheer fear of possible Soviet repression, to endeavor anxiously to conform to Soviet desires in the shaping of its domestic life, or, if it failed to do so, would at once become the victim of a new Soviet military intervention.

The strictly military facets of this view will be mentioned in another context. But a word may be said here about its political connotations. It rests, clearly, on the assumption that publicly-assumed contractual obligation has no inhibiting effect whatsoever on Soviet policy, and that, accordingly, the Soviet Government would be quite capable of conducting an initial withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe only as a ruse of sorts, designed to get the United States to leave the continent, after which it would feel wholly free to violate its own part of the bargain at will.

This view fails to take into account the real political situation

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of the Soviet Government and the checks and balances that do operate to limit its freedom of action. It is simply not true that the Soviet Government is not obliged to take any account of world opinion or domestic opinion, or to pay any debt whatsoever, in the formulation of its policies, to the outward appearance of consistency and fidelity to obligation. The degree to which it has made the cause of "peace" and "noninterference" the basis of its propaganda, internally and externally, already represents a form of commitment to opinion within the Communist orbit and throughout the non-European world more serious than is generally recognized in the West. This is not to say that public opinion of this sort represents a force which could permanently inhibit Soviet policy in any vital matter; but it is a factor which cannot be wholly ignored or too abruptly and cavalierly treated by Soviet policy-makers at any given point. It is also important to remember that now, in contrast to previous decades, Soviet power operates within the framework of a genuine alliance. The other members of that alliance are not exactly the spineless, anxious slaves of Russian whim that some of us like to picture them as being. Moscow, for various reasons, cannot habitually play fast and loose with their interests without jeopardizing the unity and strength of the Communist bloc.

This being the case, it is quite wrong to suppose that a Soviet withdrawal from the satellite area, pursuant to solemn international agreement, would not represent a serious political commitment on the part of the Soviet Government. Moscow could of course throw all these inhibitions aside and do, flagrantly, all the things that the opponents of disengagement fear; but it could do so only once and only for the highest stakes: in the contingency, that is, of general war. If it is anything less than a general war which Western policy has in mind, if the game is still conceived as one of relative advantage in a limited political competition, then sober analysis must recognize that any general agreement entered into by the Russians involving mutual concessions with respect to Central and Eastern Europe would constitute a serious political move, having the widest sort of political implications. It would create a new situation which even Moscow itself could hardly expect to reverse except by the most drastic of means, and hence would not be lightly entered into.

If this is, or should be visible, to people in the West, it will be no less visible to people in Eastern Europe, whose difficult situa-

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tion demands of them a harsh realism of outlook and the courage to take reasonable chances in the interests of its alleviation. It is all very well to say that these countries, appalled at the thought of the proximity of Soviet power, and at the absence of American forces from Germany, would fall over themselves to discover Soviet pleasure and to make themselves the instruments of it, whether Russia actually re-invaded them or not. But experience simply fails to bear this out. The Finns have existed for years in a state of complete vulnerability to Soviet power and without the faintest reason to expect that anyone in the West would come to their assistance if the Russians put real pressure on them. This has not prevented them from leading an acceptable national existence and from cultivating institutions and practices wholly different from those of the Soviet Union. The Jugoslavs did not ask whether they had Atlantic Pact support when they made their break with Moscow. If the Poles have shown confidence and imagination in developing their own "path to socialism," a path which, again, departs materially from the Soviet example, it is certainly not an American guarantee which has given them this courage. The Turks did not wait for the formation of the North Atlantic Alliance before showing stoutness in the face of Soviet demands. In vain one seeks, in the Austrian scene, the evidences of that panicky running-for-cover before internal Communist pressures which critics of the concept of disengagement have portrayed as the inevitable result of leaving parts of Europe without the protection of American garrisons or of membership in NATO.

The reluctance of some Americans to believe that others could conceivably survive without immediate American military protection has its element of justification in the sense that the general maintenance of American strength is required for the preservation of a world balance in which the restraints now operating on Soviet policy can continue to have full validity. But to assume from this that no independence of national life can survive in the neighborhood of Soviet power without specific American guarantees or the immediate proximity of American garrisons is to ignore all the political imponderables and to succumb to that overmilitarization of thought about the cold war in the face of which no peaceful solutions of world differences are even thinkable. Not only do many of us underrate the courage and ingenuity which others are capable of manifesting in the protection of their national independence; but we forget that there are those who

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would rather risk this effort independently than commit their fortunes entirely to the protection of a Western alliance which appears to be increasingly inspired by an acceptance of the inevitability of major war.

The fear is often expressed that a Soviet violation of a general agreement on disengagement would come in a manner so gradual as to place the Western powers before the choice of resorting to major war over a relatively insignificant issue or accepting a piecemeal Soviet infiltration of the area from which Soviet forces might have been withdrawn. But is it beyond the resources of human ingenuity to take account of this problem in any new negotiation? What is at stake here is, after all, not political infiltration—the Eastern European countries bordering on the Soviet Union already have régimes acceptable to Moscow. What is at stake here is the possible return of units of the Soviet armed forces: a relatively definite and ascertainable circumstance. Is there any reason in principle why an agreement on disengagement could not have, built into it, its own sanctions for the event of violation: sanctions by virtue of which any infringement of this nature would give the other party clearly specified and automatic rights of reëntry? If what we are talking about is a gradual and piecemeal reintroduction of Soviet armed units (in itself not a very likely contingency), there would be plenty of time for the Western powers to avail themselves of such a right.

IV

Among those who are most apprehensive about any discussion of the problem of disengagement are those whose minds are riveted less on the danger of a permanent Soviet control of Eastern Europe than on the dangers of a possible re-assertion of the power of a united Germany in European affairs. It would be wrong to underestimate the number of people, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and particularly in some of the smaller European countries, who would actually prefer the divided Europe and divided Germany of today to an undivided Europe from which the forces of the great non-European powers would have departed and in which a united Germany, not bound by exclusive and formal ties with the West, could again play the rôle of a great power. There are even those in Western Europe who, in preference to this latter alternative, would be prepared to accept Soviet hegemony over the entire continent.

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It is not the purpose here to reproach people for these feelings, to question the validity of the trauma from which they proceed, or to deny the magnitude of the uncertainties that would be produced by any alteration of the present status. Who is to measure the monstrosity of what took place between 1938 and 1945?

In principle, the thesis of German partition was not without its force and its logic. The German problem, in its present dimension, began with the achievement of German unification in 1870. The fearful European wars of this century have been the expression of the failure to find—and perhaps even the impossibility of finding—any acceptable place in a community of fully sovereign European states for a united Germany likewise fully sovereign. To the writer of these lines it has seemed for many years self-evident that a truly constructive European policy for the postwar period could not have as its goal merely another attempt to fit a sovereign united Germany into a system of smaller European sovereignties whom it was bound to outclass in many vital manifestations of national energy. Germany could conceivably go only one of two ways: backward, by process of partition, to a point where sovereignty would be tolerable because it was not united; or forward, toward membership in a broader and higher system of political loyalties—in some sort of European federation, where unification would be tolerable because it was not truly sovereign. But the first alternative, plainly, was anachronistic, politically impractical and pregnant with possibilities for a reënactment of the unhappy past. In the second lay the hope.

There is, accordingly, no disposition here to challenge the proposition that a constructive future for a united Germany is thinkable only within the framework of a set of international obligations which would draw German energies into channels broader and more worthy than those of the mere realization of competitive national ideals. The questions at issue are only, first, whether the framework to be sought should be an exclusively Western European one, and should embrace only one portion of Germany, or whether it should be a general European one, embracing all of the German people and presumably some of the other peoples of Central and Eastern Europe as well; and, secondly, if it is to be the latter, by what stages one is to proceed in this direction.

If the eastern half of Europe is not to become in permanence a part of the Russian empire, it would seem obvious that the sights of Western policy ought to be set on the wider rather than the

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more narrow concept. Had they been so oriented, this would not have precluded the development within Western Europe of the immensely valuable and hopeful institutions of a European community, the growth of which we have witnessed in recent years. It would, however, have put us on our guard against developing these institutions in a way to prejudice their eventual extension to the entire continent or their replacement by similar institutions on a continental scale. In particular, we would have been warned against too close an identification of these institutions with military arrangements applicable to only a portion of the continent. If there is ever to be a prospect of unlocking the great political and military cramp by which the life of the continent is now restricted, a way will have to be found to differentiate sharply between the military obligations of individual continental countries to extra-continental powers—the means, that is, by which their security is to be guaranteed, on the one hand, and the arrangements which may exist among them for intimate collaboration and even for the bridging of the barrier of sovereignty in economic and technical fields, on the other. What has worried some of us in recent years is the impression that this distinction has become increasingly blurred in the formulation of Western policies, and that the development of the elements of community within the European family—a process infinitely important in principle to the very prospects for the survival and prosperity of European civilization—is occurring in Western Europe in such a way that only by the hopeless device of general war or in the unlikely event of a total collapse of Russian power could it conceivably be spread to the remainder of the continent.

Even if the validity of these fears be accepted, there is, admittedly, a further problem of phasing. It was possible at one time to suppose that it might not be necessary to regard the definition of Germany's supra-national obligations within the European community as an integral part of any initial agreement on German unification and disengagement of Europe; it was possible to suppose that the change from a hopelessly divided to a hopefully united Europe might be carried out in modest, tentative and easy stages, whereby the creation of German unity would precede the final definition of Germany's place and obligations within the European family.

The tenor of the debate that has taken place within the past year on the subject of disengagement, and particularly the ear-

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nestness of the fears revealed regarding any German unification that would operate to weaken Germany's present obligations to her Western European neighbors, suggests that this concept of staging may have been wrong. Perhaps it is not realistic to discuss German unification and a possible modification of Germany's relation to the Atlantic Pact without at the same time specifying precisely both the political guarantees and strictures which would affect a united Germany and the supra-national institutions in which she as well as any other affected countries would be embraced. It is possible, in other words, that such problems as the formulation of a general European security pact, the future scope of the institutions of the European community, and probably even the bitter question of Germany's eastern borders, may have to be faced simultaneously with the first steps toward a general disengagement.

One might hope that this would not be so; for if it is, the whole approach to this problem obviously becomes more complex, more delicate, more comprehensive in its implications, more closely related to the general problem of the weapons race and of world security than it would otherwise be; and the principle of gradualness, essential perhaps to any politically feasible solution, is placed in question. But the problem does not thereby become theoretically impossible of solution, nor is its urgency thereby reduced. If this must be the scope of the discussion, so be it. But let the discussion at least proceed.

V

A large proportion of the doubts and hesitations that have surrounded the question of disengagement has related to the possible military effects of any move in this direction. There is, in the first place, the fear of the effect of any disengagement on the Western ability to resist, by local tactical operations, a Soviet attack on the western part of the continent. Closely connected with this fear is the belief that a removal of the American, British and French garrisons from Western Germany and any alteration in Germany's obligations under the Atlantic Pact would amount to "the dismantling of NATO" and would demoralize the Western community politically in addition to weakening its military posture. Finally there is the argument that any disengagement which would serve to deny to the United States or the NATO command, as the case might be, the possibility of maintaining missile sites on

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German territory would cripple the Western deterrent power in the face of the Soviet capability in the long-range strategic weapons. The composite effect of these anxieties is to produce a frame of mind which sees any modification of present NATO military policies as possible only when the United States can be sure of matching the Soviet Union in the field of intercontinental ballistic missiles and when the Soviet Government agrees to a program of conventional disarmament which would make it no longer possible for it to overshadow the NATO group by its scale of conventional armaments.

None of these considerations is without force or substance. Precisely for this reason it is perhaps well, before looking critically at them, to bear in mind that the cultivation of the ideal military posture will always be in conflict with any serious effort to ease international political tensions. There is no conceivable agreement with the Soviet Union, even in the field of disarmament itself and all the more so in any field involving territorial questions, which would not involve concessions in the military field and the acceptance of new risks disagreeable and shocking to Western military planners. The ideal military posture is simply the enemy of every political *détente* or compromise; and whoever is not prepared to make sacrifices and to accept risks in the military field should not lay claim to any serious desire to see world problems settled by any means short of war.

The fears relating to the effect of a possible disengagement on the balance of conventional weapons in Europe are predicated, as a rule, on that same depreciation of the value of a possible Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Germany which was mentioned above. Of course, if no appreciable military value is to be attached to the question of the area of peacetime deployment of the Soviet armies in Europe—if, that is, it is to be regarded as a matter of indifference whether Soviet forces are stationed in Eastern Germany or whether their western limit is to be 500 miles further east—then, obviously, any compensatory move made by the Western powers, whether it be a reduction or relocation of their present garrisons in Germany, or a complete withdrawal to the United States, appears as an inordinate price to pay. The civilian obviously lacks the authority to debate this point, but he may perhaps be forgiven if he ventures to suppose that *some* importance must attach to this factor, and that, in particular, it must make *some* difference whether Soviet forces start, in a possible

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military encounter, from behind the Polish-Soviet border or from a line 30 miles from Hamburg and 100 miles from the Rhine. The predictions of an effortless return of the Soviet army over this entire distance in a matter of a few hours carry singularly little conviction to one whose memories of governmental discussions inform him that in the world of military planning it always is only the enemy's forces who are capable of such staggering feats: one's own military authorities invariably have a hundred solid reasons why nothing of the sort would be possible if it were *their* forces who had to do it. Is it too much to suppose that Soviet statesmen are sometimes confronted with similar reactions?

For the actual effect of a possible disengagement on the balance of conventional forces, let us glance briefly at what is now occurring and what is likely to be the situation within a few years. If present trends continue unchecked, the present program of German rearmament will culminate in the achievement by the year 1961 of the present goal of 12 German divisions. When this goal has been reached—in fact, long before—the German army will be by far the strongest component of NATO strength generally on the continent and a much more important factor than the Western garrisons now stationed on German territory. When this occurs (and its occurrence, let us remember, is now less than two years off), Germany will have a ground strength which would be fully able to assume the rôle fulfilled in the past by the Western garrisons: namely, of assuring that any military encroachment by the Russians would, to stand chances of success, have to assume dimensions which would make a general war unavoidable. The question will then present itself to Western military planners as follows: Is the retention of the foreign garrisons in Western Germany, themselves no longer the essential element in Germany's local protection, of greater value than the strategic advantage to be obtained by the removal of the Soviet divisions now in Eastern Germany to a point several hundred miles further east? It is hard to believe that the answer, from the German standpoint, could be an affirmative one; and it is hard to see that even NATO as a whole would be militarily weakened by the change, grievous as might be the political effects of a withdrawal that came about in this manner.

So far, therefore, as the prospects of disengagement relate to the balance in conventional armament, it is difficult to see the justification for the charge that this would amount to a "disman-

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tling" of Western strength. Even if a future united Germany were not to be a member of the NATO group, she would presumably continue to have an interest in her own survival; the ground force she would be maintaining would still be greater in conventional weapons than that which NATO has been maintaining in Western Germany in recent years; this force would presumably be no less resolutely attached to the idea of the defense of Western German territory than have been the NATO forces of the recent period; and the danger of surprise attack, as well as the strength of the possible Soviet punch in Central Europe, would have been appreciably weakened by the geographic relocation of the Soviet forces.

It is, therefore, primarily in the matter of the missile sites, if anywhere, that the real military sacrifice involved in a possible disengagement must, from the NATO standpoint, be seen. But is this really so grievous a sacrifice? Western Germany is not the only place where such missiles can be stationed or from which they can be launched. To judge from the Rapacki proposal, which mentioned only Poland, Czechoslovakia and Germany, an abstention from the installation of missile sites in Western Germany would not necessarily affect the possibility of their being retained elsewhere in Europe, on the territory of other NATO countries. Beyond this there is the fact that as the development of the I.C.B.M. proceeds and as the use of the submarine as a floating missile site is perfected, the need for missile sites in Western Europe will presumably decline.

Many Western minds have come to be dominated so exclusively by military considerations that they are inclined to dismiss the possibility or the utility of any political agreements with the Russians in the absence of some general agreement in the field of disarmament, and particularly one which would reduce the Soviet conventional forces to levels comparable with those maintained by the NATO group. If this view is authoritatively adhered to, it is a poor augury for the future.

It is not likely that the Russians are going to agree at this juncture to any major diminution in the power of their ground establishment. Least of all are they likely to consent to equate it with the relatively small establishments of the Western countries, some of whom have permitted the maintenance of ground forces to become so expensive and so cumbersome that they have tended to price themselves out of the military competition. The imbalance in ground forces is partly an internal Western question.

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There are two things that people in the West might do to correct the present imbalance in conventional forces. The first would be to have a hard and unsparing look at the presuppositions for the prevalent view that the West must always be hopelessly inferior to Russia in this field and ask itself whether everything possible has really been done to cheapen the maintenance of ground forces, to eliminate administrative and logistical luxuries, and to give them maximum real efficiency for the conditions of modern war. The second would be to explore the possibility of negotiating concessions not in respect to the total strength of Russian ground forces but in respect to the geographic area of their deployment. But this is precisely the possibility that is so emphatically rejected by those who throw up their hands in horror at the thought of any exploration of possibilities for modifying the present lines of political and military responsibility in Europe.

VI

In the view of those who deplore any discussion of disengagement, one can usually find, explicit or implicit, the belief that adherence to present policy offers both stability and hope for improvement. Leaving Berlin aside for the moment, many arguments can be found to support this view in the striking economic and political progress made in Western Europe in recent years.

One would not wish to deny this progress, nor to dispute the proposition that the successes achieved in the development of Western European strength to date should not be bargained away. But there has been, in addition to the uncertain status of Berlin, one major weakness in the developing Western situation that should be noted—a weakness even from the standpoint of those (and there are many of them among us) who at heart have no interest in removing the division of the continent at all.

We have already seen that when the Germans complete their present military program, the Western garrisons will no longer play the most important part in the thinking of Germans about their own defense or in the thinking of the Russians about the problem of a European settlement. With this change, the possibility of withdrawal of French, British and American forces from Western Germany—the card which the West might once have exploited in an effort to bring about a Soviet withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe—will, like a virginity too long cherished, have outworn its own value. The German army—its weapons, its

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location, its obligations of alliance—will then be the decisive factor in the shaping of the future political relationship between Russia and the West in the heart of Europe.

If, of course, the new German army were to become in organization and conceptual principle as dependent on atomic weapons as is the American defense establishment of this day—were the Germans, in other words, to place themselves in a position where they could not dispense with atomic weapons without generally emasculating their over-all military capability—then the chances for any change in the present status quo in Central Europe would be practically non-existent. Confronted with such a force on the western side of the Elbe, the Soviet Government, which will presumably observe a much greater prudence than has the American Government about putting atomic weapons in the hands of its allies, will see no choice but to keep its own forces, themselves armed with atomic weapons, in substantially the positions they occupy today. The atomic armament of Western Germany is in fact the enemy of any real progress in the matter of unification. The Western chanceries could not have been oblivious to this fact when they refused even to consider the Rapacki proposals for an atom-free zone in the center of the continent, and when they took the decision to introduce atomic weapons into the NATO defenses on German soil.

But will the German commitment really be so deep as these decisions suggest? Will the German army really be so constituted that without the tactical atomic weapon it would lose its effectiveness entirely?

The public is not fully taken into confidence in these matters, and we cannot know. Such fragmentary material as has reached the press would permit the inference that perhaps it will not be entirely this way; that the tactical atomic weapon which the Germans are now acquiring will perhaps be introduced into German armed forces in a manner so circumspect that it will be possible for the Germans, at a future point, to take it or leave it, as their own interests may dictate. There is no reason to suppose, on the basis of such cryptic statements as have come this way from official circles in Germany, that German military theorists are nearly so addicted to the atomic weapon in their strategic concepts as are those of the United States or that they feel at all the same degree of despair about their prospects for coping with Soviet military competition on the plane of conventional weapons.

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Surely it is worth noting that if this should be the case, there would be a theoretical possibility for direct German dealings with Moscow, at some point, over the problem of German reunification. The French, British and Americans would not, in this contingency, be able to deal with Russia about such matters as German unification; for to them the atomic weapon, as the basis for European defense, is sacrosanct and not expendable. But the Germans may not find themselves thus limited.

The author of these lines is not one of those who feels that Germany would be incapable of dealing directly with the Soviet Union without losing her own independence or jeopardizing the interests of the Atlantic community. He considers, as an historian, that the sinisterness of the Rapallo Treaty was greatly exaggerated in Western opinion, and that the Western powers, had they taken a more sensible attitude toward Germany in the wake of World War I, would have had little to fear from the normal development of German-Soviet relations in the period of the Weimar Republic. It is not the dealings of a moderate German government with the Soviet Union that the West has real cause to fear, but only the dealings of a Hitler. There is also no reason to conclude that it would be anything unnatural, or a "betrayal" of the West, if Germany were to exploit the possibilities which circumstances may soon confer upon her. National interest, not sentiment or emotion, forms the normal basis for policy; and nations must not be expected to ignore the most vital of their own interests in deference to international obligation.

But there are certain points at which a word of caution is in order.

First of all, it cannot be assumed that if negotiation is left to the Germans they will have the same concern as do the other Western governments for the removal of the division of the continent as a whole. Their efforts are naturally more apt to be directed to the more narrow goal of German unification. No longer having any great need for the presence of Western garrisons on their territory, possessed themselves of a national armed force which would alone constitute a formidable obstacle to any attack launched by the Soviet forces now in Eastern Germany, they will not have that same concern for the general superiority of Soviet ground forces which plays so prominent a part in Western thinking. They will then be free to trade, if they can, the severance of their ties with NATO, a relinquishment of the tactical atomic

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weapon, acceptance of the present Polish border, and perhaps the assurance of a gradual adjustment in the political and military status of Eastern Germany, for a retirement of Soviet forces beyond the Polish-German frontier and for the privilege of bringing about a general unification of their country.

Even such a development, be it reiterated, would not necessarily be in itself catastrophic to Western interests. It might even hold advantages. It might open up the question as to the necessity of the further maintenance of Soviet garrisons in Poland and Hungary; it might confront the Soviet Government with a choice of withdrawing those garrisons or accepting a considerable added strain on Soviet-satellite relations. There is certainly strong sentiment in both these countries for a withdrawal of the Soviet troops. This sentiment would be heightened if the necessity of maintaining lines of communication to Soviet garrisons in Germany could no longer serve as a reason for maintaining Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.

But the shock to the unity of the Western world arising from any such development would be profound. A separate German-Soviet agreement, however innocuous or even constructive in its consequences, would set in motion trains of memory, suspicion and resentment of which only the Communists could be the beneficiaries. A Western community which had held open, in its own political posture, the possibility of a compromise with Russia over European problems—a Western community, in other words, which had taken a hopeful and a plausible position in favor of a removal of the division of the continent—would be better armed against this contingency. It would be in a position at best to share, and at the worst to welcome, such a German success, as simply one way (who knows, perhaps the only way) of realizing common Western desiderata. But a Western community which had nailed its flag to the mast of an unconditional capitulation of the Soviet interest in Central and Eastern Europe could find itself only humiliated, deflated and injured in its unity and prestige by a German-Soviet compromise.

VII

Leaving the question of Berlin aside once again, let us ask ourselves: What if the division of the continent goes on indefinitely? Does this not also involve risks? Must it not come, with time, to constitute an almost irreparable alienation of the eastern half of

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the continent from its western half? This is not just a question of whether people are happy under Communist rule. Just as old vested interests are being destroyed, new ones are growing up which in time will gain legitimacy and toughness; and they, too, will some day have to be overcome if the unification of the continent is ever to occur. Is it realistic to hope, in these circumstances, that negotiation long deferred will be easier and more hopeful than negotiation today?

Those who cherish and cultivate the values of a "little Europe" deserve our fullest respect. They include some of the finest Europeans. Their arguments are powerful ones. Perhaps they are even right. But they cannot expect to eat their cake and have it, too. They must face the fact that what they are affirming is a Europe divided permanently, and that in the face of this reality the Russians, whatever their preference, will have in the long run no choice but to digest and incorporate their half of Europe as they have digested and incorporated many border areas before, whether the cost be patient persistence of political discipline exerted on the respective peoples, or a dispersal of them, or outright genocide, or a mixture of all three. The present Berlin crisis is itself only a manifestation—one of the first of many—of this reality. Can the West really adjust to this process, even assuming the Berlin crisis is in some way surmounted? A final Russian absorption of Eastern Europe would obviously have most profound connotations for the entire balance of political, economical and military power on a world scale. It may even be questioned whether these results would be consistent with the basic presuppositions of the North Atlantic alliance itself, which was surely not originally predicated on a belief that the problem was to contain militarily, in permanence, a Soviet empire extending from the Elbe to the Pacific.

Or was it? Perhaps the deepest issue at stake in this whole problem of disengagement resolves around this point. There were those of us who, in the inspiring days of the birth of the Marshall Plan and NATO, conceived that the purpose of the cultivation of Western strength was to place the West in a position where it would some day be able to negotiate the liquidation of the vast misunderstanding represented in the division of the continent. What loomed to us at the end of this road we were entering upon was not the crushing of Soviet power by the force of our actions but compromise—compromise on terms more favorable to our-

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selves than the conditions of that day would have permitted—compromise that would have given not only to a portion of Europe but to the great body of it the possibility to live. Here lay the connection, which many have found it so hard to discern, between "containment" and "disengagement." And while it did not occur to us that the *substance* of the gains we hoped to see made in Western Europe could ever be regarded as expendable for purpose of negotiation (this would have been patently self-defeating), it also did not occur to us that there was to be, in the institutional and particularly the military devices which we were then creating, anything so sacrosanct that these devices could not one day be modified or exchanged in favor of ones with a wider range of relevance and acceptance.

There were others, we must now conclude, who saw these things quite differently. For them, the purpose of the building of Western strength was not the creation of bargaining power with a view to eventual compromise but the achievement by Western Europe of a political and military posture so powerful and so eloquent that recalcitrance would melt before it and Europe would eventually find its unification automatically on *our* terms, without the necessity of dealing with our major adversaries or making concessions to their interests. In the forceful and moving statement contributed to *Foreign Affairs* some months ago by Mr. Dean Acheson,[2] one finds indeed the word "negotiations" but one is at a loss to discover what content this expression might be expected to have. "The interests of the Russian people in their own security and welfare" are, he says, to be preserved. But surely the Soviet Government cannot be expected to perceive these interests and this security precisely as we do, and they will be unlikely to regard as a fit subject of negotiation a mere retraction of their power in favor of the extension to Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe of the international military, political and economic arrangements now prevailing, under American aegis or encouragement, in the western half of the continent. The rosy prospects which Mr. Acheson and others discern at the end of the present road of Western policy seem to rest in general on the possibility for an extensive breakdown of Soviet power. While this possibility cannot be excluded (anything can happen in a political society whose constitutional foundation is so unfirm and so much in transition as that of Russia today), the probability of any such

[2] "The Illusion of Disengagement," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1958.

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development is surely far too slight to warrant its entering seriously into the calculations of Western policy. The evolution of Soviet society in the wake of Stalinism is now in progress. It is by no means inconsiderable, nor is it devoid of hopeful elements. But it contains no signs of a total breakdown; it has not yet been such as to modify the irrealism with which Soviet leaders view the outside world; and it has not served to reduce—on the contrary—the general military and diplomatic potential of the Soviet state.

VIII

It is impossible to derive anything resembling encouragement from the long note on Berlin which the Soviet Government presented to the Western powers at the end of November 1958. The note, in fact, is worse than discouraging, for it indicates no interest in any German settlement except at the price of the liberties of the people of the western sectors of Berlin, and it reveals a Soviet mental world so far from that of people in the West, and so far, indeed, from the known facts of history, that one is forced to rub one's eyes to realize that it can exist on this planet. Most alarming of all is the impression one receives that in the case of Khrushchev, as contrasted with Stalin and many other Soviet officials, what is said about the background of these differences is really believed. We may be paying, here, a bitter price for our tendency over the whole span of Western-Soviet relations to dismiss all Soviet ideological statements as "just propaganda," and to discuss with Soviet leaders everything but the main thing.

It may well be asked today whether there is any point in trying to talk with Khrushchev about Berlin or any other question involving Germany before one has talked with him about a great many other things. The past rises up among us, at this point, as a real barrier to the solution of the problems of the present. How, one wonders, can one agree on the problems that lie before us unless one talks out in some way the sources of this measureless bitterness and distrust? Is there any short-cut here? Khrushchev charges the Western powers with failing to collaborate with Russia against Hitler in the early thirties. Must he not be reminded that the Russia with which they would have had to collaborate at that time was the Russia of Stalin, with all that that name implies, and that Stalin's help against Hitler could have been had only at the price of delivering the Eastern European countries up to him, as a deliberate and cynical act of betrayal? The recent Soviet

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note asserts that it was only when Germany attacked the Western countries in 1940 that the American and British Governments "had no alternative but to acknowledge their miscalculations and to take the road of organizing jointly with the Soviet Union resistance" to the Axis countries. Can one avoid reminding Khrushchev that at that time his country had a Non-Aggression Pact with Germany, that responsible Soviet officials were just then congratulating the Germans on the fall of Paris, and that the official line of the Soviet Union was that it would "pull nobody's chestnuts out of the fire"?

Must it not be pointed out further—it is, after all, a demonstrable fact—that the establishment of the East German *Bereitschaften* long preceded the first steps of rearmament of Western Germany? Can it not, and must it not, be said to the Kremlin, insistently and authoritatively, that what the West is interested in is not social systems but human freedom itself; that this is the true source of its concern for the people of Berlin; that its purpose is not to predetermine what social system the people of the Western sectors shall have but to assure that their own wishes shall be the predominant factor in whatever choice is made; and, conversely, that our distaste for what is being done in Eastern Europe and our objection to its spread to further portions of Germany arise not from "fear of socialism" but from the fact that Soviet socialism, as known heretofore in Eastern Europe, represents an unpopular and unwanted political system, imposed by one country on another?

Must we not, finally, make the effort to undo the damage done during the recent war by the easy assumption that certain general expressions have the same meaning everywhere? Must we not make it clear that we cannot accept the word "democracy" as a fit description for what confesses itself a dictatorship, or "peace-loving" for an attitude which embraces the most savage repression of majority opinion in the interests of a foreign government, and that we are not unaware that such terms as "fascist" and "militarist" are employed quite indiscriminately in the language of Communism to denote anyone who has the temerity not to be in agreement with Soviet purposes? Must we not, in short, have out with Khrushchev and his present associates the whole question of the unhappy Stalinist past which he is unwilling either fully to espouse or fully to deny, and confront him in the most insistent way with the effects of 35 years of unalleviated cynicism, deceitfulness

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and brutality in the dealings of Soviet power with the detested capitalist world? These may not have been *his* years, or *his* policies; but they did exist, and he should be the last to deny it.

In the absence of this clarification, or pending its substantial completion (and it will not be soon completed), the prospects for progress in the questions of Berlin, of Germany, and of Central and Eastern Europe as a whole, are anything but promising; and the possibility must be faced that the bout of exchanges ushered in by the recent Soviet move will have about it a finality which, in one way or another, will cause the entire question to assume dimensions different from anything we have known thus far. If so, it is doubly important that the Western position at this truly crucial juncture should be one of utmost liberality, scope and flexibility, involving a real readiness to compromise where compromise is permissible and to accept the lesser risks for the sake of avoiding the major ones.

Under the lowering clouds of sputnik, of Quemoy and Iraq, of the glaring disingenuousness of Soviet attitudes in questions of disarmament, and of the vicious distortions that are used to shore up the move on Berlin, it is perhaps too much to ask that men should still find the heart to address themselves to the slender possibilities for political compromise in Europe. But there are some of us who will depart with great reluctance from a belief that the basic elements of reasonable compromise are actually present in the realities of the European situation, however deeply they may be buried behind all the mutual fears and inhibitions and all the confusions of the atomic rivalry. Our concern is not to persuade people that the problem is an easy one, or that the prospects for solution are favorable, or that the concessions necessary to permit agreement have only to be made on the Western side. Our concern is to assure, as a matter of conscience no less than practicality, that in what may be a moment of the utmost gravity in our history and in the history of the world, the position adopted by American statesmanship be such as to test and exhaust every last possibility that may exist for the peaceful resolution of the differences in question.

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THE DELICATE BALANCE OF TERROR

By Albert Wohlstetter

THE first shock administered by the Soviet launching of sputnik has almost dissipated. The flurry of statements and investigations and improvised responses has died down, leaving a small residue: a slight increase in the schedule of bomber and ballistic missile production, with a resulting small increment in our defense expenditures for the current fiscal year; a considerable enthusiasm for space travel; and some stirrings of interest in the teaching of mathematics and physics in the secondary schools. Western defense policy has almost returned to the level of activity and the emphasis suited to the basic assumptions which were controlling before sputnik.

One of the most important of these assumptions—that a general thermonuclear war is extremely unlikely—is held in common by most of the critics of our defense policy as well as by its proponents. Because of its crucial rôle in the Western strategy of defense, I should like to examine the stability of the thermonuclear balance which, it is generally supposed, would make aggression irrational or even insane. The balance, I believe, is in fact precarious, and this fact has critical implications for policy. Deterrence in the 1960s is neither assured nor impossible but will be the product of sustained intelligent effort and hard choices, responsibly made. As a major illustration important both for defense and foreign policy, I shall treat the particularly stringent conditions for deterrence which affect forces based close to the enemy, whether they are U.S. forces or those of our allies, under single or joint control. I shall comment also on the inadequacy as well as the necessity of deterrence, on the problem of accidental outbreak of war, and on disarmament.[1]

II. THE PRESUMED AUTOMATIC BALANCE

I emphasize that requirements for deterrence are stringent. We have heard so much about the atomic stalemate and the receding probability of war which it has produced that this may strike the reader as something of an exaggeration. Is deterrence a necessary consequence of both sides having a nuclear delivery capability,

[1] I want to thank C. J. Hitch, M. W. Hoag, W. W. Kaufman, A. W. Marshall, H. S. Rowen and W. W. Taylor for suggestions in preparation of this article.

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and is all-out war nearly obsolete? Is mutual extinction the only outcome of a general war? This belief, frequently expressed by references to Mr. Oppenheimer's simile of the two scorpions in a bottle, is perhaps the prevalent one. It is held by a very eminent and diverse group of people—in England by Sir Winston Churchill, P. M. S. Blackett, Sir John Slessor, Admiral Buzzard and many others; in France by such figures as Raymond Aron, General Gallois and General Gazin; in this country by the titular heads of both parties as well as almost all writers on military and foreign affairs, by both Henry Kissinger and his critic, James E. King, Jr., and by George Kennan as well as Dean Acheson. Mr. Kennan refers to American concern about surprise attack as simply obsessive;[2] and many people have drawn the consequence of the stalemate as has Blackett, who states: "If it is in fact true, as most current opinion holds, that strategic air power has abolished global war, then an urgent problem for the West is to assess how little effort must be put into it to keep global war abolished."[3] If peace were founded firmly on mutual terror, and mutual terror on symmetrical nuclear capabilities, this would be, as Churchill has said, "a melancholy paradox;" none the less a most comforting one.

Deterrence, however, is not automatic. While feasible, it will be much harder to achieve in the 1960s than is generally believed. One of the most disturbing features of current opinion is the underestimation of this difficulty. This is due partly to a misconstruction of the technological race as a problem in matching striking forces, partly to a wishful analysis of the Soviet ability to strike first.

Since sputnik, the United States has made several moves to assure the world (that is, the enemy, but more especially our allies and ourselves) that we will match or overmatch Soviet technology and, specifically, Soviet offense technology. We have, for example, accelerated the bomber and ballistic missile programs, in particular the intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The problem has been conceived as more or better bombers—or rockets; or sputniks; or engineers. This has meant confusing deterrence with matching or exceeding the enemy's ability to strike first. Matching weapons, however, misconstrues the nature of the technological race. Not, as is frequently said, because only a few bombs

[2] George F. Kennan, "A Chance to Withdraw Our Troops in Europe," *Harper's Magazine*, February 1958, p. 41.

[3] P. M. S. Blackett, "Atomic Weapons and East-West Relations" (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1956), p. 32.

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owned by the defender can make aggression fruitless, but because even many might not. One outmoded A-bomb dropped from an obsolete bomber might destroy a great many supersonic jets and ballistic missiles. To deter an attack means being able to strike back in spite of it. It means, in other words, a capability to strike second. In the last year or two there has been a growing awareness of the importance of the distinction between a "strike-first" and a "strike-second" capability, but little, if any, recognition of the implications of this distinction for the balance of terror theory.

Where the published writings have not simply underestimated Soviet capabilities and the advantages of a first strike, they have in general placed artificial constraints on the Soviet use of the capabilities attributed to them. They assume, for example, that the enemy will attack in mass over the Arctic through our Distant Early Warning line, with bombers refueled over Canada—all resulting in plenty of warning. Most hopefully, it is sometimes assumed that such attacks will be preceded by days of visible preparations for moving ground troops. Such assumptions suggest that the Soviet leaders will be rather bumbling or, better, coöperative. However attractive it may be for us to narrow Soviet alternatives to these, they would be low in the order of preference of any reasonable Russians planning war.

III. THE QUANTITATIVE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM AND THE UNCERTAINTIES

In treating Soviet strategies it is important to consider Soviet rather than Western advantage and to consider the strategy of both sides quantitatively. The effectiveness of our own choices will depend on a most complex numerical interaction of Soviet and Western plans. Unfortunately, both the privileged and unprivileged information on these matters is precarious. As a result, competent people have been led into critical error in evaluating the prospects for deterrence. Western journalists have greatly overestimated the difficulties of a Soviet surprise attack with thermonuclear weapons and vastly underestimated the complexity of the Western problem of retaliation.

One intelligent commentator, Richard Rovere, recently expressed the common view: "If the Russians had ten thousand warheads and a missile for each, and we had ten hydrogen bombs and ten obsolete bombers, . . . aggression would still be a folly that would appeal only to an insane adventurer." Mr. Rovere's exam-

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ple is plausible because it assumes implicitly that the defender's hydrogen bombs will with certainty be visited on the aggressor; then the damage done by the ten bombs seems terrible enough for deterrence, and any more would be simply redundant. This is the basis for the common view. The example raises questions, even assuming the delivery of the ten weapons. For instance, the targets aimed at in retaliation might be sheltered and a quite modest civil defense could hold within tolerable limits the damage done to such city targets by ten delivered bombs. But the essential point is that the weapons would not be very likely to reach their targets. Even if the bombers were dispersed at ten different points, and protected by shelters so blast resistant as to stand up anywhere outside the lip of the bomb crater—even inside the fire ball itself—the chances of one of these bombers surviving the huge attack directed at it would be on the order of one in a million. (This calculation takes account of the unreliability and inaccuracy of the missile.) And the damage done by the small minority of these ten planes that might be in the air at the time of the attack, armed and ready to run the gauntlet of an alert air defense system, if not zero, would be very small indeed compared to damage that Russia has suffered in the past. For Mr. Rovere, like many other writers on this subject, numerical superiority is not important at all.

For Joseph Alsop, on the other hand, it is important, but the superiority is on our side. Mr. Alsop recently enunciated as one of the four rules of nuclear war: "The aggressor's problem is astronomically difficult; and the aggressor requires an overwhelming superiority of force."[4] There are, he believes, no fewer than 400 SAC bases in the NATO nations alone and many more elsewhere, all of which would have to be attacked in a very short space of time. The "thousands of coördinated air sorties and/or missile firings," he concludes, are not feasible. Mr. Alsop's argument is numerical and has the virtue of demonstrating that at least the relative numbers are important. But the numbers he uses are very wide of the mark. He overestimates the number of such bases by a factor of more than ten,[5] and in any case, missile firings on the scale of a thousand or more involve costs that are by no means out of proportion, given the strategic budgets of the

[4] Joseph Alsop, "The New Balance of Power," *Encounter*, May 1958, p. 4. It should be added that, since these lines were written, Mr. Alsop's views have altered.

[5] *The New York Times*, September 6, 1958, p. 2.

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great powers. Whether or not thousands are needed depends on the yield and the accuracy of the enemy missiles, something about which it would be a great mistake for us to display confidence.

Perhaps the first step in dispelling the nearly universal optimism about the stability of deterrence would be to recognize the difficulties in analyzing the uncertainties and interactions between our own wide range of choices and the moves open to the Soviets. On our side we must consider an enormous variety of strategic weapons which might compose our force, and for each of these several alternative methods of basing and operation. These are the choices that determine whether a weapons system will have any genuine capability in the realistic circumstances of a war. Besides the B-47E and the B-52 bombers which are in the United States strategic force now, alternatives will include the B-52G (a longer-range version of the B-52); the Mach 2 B-58A bomber and a "growth" version of it; the Mach 3 B-70 bomber; a nuclear-powered bomber possibly carrying long-range air-to-surface missiles; the Dynasoar, a manned glide-rocket; the Thor and the Jupiter, liquid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missiles; the Snark intercontinental cruise missile; the Atlas and the Titan intercontinental ballistic missiles; the submarine-launched Polaris and Atlantis rockets; and Minuteman, one potential solid-fueled successor to the Thor and Titan; possibly unmanned bombardment satellites; and many others which are not yet gleams in anyone's eye and some that are just that.

The difficulty of describing in a brief article the best mixture of weapons for the long-term future beginning in 1960, their base requirements, their potentiality for stabilizing or upsetting the balance among the great powers, and their implications for the alliance, is not just a matter of space or the constraint of security. The difficulty in fact stems from some rather basic insecurities. These matters are wildly uncertain; we are talking about weapons and vehicles that are some time off and, even if the precise performances currently hoped for and claimed by contractors were in the public domain, it would be a good idea to doubt them.

Recently some of my colleagues picked their way through the graveyard of early claims about various missiles and aircraft: their dates of availability, costs and performance. These claims are seldom revisited or talked about: *de mortuis nil nisi bonum.* The errors were large and almost always in one direction. And the less we knew, the more hopeful we were. Accordingly the missiles

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benefited in particular. For example, the estimated cost of one missile increased by a factor of over 50—from about $35,000 in 1949 to some $2 million in 1957. This uncertainty is critical. Some but not all of the systems listed can be chosen and the problem of choice is essentially quantitative. The complexities of the problem, if they were more widely understood, would discourage the oracular confidence of writers on the subject of deterrence.

Some of the complexities can be suggested by referring to the successive obstacles to be hurdled by any system providing a capability to strike second, that is, to strike back. Such deterrent systems must have (a) a stable, "steady-state" peacetime operation within feasible budgets (besides the logistic and operational costs there are, for example, problems of false alarms and accidents). They must have also the ability (b) to survive enemy attacks, (c) to make and communicate the decision to retaliate, (d) to reach enemy territory with fuel enough to complete their mission, (e) to penetrate enemy active defenses, that is, fighters and surface-to-air missiles, and (f) to destroy the target in spite of any "passive" civil defense in the form of dispersal or protective construction or evacuation of the target itself.

Within limits the enemy is free to use his offensive and defensive forces so as to exploit the weaknesses of each of our systems. He will also be free, within limits, in the 1960s to choose that composition of forces which will make life as difficult as possible for the various systems we might select. It would be quite wrong to assume that we have the same degree of flexibility or that the uncertainties I have described affect a totalitarian aggressor and the party attacked equally. A totalitarian country can preserve secrecy about the capabilities and disposition of his forces very much better than a Western democracy. And the aggressor has, among other enormous advantages of the first strike, the ability to weigh continually our performance at each of the six barriers and to choose that precise time and circumstance for attack which will reduce uncertainty. It is important not to confuse our uncertainty with his. Strangely enough, some military commentators have not made this distinction and have founded their certainty of deterrence on the fact simply that there are uncertainties.

Unwarranted optimism is displayed not only in the writings of journalists but in the more analytic writings of professionals. The recent writings of General Gallois[6] parallel rather closely

[6] General Pierre M. Gallois, "A French General Analyzes Nuclear-Age Strategy," *Réalités*, Nov. 1958, p. 19; "Nuclear Aggression and National Suicide," *The Reporter*, Sept. 18, 1958, p. 23.

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Mr. Alsop's faulty numerical proof that surprise attack is astronomically difficult—except that Gallois' "simple arithmetic," to borrow his own phrase, turns essentially on some assumptions which are at once inexplicit and extremely optimistic with respect to the blast resistance of dispersed missile sites subjected to attack from relatively close range.[7] Mr. Blackett's recent book, "Atomic Weapons and East-West Relations," illustrates the hazards confronting a most able analyst in dealing with the piecemeal information available to the general public. Mr. Blackett, a Nobel prize-winning physicist with wartime experience in military operations research, lucidly summarized the public information available when he was writing in 1956 on weapons for all-out war. But much of his analysis was based on the assumption that H-bombs could not be made small enough to be carried in an intercontinental missile. It is now widely known that intercontinental ballistic missiles will have hydrogen warheads, and this fact, a secret at the time, invalidates Mr. Blackett's calculations and, I might say, much of his optimism on the stability of the balance of terror. In sum, one of the serious obstacles to any widespread rational judgment on these matters of high policy is that critical elements of the problem *have* to be protected by secrecy. However, some of the principal conclusions about deterrence in the early 1960s can be fairly firmly based, and based on public information.

IV. THE DELICACY OF THE BALANCE OF TERROR

The most important conclusion is that we must expect a vast increase in the weight of attack which the Soviets can deliver with little warning, and the growth of a significant Russian capability for an essentially warningless attack. As a result, strategic deterrence, while feasible, will be extremely difficult to achieve, and at critical junctures in the 1960s, we may not have the power to deter attack. Whether we have it or not will depend on some difficult strategic choices as to the future composition of the deterrent forces as well as hard choices on its basing, operations and defense.

Manned bombers will continue to make up the predominant part of our striking force in the early 1960s. None of the popular remedies for their defense will suffice—not, for example, mere increase of alertness (which will be offset by the Soviet's increasing capability for attack without significant warning), nor simple

[7] See footnote, p. 228.

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dispersal or sheltering alone or mobility taken by itself, nor a mere piling up of interceptors and defense missiles around SAC bases. Especially extravagant expectations have been placed on the airborne alert—an extreme form of defense by mobility. The impression is rather widespread that one-third of the SAC bombers are in the air and ready for combat at all times.[8] This belief is belied by the public record. According to the Symington Committee Hearings in 1956, our bombers averaged 31 hours of flying per month, which is about 4 percent of the average 732-hour month. An Air Force representative expressed the hope that within a couple of years, with an increase in the ratio of crews to aircraft, the bombers would reach 45 hours of flight per month—which is 6 percent. This 4 to 6 percent of the force includes bombers partially fueled and without bombs. It is, moreover, only an average, admitting variance down as well as up. Some increase in the number of armed bombers aloft is to be expected. However, for the current generation of bombers, which have been designed for speed and range rather than endurance, a continuous air patrol for one-third of the force would be extremely expensive.

On the other hand, it would be unwise to look for miracles in the new weapons systems, which by the mid-1960s may constitute a considerable portion of the United States force. After the Thor, Atlas and Titan there are a number of promising developments. The solid-fueled rockets, Minuteman and Polaris, promise in particular to be extremely significant components of the deterrent force. Today they are being touted as making the problem of deterrence easy to solve and, in fact, guaranteeing its solution. But none of the new developments in vehicles is likely to do that. For the complex job of deterrence, they all have limitations. The unvaryingly immoderate claims for each new weapons system should make us wary of the latest "technological breakthroughs." Only a very short time ago the ballistic missile itself was supposed to be intrinsically invulnerable on the ground. It is now more generally understood that its survival is likely to depend on a variety of choices in its defense.

It is hard to talk with confidence about the mid and late-1960s. A systematic study of an optimal or a good deterrent force which considered all the major factors affecting choice and dealt ade-

[8] See, for example, "NATO, A Critical Appraisal," by Gardner Patterson and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., Princeton University Conference on NATO, Princeton, June 1957, p. 32: "Although no one pretended to know, the hypothesis that one-third of the striking force of the United States Strategic Air Command was in the air at all times was regarded by most as reasonable."

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quately with the uncertainties would be a formidable task. In lieu of this, I shall mention briefly why none of the many systems available or projected dominates the others in any obvious way. My comments will take the form of a swift run-through of the characteristic advantages and disadvantages of various strategic systems at each of the six successive hurdles mentioned earlier.

The first hurdle to be surmounted is the attainment of a stable, steady-state peacetime operation. Systems which depend for their survival on extreme decentralization of controls, as may be the case with large-scale dispersal and some of the mobile weapons, raise problems of accidents and over a long period of peacetime operation this leads in turn to serious political problems. Systems relying on extensive movement by land, perhaps by truck caravan, are an obvious example; the introduction of these on European roads, as is sometimes suggested, would raise grave questions for the governments of some of our allies. Any extensive increase in the armed air alert will increase the hazard of accident and intensify the concern already expressed among our allies. Some of the proposals for bombardment satellites may involve such hazards of unintended bomb release as to make them out of the question.

The cost to buy and operate various weapons systems must be seriously considered. Some systems buy their ability to negotiate a given hurdle—say, surviving the enemy attack—only at prohibitive cost. Then the number that can be bought out of a given budget will be small and this will affect the relative performance of competing systems at various other hurdles, for example penetrating enemy defenses. Some of the relevant cost comparisons, then, are between competing systems; others concern the extra costs to the enemy of canceling an additional expenditure of our own. For example, some dispersal is essential, though usually it is expensive; if the dispersed bases are within a warning net, dispersal can help to provide warning against some sorts of attack, since it forces the attacker to increase the size of his raid and so makes it more liable to detection as well as somewhat harder to coördinate. But as the sole or principal defense of our offensive force, dispersal has only a brief useful life and can be justified financially only up to a point. For against our costs of construction, maintenance and operation of an additional base must be set the enemy's much lower costs of delivering one extra weapon. And, in general, any feasible degree of dispersal leaves a consider-

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able concentration of value at a single target point. For example, a squadron of heavy bombers costing, with their associated tankers and penetration aids, perhaps $500,000,000 over five years, might be eliminated, if it were otherwise unprotected, by an enemy intercontinental ballistic missile costing perhaps $16,000,000. After making allowance for the unreliability and inaccuracy of the missile, this means a ratio of some ten for one or better. To achieve safety by *brute* numbers in so unfavorable a competition is not likely to be viable economically or politically. However, a viable peacetime operation is only the first hurdle to be surmounted.

At the second hurdle—surviving the enemy offense—ground alert systems placed deep within a warning net look good against a manned bomber attack, much less good against intercontinental ballistic missiles, and not good at all against ballistic missiles launched from the sea. In the last case, systems such as the Minuteman, which may be sheltered and dispersed as well as alert, would do well. Systems involving launching platforms which are mobile and concealed, such as Polaris submarines, have particular advantage for surviving an enemy offense.

However, there is a third hurdle to be surmounted—namely that of making the decision to retaliate and communicating it. Here, Polaris, the combat air patrol of B-52s, and in fact all of the mobile platforms—under water, on the surface, in the air and above the air—have severe problems. Long distance communication may be jammed and, most important, communication centers may be destroyed.

At the fourth hurdle—ability to reach enemy territory with fuel enough to complete the mission—several of our short-legged systems have operational problems such as coördination with tankers and using bases close to the enemy. For a good many years to come, up to the mid-1960s in fact, this will be a formidable hurdle for the greater part of our deterrent force. The next section of this article deals with this problem at some length.

The fifth hurdle is the aggressor's long-range interceptors and close-in missile defenses. To get past these might require large numbers of planes and missiles. (If the high cost of overcoming an earlier obstacle—using extreme dispersal or airborne alert or the like—limits the number of planes or missiles bought, our capability is likely to be penalized disproportionately here.) Or getting through may involve carrying heavy loads of radar decoys, electronic jammers and other aids to defense penetration. For exam-

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ple, vehicles like Minuteman and Polaris, which were made small to facilitate dispersal or mobility, may suffer here because they can carry fewer penetration aids.

At the final hurdle—destroying the target in spite of the passive defenses that may protect it—low-payload and low-accuracy systems, such as Minuteman and Polaris, may be frustrated by blast-resistant shelters. For example, five half-megaton weapons with an average inaccuracy of two miles might be expected to destroy half the population of a city of 900,000, spread over 40 square miles, provided the inhabitants are without shelters. But if they are provided with shelters capable of resisting over-pressures of 100 pounds per square inch, approximately 60 such weapons would be required; and deep rock shelters might force the total up to over a thousand.

Prizes for a retaliatory capability are not distributed for getting over one of these jumps. A system must get over all six. I hope these illustrations will suggest that assuring ourselves the power to strike back after a massive thermonuclear surprise attack is by no means as automatic as is widely believed.

In counteracting the general optimism as to the ease and, in fact, the inevitability of deterrence, I should like to avoid creating the extreme opposite impression. Deterrence demands hard, continuing, intelligent work, but it can be achieved. The job of deterring rational attack by guaranteeing great damage to an aggressor is, for example, very much less difficult than erecting a nearly airtight defense of cities in the face of full-scale thermonuclear surprise attack. Protecting manned bombers and missiles is much easier because they may be dispersed, sheltered or kept mobile, and they can respond to warning with greater speed. Mixtures of these and other defenses with complementary strengths can preserve a powerful remainder after attack. Obviously not all our bombers and missiles need to survive in order to fulfill their mission. To preserve the majority of our cities intact in the face of surprise attack is immensely more difficult, if not impossible. (This does not mean that the aggressor has the same problem in preserving his cities from retaliation by a poorly-protected, badly-damaged force. And it does not mean that *we* should not do more to limit the extent of the catastrophe to our cities in case deterrence fails. I believe we should.) Deterrence, however, provided we work at it, is feasible, and, what is more, it is a crucial objective of national policy.

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What can be said, then, as to whether general war is unlikely? Would not a general thermonuclear war mean "extinction" for the aggressor as well as the defender? "Extinction" is a state that badly needs analysis. Russian casualties in World War II were more than 20,000,000. Yet Russia recovered extremely well from this catastrophe. There are several quite plausible circumstances in the future when the Russians might be quite confident of being able to limit damage to considerably less than this number—if they make sensible strategic choices and we do not. On the other hand, the risks of not striking might at some juncture appear very great to the Soviets, involving, for example, disastrous defeat in peripheral war, loss of key satellites with danger of revolt spreading—possibly to Russia itself—or fear of an attack by ourselves. Then, striking first, by surprise, would be the sensible choice for them, and from their point of view the smaller risk.

It should be clear that it is not fruitful to talk about the likelihood of general war without specifying the range of alternatives that are pressing on the aggressor and the strategic postures of both the Soviet bloc and the West. Deterrence is a matter of comparative risks. The balance is not automatic. First, since thermonuclear weapons give an enormous advantage to the aggressor, it takes great ingenuity and realism at any given level of nuclear technology to devise a stable equilibrium. And second, this technology itself is changing with fantastic speed. Deterrence will require an urgent and continuing effort.

V. THE USES AND RISKS OF BASES CLOSE TO THE SOVIETS

It may now be useful to focus attention on the special problems of deterrent forces close to the Soviet Union. First, overseas areas have played an important rôle in the past and have a continuing though less certain rôle today. Second, the recent acceleration of production of intermediate-range ballistic missiles and the negotiation of agreements with various NATO powers for their basing and operation have given our overseas bases a renewed importance in deterring attack on the United States—or so it would appear at first blush. Third, an analysis can throw some light on the problems faced by our allies in developing an independent ability to deter all-out attack on themselves, and in this way it can clarify the much agitated question of nuclear sharing. Finally, overseas bases affect in many critical ways, political and economic as well as military, the status of the alliance.

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At the end of the last decade, overseas bases appeared to be an advantageous means of achieving the radius extension needed by our short-legged bombers, of permitting them to use several axes of attack, and of increasing the number of sorties possible in the course of an extended campaign. With the growth of our own thermonuclear stockpile, it became apparent that a long campaign involving many re-uses of a large proportion of our bombers was not likely to be necessary. With the growth of a Russian nuclear-delivery capability, it became clear that this was most unlikely to be feasible.

Our overseas bases now have the disadvantage of high vulnerability. Because they are closer than the United States to the Soviet Union, they are subject to a vastly greater attack by a larger variety as well as number of vehicles. With given resources, the Soviets might deliver on nearby bases a freight of bombs with something like 50 to 100 times the yield that they could muster at intercontinental range. Missile accuracy would more than double. Because there is not much space for obtaining warning—in any case, there are no deep-warning radar nets—and, since most of our overseas bases are close to deep water from which submarines might launch missiles, the warning problem is very much more severe than for bases in the interior of the United States.

As a result, early in the 1950s the U.S. Air Force decided to recall many of our bombers to the continental United States and to use the overseas bases chiefly for refueling, particularly post-strike ground refueling. This reduced drastically the vulnerability of U.S. bombers and at the same time retained many of the advantages of overseas operation. For some years now SAC has been reducing the number of aircraft usually deployed overseas. The purpose is to reduce vulnerability and has little to do with any increasing radius of SAC aircraft. The early B-52 radius is roughly that of the B-36; the B-47, roughly that of the B-50 or B-29. In fact the radius limitation and therefore the basing requirements we have discussed will not change substantially for some time to come. We can talk with comparative confidence here, because the U.S. strategic force is itself largely determined for this period. Such a force changes more slowly than is generally realized. The vast majority of the force will consist of manned bombers, and most of these will be of medium range. *Some* U.S. bombers will be able to reach *some* targets from *some* U.S. bases

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within the 48 states without landing on the way back. On the other hand, some bomber-target combinations are not feasible without pre-target landing (and are therefore doubtful). The Atlas, Titan and Polaris rockets, when available, can of course do without overseas bases (though the proportion of Polaris submarines kept at sea can be made larger by the use of submarine tenders based overseas). But even with the projected force of aerial tankers, the greater part of our force, which will be manned bombers, cannot be used at all in attacks on the Soviet Union without at least some use of overseas areas.

What of the bases for Thor and Jupiter, our first intermediate-range ballistic missiles? These have to be close to the enemy, and they must of course be operating bases, not merely refueling stations. The Thors and Jupiters will be continuously in range of an enormous Soviet potential for surprise attack. These installations therefore re-open, in a most acute form, some of the serious questions of ground vulnerability that were raised about six years ago in connection with our overseas bomber bases. The decision to station the Thor and Jupiter missiles overseas has been our principal public response to the Russian advances in rocketry, and perhaps our most plausible response. Because it involves our ballistic missiles it appears directly to answer the Russian rockets. Because it involves using European bases, it appears to make up for the range superiority of the Russian intercontinental missile. And most important, it directly involves the NATO powers and gives them an element of control.

There is no question that it was genuinely urgent not only to meet the Russian threat but to do so visibly, in order to save the loosening NATO alliance. Our allies were fearful that the Soviet ballistic missiles might mean that we were no longer able or willing to retaliate against the Soviet Union in case of an attack on them. We hastened to make public a reaction which would restore their confidence. This move surely appears to increase our own power to strike back, and also to give our allies a deterrent of their own, independent of our decision. It has also been argued that in this respect it merely advances the inevitable date at which our allies will acquire "modern" weapons of their own, and that it widens the range of Soviet challenges which Europe can meet. But we must face seriously the question whether this move will in fact assure either the ability to retaliate or the decision to attempt it, on the part of our allies or ourselves. And we should ask at the

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very least whether further expansion of this policy will buy as much retaliatory power as other ways of spending the considerable sums involved. Finally, it is important to be clear whether the Thor and Jupiter actually increase the flexibility or range of response available to our allies.

One justification for this move is that it disperses retaliatory weapons and that this is the most effective sanction against the thermonuclear aggressor. The limitations of dispersal have already been discussed, but it remains to examine the argument that overseas bases provide *widespread* dispersal, which imposes on the aggressor insoluble problems of coördination.

There is of course something in the notion that forcing the enemy to attack many political entities increases the seriousness of his decision, but there is very little in the notion that dispersal in several countries makes the problem of destruction more difficult in the military sense. Dispersal does not require separation by the distance of oceans—just by the lethal diameters of enemy bombs. And the task of coördinating bomber attacks on Europe and the eastern coast of the United States, say, is not appreciably more difficult than coördinating attacks on our east and west coasts. In the case of ballistic missiles, the elapsed time from firing to impact on the target can be calculated with high accuracy. Although there will be some failures and delays, times of firing can be arranged so that impact on many dispersed points is almost simultaneous—on Okinawa and the United Kingdom, for instance, as well as on California and Ohio. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that these far-flung bases, while distant from each other and from the United States, are on the whole close to the enemy. To eliminate them, therefore, requires a smaller expenditure of resources on his part than targets at intercontinental range. For close-in targets he can use a wider variety of weapons carrying larger payloads and with higher accuracy.

The seeming appositeness of an overseas-based Thor and Jupiter as an answer to a Russian intercontinental ballistic missile stems not so much from any careful analysis of their retaliatory power under attack as from the directness of the comparison they suggest: a rocket equals a rocket, an intercontinental missile equals an intermediate-range missile based at closer range to the target. But this again mistakes the nature of the technological race. It conceives the problem of deterrence as that of simply matching or exceeding the aggressor's capability to strike first.

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A surprising proportion of the debate on defense policy has betrayed this confusion. Matching technological developments are useful for prestige, and such demonstrations have a vital function in preserving the alliance and in reassuring the neutral powers. But propaganda is not enough. The only reasonably certain way of maintaining a reputation for strength is to display an actual power to our friends as well as our enemies. We should ask, then, whether further expansion of the current programs for basing Thor and Jupiter is an efficient way to increase American retaliatory power. If overseas bases are considered too vulnerable for manned bombers, will not the same be true for missiles?

The basis for the hopeful impression that they will not is rather vague, including a mixture of hypothetical properties of ballistic missiles in which perhaps the dominant element is their supposedly much more rapid, "push-button" response. What needs to be considered here are the response time of such missiles (including decision, preparation and launch times), and how they are to be defended.

The decision to fire a missile with a thermonuclear warhead is much harder to make than a decision simply to start a manned aircraft on its way, with orders to return to base unless instructed to continue to its assigned target. This is the "fail-safe" procedure practised by the U.S. Air Force. In contrast, once a missile is launched, there is no method of recall or deflection which is not subject to risks of electronic or mechanical failure. Therefore such a decision must wait for much more unambiguous evidence of enemy intentions. It must and will take a longer time to make and is less likely to be made at all. Where more than one country is involved, the joint decision is harder still, since there is opportunity to disagree about the ambiguity of the evidence, as well as to reach quite different interpretations of national interest. On much less momentous matters the process of making decisions in NATO is complicated, and it should be recognized that such complexity has much to do with the genuine concern of the various NATO powers about the danger of accidentally starting World War III. Such fears will not be diminished with the advent of I.R.B.M.s. In fact, widespread dispersion of nuclear armed missiles raises measurably the possibility of accidental war.

Second, it is quite erroneous to suppose that by contrast with manned bombers the first I.R.B.M.s can be launched almost as simply as pressing a button. Count-down procedures for early

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missiles are liable to interruption, and the characteristics of the liquid oxygen fuel limits the readiness of their response. Unlike JP-4, the fuel used in jet bombers, liquid oxygen cannot be held for long periods of time in these vehicles. In this respect such missiles will be *less* ready than alert bombers. Third, the smaller warning time available overseas makes more difficult any response. This includes, in particular, any active defense, not only against ballistic missile attacks but, for example, against low altitude or various circuitous attacks by manned aircraft.

Finally, passive defense by means of shelter is more difficult, given the larger bomb yields, better accuracies and larger forces available to the Russians at such close range. And if the press reports are correct, the plans for I.R.B.M. installations do not call for bomb-resistant shelters. If this is so, it should be taken into account in measuring the actual contribution of these installations to the West's retaliatory power. Viewed as a contribution to deterring all-out attack on the United States, the Thor and Jupiter bases seem unlikely to compare favorably with other alternatives. If newspaper references to hard bargaining by some of our future hosts are to be believed, it would seem that such negotiations have been conducted under misapprehensions on both sides as to the benefits to the United States.

But many proponents of the distribution of Thor and Jupiter—and possibly some of our allies—have in mind not an increase in U.S. deterrence but the development of an independent capability in several of the NATO countries to deter all-out attack against themselves. This would be a useful thing if it can be managed at supportable cost and if it does not entail the sacrifice of even more critical measures of protection. But aside from the special problems of joint control, which would affect the certainty of response adversely, precisely who their legal owner is will not affect the retaliatory power of the Thors and Jupiters one way or the other. They would not be able to deter an attack which they could not survive. It is curious that many who question the utility of American overseas bases (for example, our bomber bases in the United Kingdom) simply assume that, for our allies, possession of strategic nuclear weapons is one with deterrence.

There remains the view that the provision of these weapons will broaden the range of response open to our allies. In so far as this view rests on the belief that the intermediate-range ballistic missile is adapted to limited war, it is wide of the mark. The inac-

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curacy of an I.R.B.M. requires high-yield warheads, and such a combination of inaccuracy and high yield, while quite appropriate and adequate against unprotected targets in a general war, would scarcely come within even the most lax, in fact reckless, definition of limited war. Such a weapon is inappropriate for even the nuclear variety of limited war, and it is totally useless for meeting the wide variety of provocation that is well below the threshold of nuclear response. In so far as these missiles will be costly for our allies to install, operate and support, they are likely to displace a conventional capability that might be genuinely useful in limited engagements. More important, they are likely to be used as an excuse for budget cutting. In this way they will accelerate the general trend toward dependence on all-out response and so will have the opposite effect to the one claimed.

Nevertheless, if the Thor and Jupiter have these defects, might not some future weapon be free of them? Some of these defects, of course, will be overcome in time. Solid fuels or storable liquids will eventually replace liquid oxygen, reliabilities will increase, various forms of mobility or portability will become feasible, accuracies may even be so improved that such weapons can be used in limited wars. But these developments are all years away. In consequence, the discussion will be advanced if a little more precision is given such terms as "missiles" or "modern" or "advanced weapons." We are not distributing a generic "modern" weapon with all the virtues of flexibility in varying circumstances and of invulnerability in all-out war. But even with advances in the state of the art on our side, it will remain difficult to maintain a deterrent, especially close in under the enemy's guns.

It follows that, though a wider distribution of nuclear weapons may be inevitable, or at any rate likely, and though some countries in addition to the Soviet Union and the United States may even develop an independent deterrent, it is by no means inevitable or even very likely that the power to deter all-out thermonuclear attack will be widespread. This is true even though a minor power would not need to guarantee as large a retaliation as we in order to deter attack on itself. Unfortunately, the minor powers have smaller resources as well as poorer strategic locations.[9] Mere membership in the nuclear club might carry with it

[9] General Gallois argues that, while alliances will offer no guarantee, "a small number of bombs and a small number of carriers suffice for a threatened power to protect itself against atomic destruction." (*Réalités, op. cit.*, p. 71.) His numerical illustrations give the defender

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prestige, as the applicants and nominees expect, but it will be rather expensive, and in time it will be clear that it does not necessarily confer any of the expected privileges enjoyed by the two charter members. The burden of deterring a general war as distinct from limited wars is still likely to be on the United States and therefore, so far as our allies are concerned, on the military alliance.

There is one final consideration. Missiles placed near the enemy, even if they could not retaliate, would have a potent capability for striking first by surprise. And it might not be easy for the enemy to discern their purpose. The existence of such a force might be a considerable provocation and in fact a dangerous one in the sense that it would place a great burden on our deterrent force which more than ever would have to guarantee extreme risks to the attacker—worse than the risks of waiting in the face of this danger. When not coupled with the ability to strike in retaliation, such a capability might suggest—erroneously, to be sure, in the case of the democracies—an intention to strike first. If so, it would tend to provoke rather than to deter general war.

I have dealt here with only one of the functions of overseas bases: their use as a support for the strategic deterrent force. They have a variety of important military, political and economic rôles which are beyond the scope of this paper. Expenditures in

some 400 underground launching sites (*ibid.*, p. 22, and *The Reporter, op cit.*, p. 25) and suggest that their elimination would require between 5,000 and 25,000 missiles—which is "more or less impossible"—and that in any case the aggressor would not survive the fallout from his own weapons. Whether these are large numbers of targets from the standpoint of the aggressor will depend on the accuracy, yield and reliability of offense weapons as well as the resistance of the defender's shelters and a number of other matters not specified in the argument. General Gallois is aware that the expectation of survival depends on distance even in the ballistic missile age and that our allies are not so fortunate in this respect. Close-in missiles have better bomb yields and accuracies. Moreover, manned aircraft—with still better yields and accuracies—can be used by an aggressor here since warning of their approach is very short. Suffice it to say that the numerical advantage General Gallois cites is greatly exaggerated. Furthermore, he exaggerates the destructiveness of the retaliatory blow against the aggressor's cities by the remnants of the defender's missile force—even assuming the aggressor would take no special measures to protect his cities. But particularly for the aggressor—who does not lack warning—a civil defense program can moderate the damage done by a poorly organized attack. Finally, the suggestion that the aggressor would not survive the fall-out from his own weapons is simply in error. The rapid-decay fission products which are the major lethal problem in the locality of a surface burst are not a serious difficulty for the aggressor. The amount of the slow-decay products, strontium-90 and cesium-137, in the atmosphere would rise considerably. If nothing were done to counter it, this might, for example, increase by many times the incidence of such relatively rare diseases as bone cancer and leukemia. However, such a calamity, implying an increase of, say, 20,000 deaths per year for a nation of 200,000,000, is of an entirely different order from the catastrophe involving tens of millions of deaths, which General Gallois contemplates elsewhere. And there are measures that might reduce even this effect drastically. (See the RAND Corporation Report R-322-RC, *Report on a Study of Non-Military Defense*, July 1, 1958.)

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connection with the construction or operation of our bases, for example, are a form of economic aid and, moreover, a form that is rather palatable to the Congress. There are other functions in a central war where their importance may be very considerable and their usefulness in a limited war might be substantial.

Indeed nothing said here should suggest that deterrence is in itself an adequate strategy. The complementary requirements of a sufficient military policy cannot be discussed in detail here. Certainly they include a more serious development of power to meet limited aggression, especially with more advanced conventional weapons than those now available. They also include more energetic provision for active and passive defenses to limit the dimensions of the catastrophe in case deterrence should fail. For example, an economically feasible shelter program might make the difference between 50,000,000 survivors and 120,000,000 survivors.

But it would be a fatal mistake to suppose that because strategic deterrence is inadequate by itself it can be dispensed with. Deterrence is not dispensable. If the picture of the world I have drawn is rather bleak, it could none the less be cataclysmically worse. Suppose both the United States and the Soviet Union had the power to destroy each others' retaliatory forces and society, given the opportunity to administer the opening blow. The situation would then be something like the old-fashioned Western gun duel. It would be extraordinarily risky for one side *not* to attempt to destroy the other, or to delay doing so, since it not only can emerge unscathed by striking first but this is the sole way it can reasonably hope to emerge at all. Evidently such a situation is extremely unstable. On the other hand, if it is clear that the aggressor too will suffer catastrophic damage in the event of his aggression, he then has strong reason not to attack, even though he can administer great damage. A protected retaliatory capability has a stabilizing influence not only in deterring rational attack, but also in offering every inducement to both powers to reduce the chance of accidental war.

The critics who feel that deterrence is "bankrupt" sometimes say that we stress deterrence too much. I believe this is quite wrong if it means that we are devoting too much effort to protect our power to retaliate; but I think it is quite right if it means that we have talked too much of a strategic threat as a substitute for many things it cannot replace.

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VI. DETERRENCE, ACCIDENTS AND DISARMAMENT

Up to now I have talked mainly about the problem of deterring general war, of making it improbable that an act of war will be undertaken deliberately, with a clear understanding of the consequences, that is, rationally. That such deterrence will not be easy to maintain in the 1960s simply expresses the proposition that a surprise thermonuclear attack might *not* be an irrational or insane act on the part of the aggressor. A deterrent strategy is aimed at a rational enemy. Without a deterrent, general war is likely. With it, however, war might still occur.

In order to reduce the risk of a rational act of aggression, we are being forced to undertake measures (increased alertness, dispersal, mobility) which, to a significant extent, increase the risk of an irrational or unintentional act of war. The accident problem is serious, and it would be a great mistake to dismiss the recent Soviet charges on this subject as simply part of the war of nerves. In a clear sense the great multiplication and spread of nuclear arms throughout the world, the drastic increase in the degree of readiness of these weapons, and the decrease in the time available for the decision on their use must inevitably raise the risk of accident. The B-47 accidents this year at Sidi Slimane and at Florence, S. C., and the recent Nike explosion are just a beginning. Though incidents of this sort are not themselves likely to trigger misunderstanding, they suggest the nature of the problem.

There are many sorts of accidents that could happen. There can be electronic or mechanical failures of the sort illustrated by the B-47 and Nike mishaps; there can be aberrations of individuals, perhaps quite low in the echelon of command; there can be miscalculations on the part of governments as to enemy intent and the meaning of ambiguous signals. Not all deterrent strategies will involve the risk of accident equally. One of the principles of selecting a strategy should be to reduce the chance of accident, wherever we can, without a corresponding increase in vulnerability to a rational surprise attack. This is the purpose of the "fail-safe" procedures for launching SAC.

These problems are also relevant to the disarmament question. The Russians, exploiting an inaccurate United Press report which suggested that SAC started en masse toward Russia in response to frequent radar "ghosts," cried out against these supposed Arctic flights. The United States response, and its sequels, stated

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correctly that such flights had never been undertaken except in planned exercises and would not be undertaken in response to such unreliable warning. We pointed out the importance of quick response and a high degree of readiness in the protection of the deterrent force. The nature of the fail-safe precaution was also described.

We added, however, to cap the argument, that if the Russians were really worried about surprise attack they would accept the President's "open skies" proposal. This addition, however, conceals an absurdity. Aerial photography would have its uses in a disarmament plan—for example, to check an exchange of information on the location of ground bases. However, so far as surprise is concerned, an "open skies" plan would have direct use only to discover attacks requiring much more lengthy, visible and unambiguous preparations than are likely today.[10] The very readiness of our own strategic force suggests a state of technology which outmodes the "open skies" plan as a counter to surprise attack. Not even the most advanced reconnaissance equipment can disclose an intention from 40,000 feet. Who can say what the men in the blockhouse of an I.C.B.M. base have in mind? Or, for that matter, what is the final destination of training flights or fail-safe flights starting over the Pacific or North Atlantic from staging areas?

The actions that need to be taken on our own to deter attack might usefully be complemented by bilateral agreements for inspection and reporting and, possibly, limitation of arms and of methods of operating strategic and naval air forces. But the protection of our retaliatory power remains essential; and the better the protection, the smaller the burden placed on the agreement to limit arms and modes of operation and to make them subject to inspection. Reliance on "open skies" alone to prevent surprise would invite catastrophe and the loss of power to retaliate. Such a plan is worthless for discovering a well prepared attack with I.C.B.M.s or submarine-launched missiles or a routine mass training flight whose destination could be kept ambiguous. A tremendous weight of weapons could be delivered in spite of it.

Although it is quite hopeless to look for an inspection scheme which would permit abandonment of the deterrent, this does not

[10] Aerial reconnaissance, of course, could have an *indirect* utility here for surveying large areas to determine the number and location of observation posts needed to provide more timely warning.

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mean that some partial agreement on inspection and limitation might not help to reduce the chance of any sizable surprise attack. We should explore the possibilities of agreements involving limitation and inspection. But how we go about this will be conditioned by our appreciation of the problem of deterrence itself.

The critics of current policy who perceive the inadequacy of the strategy of deterrence are prominent among those urging disarmament negotiations, an end to the arms race and a reduction of tension. This is a paramount interest of some of our allies. The balance of terror theory is the basis for some of the more light-hearted suggestions: if deterrence is automatic, strategic weapons on one side cancel those of the other, and it should be easy for both sides to give them up. So James E. King, Jr., one of the most sensible writers on the subject of limited war, suggests that weapons needed for "unlimited" war are those which both sides can most easily agree to abolish, simply because "neither side can anticipate anything but disaster" from their use. "Isn't there enough stability in the 'balance of terror,'" he asks, "to justify our believing that the Russians can be trusted—within acceptable limits—to abandon the weapons whose 'utility is confined to the threat or conduct of a war of annihilation'?"[11]

Indeed, if there were no real danger of a rational attack, then accidents and the "*n*th" country problem would be the only problems. As I have indicated, they are serious problems and some sorts of limitation and inspection agreement might diminish them. But if there is to be any prospect of realistic and useful agreement, we must reject the theory of automatic deterrence. And we must bear in mind that the more extensive a disarmament agreement is, the smaller the force that a violator would have to hide in order to achieve complete domination. Most obviously, "*the abolition* of the weapons necessary in a general or 'unlimited' war" would offer the most insuperable obstacles to an inspection plan, since the violator could gain an overwhelming advantage from the concealment of even a few weapons. The need for a deterrent, in this connection too, is ineradicable.

VII. SUMMARY

Almost everyone seems concerned with the need to relax tension. However, relaxation of tension, which everyone thinks is

[11] James E. King, Jr., "Arms and Man in the Nuclear-Rocket Era," *The New Republic*, September 1, 1958.

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good, is not easily distinguished from relaxing one's guard, which almost everyone thinks is bad. Relaxation, like Miltown, is not an end in itself. Not all danger comes from tension. To be tense where there is danger is only rational.

What can we say then, in sum, on the balance of terror theory of automatic deterrence? It is a contribution to the rhetoric rather than the logic of war in the thermonuclear age. The notion that a carefully planned surprise attack can be checkmated almost effortlessly, that, in short, we may resume our deep pre-sputnik sleep, is wrong and its nearly universal acceptance is terribly dangerous. Though deterrence is not enough in itself, it is vital. There are two principal points.

First, deterring general war in both the early and late 1960s will be hard at best, and hardest both for ourselves and our allies wherever we use forces based near the enemy.

Second, even if we can deter general war by a strenuous and continuing effort, this will by no means be the whole of a military, much less a foreign policy. Such a policy would not of itself remove the danger of accidental outbreak or limit the damage in case deterrence failed; nor would it be at all adequate for crises on the periphery.

A generally useful way of concluding a grim argument of this kind would be to affirm that we have the resources, intelligence and courage to make the correct decisions. That is, of course, the case. And there is a good chance that we will do so. But perhaps, as a small aid toward making such decisions more likely, we should contemplate the possibility that they may *not* be made. They *are* hard, *do* involve sacrifice, *are* affected by great uncertainties and concern matters in which much is altogether unknown and much else must be hedged by secrecy; and, above all, they entail a new image of ourselves in a world of persistent danger. It is by no means *certain* that we shall meet the test.

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THREE GENERATIONS OF THE SOVIET INTELLIGENTSIA

By Leopold H. Haimson

AFTER 40 years of Communist rule the Soviet intelligentsia is still far from homogeneous. Each generation has been subject to quite different influences as gradually the vision of an unrealized revolutionary Utopia has been transformed —partly into a set of ritualistic utterances and practices, partly into stabilized institutions. There have been changes, too, in the intelligentsia's relationship to authority, as the still relatively free and even anti-authoritarian intellectual climate of the early and middle 1920s was replaced little by little by the rigidly orthodox intellectual atmosphere and ubiquitous controls of the Stalin era. There also have been changes in the social composition and in the sense of social identity of the intelligentsia, which reflected in turn the great social overturns and dislocations of the late 1920s and early 1930s and the subsequent stabilization of Soviet society. And, last but not least, there have been changes of emphasis in the intelligentsia's intellectual pursuits and concerns, following the "Second Socialist Offensive," with the emergence, full grown, of a society oriented toward science and technology. Each of these processes and patterns of change has left its mark in differing degree on the different generations of the present Soviet intelligentsia.

A visitor to Russia today quickly draws the impression that there are gaping chasms—which almost no continuities or points of contact seem to bridge—between major age groups in the intelligentsia. Three major groups stand out: the generation that had already reached intellectual maturity before the Bolshevik seizure of power, or at least before the imposition in the 1930s of totalitarian controls over Soviet intellectual life; the middle generation, including those between, say, the ages of 35 and 50, who spent almost all their adult life stifling under what has come to be called "the cult of personality;" and finally the group of young men and women who, while largely educated under Stalin, have begun to make their presence felt on the Soviet intellectual scene only under the more clement and chaotic conditions of the post-Stalin "thaw."

The survivors of the pre-revolutionary generation of the intelli-

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gentsia are now few in number. Yet one is struck by their extraordinary prominence and influence on the intellectual and particularly the academic scene. One finds these aging symbols of the past—complete down to their redingotes, pinces-nez and small Vandyke beards—still occupying the major chairs in Russian universities. One finds them still editing the major works published by the Academy of Sciences and still scurrying, with a busy and proprietary air, about the halls and offices of its various institutes; occasionally one even finds them, in their studios or salons, eagerly presiding over gatherings of young adepts of literature and the arts.

How do these men seem to be faring after four decades of war, revolution, penury and terror? They seem much older, of course, more frayed and more fragile, but at the core remarkably unchanged. Through these years of continuous pressure and stress most of them have managed somehow to hold onto the basic interests, values and personal style of life that they originally carved out for themselves, and even their energy, their zest for existence, seems unimpaired. While talking with these aging figures one sometimes feels as if one were resuming a conversation, interrupted for 30 or 40 years, exactly at the point where one had left it: the names of the same authors, the titles of the same books are cited; the same intellectual and aesthetic standards, the same basic likes and dislikes are expressed.

All this is not to imply that these men have maintained an active or even a passive hostility toward the Soviet régime. Quite the contrary, most of them seem to have made their peace with it, if only by burying themselves in the confines of their professional work. Indeed, at critical moments when the world threatened to engulf them, many made the pragmatic, crass compromise of writing books or delivering lectures in which they believed not one word. And even now, basking in the measure of recognition that the post-Stalin era has brought them, they generally display wily circumspection. Yet it is worthy of emphasis how slight an impress the events of the past 40 years seem to have made on them. Though the régime did largely succeed in controlling the nature of their writings and public utterances, there apparently were many (particularly among the litterateurs) who continued even at the height of the Stalin era to seek their own truths; and while their thoughts could not usually be published, they often received wide circulation in manuscript form. (To this day, some

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of the poems most popular in certain intellectual circles have never appeared in print.)

I vividly recall the passing comment of a prominent literary historian of this older generation as we were browsing in a book store. Pointing to the more recent volumes in a series that he himself had edited, he explained to me, with complete aplomb, and in impeccable if somewhat dated French slang: "These particular volumes still smell, I'm afraid—they appeared a little too early." I remember another conversation, about Russian historiography, with a formidable-looking old scholar, the author of monumental works on the early history of Russia. At the end of this talk, during which he had cited only standard pre-Soviet works on the subject, he observed, in the most casual manner: "It is a pity that Miliukov never finished his book on Russian historical thought; nothing to make up for it has been published in recent years." The fact that Miliukov, a prominent leader of the liberal Kadet party and the first foreign minister of the Provisional Government in 1917, has been denounced for many years as an arch reactionary had not apparently entered his mind. And finally I recall a talk with an aged and sickly writer, a Jew who had suffered much at the hands of the régime during the last years of Stalin's life. Despite all his disappointments, this ailing old man, brushing aside my own expressions of skepticism, valiantly strove to infuse me with his rosy, nineteenth-century faith in the inherent goodness of the Russian people and in the vast promise of modern scientific progress.

The sources of the inner resilience, security and assurance that the members of this generation commonly display appear to have been drawn largely from the traditions and style of life of the past, with manifestations as varied as their own pre-revolutionary or pre-Stalinist experiences. Those who spent some of their student years in Western Europe have kept the thoughts and values—even the speech and mannerisms—of the universal European culture. Others have sunk their roots deep in the history and culture of the Russian past, and have found there a secure basis for their own identity. Others still have somehow kept intact—despite the post-revolutionary experience—the touching cult of the People, the innocent Golden Populist credo of the old leftist intelligentsia. It might perhaps be said that for many of these men life came to a standstill 30 or 40 years ago, but that the experiences of those earlier times still uphold and nourish them.

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II

The contrast between these old men of the Russian intelligentsia and those who immediately followed in their footsteps is of dramatic and tragic proportions. If the survivors of the old generation impress one with their continued preëminence, the members of the second generation, who spent all of their adult lives under Stalin's rule, are striking for their lack of real vigor and influence on the contemporary scene. What has happened to this middle generation which usually exercises so prominent a rôle in a country's intellectual life?

To a degree, the impression that it is largely absent from the stage is literally true; for this, we must recall, is the generation that was most nakedly exposed to, and most heavily decimated by, the great purges of the 1930s, the carnage of the war years and the obscurantist reaction of the postwar period. Yet physical bloodletting provides only part of the explanation.

These survivors are not all of a type. Some have the somewhat abrupt and "businesslike" manner, the rigidity in personal intercourse, the broad, squarish physical features characteristic of the "new" intelligentsia largely recruited from the ranks during the great social overturns of the 1920s and early 1930s. Others seem to reflect in speech and mannerisms their upbringing by the old intelligentsia. Many are found in positions of bureaucratic or official responsibility; they are administrators in universities and institutes, Party hacks of the press, literature and the arts. But some have also survived among the scholars and artists who were compelled to carry on their work somehow under the vigilant eyes of the official keepers of orthodoxy.

The differences between the eldest generation of the intelligentsia and their own immediate descendants, particularly in the fields of literature and the arts, are largely of an emotional rather than an intellectual character. In contrast to the impression of vigor and zest conveyed by most of the old men, many of their "children" appear to be facing the future with a feeling of futility and hopelessness. Indicative of their general mood is the answer I received from a quite successful middle-aged dramatist—a pupil of Vakhtangov, and thus one of the few prominent survivors of the golden age of the Soviet experimental theatre—when I asked what one might expect of the still younger (the third) generation of the intelligentsia. "Nothing," was his reply, "nothing at all.

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The young people don't really want anything. They just want to construct little boxes. Art is dead; it will be hard, very hard to resurrect it."

This aura of futility and defeat continues to be evoked despite the fissures in official orthodoxy that have appeared since Stalin's death—the hesitant, limited, almost intangible sense of movement that then began to permeate certain spheres of Soviet intellectual life. Why this deep-seated pessimism? It might be argued (particularly in the light of the official reaction following the Hungarian uprising) that the pessimism has been justified, but this would not be particularly germane, for what needs to be explained is an attitude which is largely confined to the members of this one generation. Perhaps the most relevant fact is that these middle-aged intellectuals have had to spend almost all their lives in a world out of control, a world which subjected many of them to early disillusionment and which compelled them, in order to survive, to make abject submissions or compromises. And, unlike their elders, they have had to make their arid journey without the support of a personal set of values, without even a brief or remote memory of an unsullied past, in short, without the basis for an independent identity that could stand up against their engulfing contemporary environment. Some of them will occasionally refer wistfully in conversation to the intelligentsia's traditional heroes and their works. But they are memories at second hand. These men appear to have come out of the long Stalin night utterly spent, and they look to the future with apprehension, in part, perhaps, because they face it with no inner reserves of energy, faith or self-respect.

It should be noted that intellectuals in this age group who were subjected to administrative exile or imprisonment during the Stalin era—and who, therefore, had little occasion or tendency to compromise—present a striking contrast to those who remained "free." Surviving deportees who have returned since the governmental amnesty appear remarkably unbroken. They seem assured, fearless, not unhopeful, and it is they who provide whatever intellectual leadership this generation is still able to offer.

The smell of defeat does not hang only about those descendants of the old intelligentsia who remained in the main current of Soviet intellectual life throughout the Stalin era. To a lesser degree, signs of uncertainty and disorientation may be discerned among the "new" intelligentsia recruited from lower social strata and

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hastily trained in the late 1920s and early 1930s. When one first sees them sitting behind their big desks or presiding at the head of their long green-felt conference tables these heavy-set cultural bureaucrats look quite formidable, and they display considerable authority as they deliver themselves of the latest platitudes of the Party line. And yet an observer quickly draws the impression, as he watches their dealings with their younger subordinates, that these men are largely going through empty motions, that they have lost much of their confidence in the importance of their positions and the significance of their acts.

What has happened since Stalin's death to upset the confidence and self-esteem of men who have successfully weathered so many crises? No doubt they were somewhat puzzled and embarrassed by the ensuing modest reassertion of traditional cultural values and by the attendant confusion in government policy. To a Western visitor, the manifestations of their plight may be quite comical. I recall a session at one of the Institutes of the Academy of Sciences at which one such "official type" solemnly reproached himself for having failed to pay adequate attention in the past to, of all people, the Russian Idealist philosophers of the nineteenth century.

But the harshest blow that these bureaucrats have had to suffer has been the destruction of their sense of the importance of their rôle in the creation of a new Russian culture. With all their servile conformance to the twists and turns of government policy, with all the personal ruthlessness that most of them displayed in "ideological" and bureaucratic in-fighting, many in this segment of the middle generation were sustained throughout the Stalin era by an ideal which gave them energy and purpose. They viewed themselves during those long years not just as policemen or sycophants, but as agents in the birth and shaping of a new and different culture, in the creation of a new and different intelligentsia that would be as energetic, disciplined and down-to-earth as the old one had seemed to them anarchic and divorced from practical realities.

To understand the naïveté and crudeness of this vision, to account for its survival through the Stalin era, one needs to recall that its keepers entered Russian intellectual life as outsiders, with no backlog of intellectual traditions or experience to guide them. The official ideology and cosmogony provided literally their only intellectual frame of reference; the rôle defined for them by the

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Party provided their only conception of proper activity in the development of Russian culture. Being themselves so much creations as well as agents of the Party in a world utterly divorced from their earlier experience, few of them had occasion to question the Party's objectives or their own mission. But now, after 30 years, this sense of historic destiny has finally been undone, partly as the result of the recent changes in the Party's policies, but mainly, I think, because the culture these men had dreamed of finally came to life and in the chaos of the post-Stalin era began to assert its presence.

What appears to have been most unsettling for these men in the post-Stalin "thaw" has not been so much the Party's vague, hesitant gestures at ideological liberalization—gestures often retracted almost as soon as they were made—but rather its increasing tendency to acknowledge that the achievement of success, even in certain cultural spheres, depended more on practical skill and experience than on the rituals of theory and dogma. It is, after all, precisely in this realm of professional ability that the "new" intelligentsia of the middle generation cannot help but sense its inferiority to the young men and women now beginning to assert their presence.

Indeed, the men of the Stalin era have been partly defeated by the very measure of their success. They are finding the youth, in the main, as rational, purposeful, down-to-earth, devoid of the "fatal" inclination to vast and "frivolous" theoretical flights—in short, as seemingly "useful" and politically safe—as they could have dared to dream. At the same time, these younger men and women are as steeped in certain scientific values and skills, as acclimated to certain intellectual experiences and pursuits, as their forerunners were not. And it is by virtue of these intellectual accomplishments—and limitations—that in many areas of intellectual life they have begun to express the sense of their superiority over the "new" intelligentsia of the Stalin era and to show that they consider its tutelage superfluous.

The sense of conflict and psychological distance that many in the Stalinist intelligentsia have begun to feel in their contacts with the young also reflects the measure of their historic failure. The young who have come to the fore appear to be politically safe. Yet while they may have adopted the general ideological framework and values of their makers, they perceive these as the limits rather than as the center of their world. Observing the in-

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telligentsia of the Stalin era, they must have an attitude of indifference or even repugnance and disdain. Themselves dreamless, or animated by quite different and far more personal dreams, they cannot believe in, or indeed often perceive, the large and impersonal visions that animated their forerunners—their striving and straining for the realization of vast collective endeavors. They can see in them only despotic, "uncultured," obsolescent men, ignorant of the intellectual skills and scientific values in the name of which they purport to speak.

"We still have far too many people who talk about things they don't know anything about," a young Soviet scholar told me within the hearing of an official of his institute who had just delivered a long and windy speech. In the face of such verdicts, the bureaucrats of the Stalin era, and, generally, most of the "new" intelligentsia of the middle generation (whatever the power and authority they still hold), have finally begun to feel their age.

III

The young men and women between 25 and 35 who are now making their way in Soviet intellectual life are truly the children of the Stalin era. All their lives, they have known no other social order, no other ideology, no other vision of man and society, than those which the régime imposed upon them. And yet the gloomy forecasts of an all-pervasive state giving birth to a new race of de-personalized subjects have somehow not come to pass.

This is not to say that the failure of the régime has been unqualified or that the nature of the failure is immediately apparent. Indeed, a Western visitor is likely to draw from his first contacts an impression of almost universal ideological uniformity among the younger generation. There is an appalling kind of sameness about the assumptions they voice, and particularly about the terminology they employ in discussing broad political, social or philosophical questions. Thirty years ago, a significant percentage of the generation then young would have rejected, or at least ignored, official ideological categories; but today those of the same age almost uniformly consider themselves "socialist" in politics and "materialist" in philosophy, believe in the "Marxist" interpretation of history and venerate the "Leninist heritage"—about as unquestioningly as American schoolboys accept a stereotyped image of the American "Revolution."

Only as a visitor's acquaintances become more intimate and

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the conversation turns from generalities and abstractions does he discover that, although members of this generation abide by official ideology and use approved terminology, these are not reliable guides to their individual tastes, attitudes and thoughts. A young logician may call himself a "materialist," and if you prod him will comfortably defend the basic tenets of materialist philosophy; but this surface orthodoxy has not deterred him from absorbing the positivist outlook of most Western logicians in his thinking about specific problems encountered in his work. A young artist may consider himself a realist even while searching in Western and Russian aesthetic traditions for richer and more complex aesthetic forms. Young intellectuals, generally, may proclaim themselves to be "Leninists" and yet hunger for a political and social climate that would be more open to free and individual self-expression. (An extreme illustration of this was the argument advanced by a friend to the effect that, after all, Lenin himself had included representatives of other parties in the cabinet formed immediately after the October Revolution.)

All this is not to imply that the official ideology has now become easier to discard. On the contrary, as already observed, it is now almost automatically accepted by the young, partly because it provides the only general conceptual framework and language that they know, but chiefly, I think, due to the fundamental change in meaning that it has come to hold for them. Three decades ago, this ideology was supported by a distinct vision of Utopia; now that it has been at least partially realized in relatively stable institutions it has become largely indistinguishable from the diffuse ethos in which the members of this generation have been inextricably absorbed since childhood. While this transformation undoubtedly made them more prone to accept the ideology, it has also made them likely to give it a personal interpretation. Since it no longer rests on an abstract vision of the future but is merged with concrete and differentiated current perceptions, it no longer can be the same sort of guardian of their thoughts and feelings. The nature of this immediate experience has become the chief influence in shaping their attitudes and values, especially in their professional pursuits.

The past three decades have transformed the character of professional rôles so radically that the very meaning of the word "intelligentsia" has altered. As late as 30 years ago, the term still meant the selected few who were presumably engaged in exploring

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new ideas, new forms, new values, and in criticizing existing ones. Now it applies simply to all those who are engaged in occupations that require a degree of intellectual and technical skill. The change can be traced not merely in the increased proportion of young men and women now engaged in scientific or technical pursuits, but also very clearly in the general climate of this generation's intellectual life. Indeed, this "technocratic" orientation has become almost as characteristic of young historians or philosophers as it seems to be of young scientists and technicians, in that all show an interest in implementing "general truths" rather than in discovering them.

What are typical intellectual attitudes and values of the young? There is a genuine desire for professional competence, an urge to assimilate facts and to master the techniques required to organize and manipulate them skillfully. These traits are combined with a certain narrowness of outlook, a lack of urgent desire to explore new intellectual horizons or question basic theoretical assumptions. There is a relatively unquestioning acceptance of what are conceived to be the basic institutions and values of the existing political and social order, combined with a deeply felt urge to acquire autonomy in one's professional rôle and in a sector of private life. As one goes down the list of characteristics, the composite portrait that emerges differs little from the picture often drawn today of intellectual life in contemporary Western societies, and especially in the United States, under the impact of modern technology and mass communications. The analogy should not, of course, be pushed too far: even if certain universal tendencies of the modern age have been at work in Russia, they take distinctive shape and flavor in the Russian context.

Some of the differences are only of degree. For example, the concern of most members of the younger generation to become professionally competent is even more serious and sustained than in the West, while at the same time their intellectual horizon tends to be even narrower, their interest in any broad ultimate questions even flabbier. I might cite as example an extremely able and well-trained young Soviet logician who is very well read in the whole history of Western epistemology, from Aristotle, Leibnitz and Kant to Russell and Whitehead, but who is not in the least interested in the fundamental problems that preoccupied these great philosophers.

This narrowness of intellectual interest might be accounted for

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by the political controls and the observance of official orthodoxy within which this generation must operate. But I think other factors are more significant.

First, one is struck by a certain self-consciousness shown by this generation about the presumed attributes of their professional rôles—about their skills, their manners, even their dress. One is reminded of the attitudes of the nascent Russian intelligentsia in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries following the first flush of westernization. There is a similar concern with techniques, manners and forms rather than with basic objectives, a desire to be, and especially to appear, "cultured," a consciousness of station and some uncertainty as to precisely what are the prerequisites for it, a deeply felt sense of patriotism combined with a vivid sense of emulation of, and competition with, the West.

The intense and narrow professionalism of this generation also represents, I believe, a genuine form of self-emancipation. Their insistence on the all-importance of facts and techniques provides the safest as well as the most direct escape from the political hacks of the Stalin era. (And, by the same logic, the insistence of the latter on the "ultimate" implications of various intellectual and professional concerns, and therefore on the continued importance of ideological conformity, has constituted their chief defense.) Just as in the most innocuous manifestations of their attitudes—the desire for a private apartment, the urge to join in informal leisure activities of their own choosing (even if only the collection of postage stamps)—they reveal a deep desire for some individual autonomy, some personal privacy.

The same urge is expressed, more forcefully and directly, in the one area of intellectual life in which, occasionally, ultimate problems of value are squarely faced and explicitly discussed, namely in literature and the arts. Literature has always been the inner fortress of the Russian intelligentsia, and in the contemporary works of young writers, and particularly of young poets, its traditional visage is even now to be discerned. To be sure, the intelligentsia's traditional concern with ultimate questions and ultimate values is no longer expressed in the affirmation of broad, generous and ambitious world views, pregnant with immediate political and social implications. After 40 years of Soviet experience, it has now taken the form of a search for more modest, more personal, perhaps more human values. The rediscovery of truth-

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fulness rather than the discovery of truth; the defense of a code of personal dignity and personal honesty; the apprehension of beauty in nature and in love; the determination to endure but not to compromise—these themes are frequently expressed in the poems (many of them unpublished) of the younger generation of writers and occasionally sift through the net of official censorship into published works of prose.

What does all this portend for the future? With all the urgency of their desire for some personal autonomy, most of these young people, it must be recalled, continue to feel loyal to the foundations of their social order—to socialism and its values, as they variously choose to define them. But we must also remind ourselves that the pattern of values and thoughts that a person consciously entertains at a particular moment does not necessarily reflect precisely the complex and unstable balance between those elements that attract him to, and those that repel him from, the social order under which he lives. A sense of loyalty often represents the only real alternative to the almost intolerable bitterness and loneliness that come from a feeling of total alienation.

As to the future attitudes of this generation of the Russian intelligentsia, much will depend in the last analysis on the future policies of the régime. In my view, most of its members still appear willing to support an authoritarian political order, in which—as has been the case through most of Russia's history—respect for higher authority is combined with the recognition of some priority for the needs of the State. But most of these young men and women do not appear to expect, nor will they willingly tolerate, the all-pervasive controls, the invasions of all areas of human privacy, that have been characteristic of the past. Such a diagnosis should not lead us to feel excessively despairing or especially superior. Authoritarianism, after all, assumes a variety of forms; and through most of human history individuals have had to seek, and often have managed to find, despite its restrictions, a measure of inner freedom and dignity.

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REFLECTIONS ON A REVOLUTION IN PAKISTAN

By Charles Burton Marshall

THE case for self-determination supposes the right of a people to strive to amount to something worth while—not just the opportunity to drift into ineffectuality and frustration. The fostering of international organization and coöperation also assumes the existence of states capable of getting things done and helping each other. Both the aspiration that divides and the aspiration that unites postulate states capable of playing historic rôles. Such is the norm we assume in our concept of the state in international life. One of its characteristics is a population conscious of a political identity, and aware of a common history, able to produce consensus and endowed with capabilities for running the apparatus of a state. A second characteristic is a defined territory, identified with the people by habit and history. A third is a régime identified with the populace and the territory, and endowed with faculties for making policy—that is, for making and enforcing public decisions involving the allocation of resources to new patterns of effort and creating new relationships, in contrast to mere enforcement of custom, order and peripheral security.

It has been all too easy to regard every political entity in colonial subordination as a frustrated state and in this light to view independence as the removal of impediments to development toward a mature, reasonably effective state in accordance with inherent teleological elements. These assumptions and hopes are reflected in the bringing of ever-increasing numbers of political units into formal statehood. An enormous multiplicity of states has come about in three historic phases—the Napoleonic period, the aftermath of World War I, and notably the period since World War II—with still more in the wings getting ready to come on stage in the next few years, especially in the African continent.

These new states are admitted into the dignities of their status. They send and receive envoys. They pick up franchises in international organizations. Those rising to independence in current times usually enter almost at once into the collectivity pondering great issues at the United Nations and form part of that constituency within which contending groups of powers strive to assemble majorities to symbolize legitimacy for their own interests

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or to frustrate such majorities for their adversaries. Some of them contract themselves into alliances.

The multiplicity of states and the dilution of the character of states are basic political phenomena of the contemporary world. The anomalies inherent in all this are obvious. The words of an eighteenth century versifier are relevant—

> To deem of every nation as the same
> Is rank rebellion 'gainst the lawful claim
> Of Nature, and such dull indifference
> May be philosophy but can't be sense.

For fledgling states, the experience of being thrust into a world tribunal and having to cast their franchises on great issues must often be as bewildering—as contrary to the interests of their own right development—as would be the experience of a boy propelled into the Senate with his first pair of long pants.

My purpose is not to remonstrate against, or to suggest reform in, the situation induced by excesses of independence and equality and the rampant generation of new states emerging without regard to their fitness and viability. I wish merely to make note of disparity between juridic status and political fact as background to the consideration of the case of Pakistan. There we have a clear instance of a political entity which has left colonial status but seems unable to settle down to the serious business of being a state. Since the crossing of the threshold of independence eleven-and-a-half years ago the characteristics of statehood, even such as they were at the beginning, seem to have declined. Unity has faded. Purpose has been frittered away. Consciousness of the existence of a Pakistan with a rôle to play in history has dribbled out. "Freedom," said Matthew Arnold, "is a good horse, but a horse to ride somewhere." The Pakistanis have ridden it in circles and have tired it out.

What prompts me to set this down is the débâcle of last October—the rude destruction of such political framework of their own as the Pakistanis had been able to construct and the imposition of outright military dictatorship. My spirit is critical but friendly, for I hope the Pakistanis may yet give up their possessiveness of colonial attitudes and aptitudes. I think one can help them better with informed candor than with the ill-informed encouragement which tends to dominate in American response to events in that unhappy and confused land.

I am fully aware of the interpretation officially put forth for

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the recent revolt and the resulting dictatorship. Pakistanis have an unfailing faculty for producing scapegoats—this itself a sign of persistent colonial character in a juridically independent people. In Pakistan there is always a "they"—never a "we"—to blame for whatever is wrong. A relentless search goes on for a moral equivalent to the now departed British *raj*—someone to blame for all the rampant faults. Sometimes it is India. Sometimes it is the United States. West Pakistanis blame East Pakistanis and vice versa. Bureaucrats and the populace blame each other. In the rationale of the October 7 coup d'état, competitive politicians are identified as the authors of national woe. Parties and the parliamentary order are declared the guilty ones and sent into the political wilderness to cleanse the country of its sins.

The failure of the legislative principle in Pakistan has been too obvious to be denied. With it the idea of constitutional government and of democratic processes have come into disrepute. Yet this is only part of a sad story—only manifestations of a wider, deeper failure, a default on the whole idea of the state. During residence in Pakistan I was often told by Pakistanis, from President Mirza down, of the prematurity and impracticability of democracy in Pakistan. I, in turn, never urged democracy as such. The essential things, I stressed, were consensus, authority, a sense of policy—the creation of institutions to enable a state to amount to something and go somewhere. Anyone rejecting democratic steps to these ends must at least offer alternative ways, I argued; but this sort of reasoning was futile. On the one hand were too many Pakistanis habituated to the politics of protest and agitation—as if outcry and harangue were equivalents of policy. Too many Pakistanis, at least in high places, thought it sufficient merely to be negative about democratic modes without any creative ideas of what to put in their place.

II

It would be tedious even to list, let alone to analyze, the quarrels, velleities and frustrations which were the lot of Pakistan in its first two political phases—the initial phase as a Dominion, with the Government of India Act of 1935 and the Indian Independence Act of 1947 as basic governing instruments, and the period under the constitution of the Islamic Republic, which took effect March 23, 1956, and was overthrown by the Army last October 7. Two of these, however, do require brief consideration

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—the destructive, nagging quarrel between the executive and the Assembly and the rending rivalry and suspicion between the eastern and western wings of the country.

The first of these had roots in a simple circumstance of government in India preceding independence and partition. In the viceregal tradition, supreme power on the scene was vested in the executive. This power was exercised vicariously for a foreign sovereign. The British Parliament held the ultimate power over India. Such legislative authority as functioned on the subcontinent was contingent and imperfect, existing on assignment by the British Parliament. With the establishment of India and Pakistan as independent dominions in 1947, the executive power was vested in a Governor General and the power of Parliament was devolved upon a Constituent Assembly, which was an indirectly elected body set up by arrangements improvised by the executive authority just before partition. Out of this historical experience grew a feud over supremacy between the executive as heir to the *raj* and an Assembly as legatee of Parliament.

The issue was dormant while Mohammed Ali Jinnah lingered on as the dying personification of independence, the central will in the young Dominion, unchallenged both as the supreme executive authority and as leader of the Assembly. It remained in abeyance during Liaquat Ali Khan's dominance as Prime Minister in the sequel to Jinnah's death. The issue did emerge in the Governor Generalship of Ghulam Mohammed, 1951–55, and festered during the tenure of Iskander Mirza, last Governor General of the Dominion and then provisional President under the constitution.

These last two, each in his way, represented the viceregal pattern under new conditions and without a foreign principal. Each scorned politics, except his own ruthless kind, which neither acknowledged under that name. "May God have mercy on your soul!" was Ghulam Mohammed's remark when I once admitted to a respectful interest in politics. Each was possessive of executive ascendancy, regarded with repugnance the very idea of a parliamentary experiment in Pakistan, and professed to prefer presidential government on the American model, though without having any insight into the political character of the American presidency. Each fancied himself a strong man.

Faith in the Ataturk prototype is an enduring element of the American mythology regarding remote countries. I had often read

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this interpretation of Ghulam Mohammed before going to Pakistan in 1955. I found instead a sickened man, vague and fitful of will, pitifully possessive of power vastly beyond his capabilities. With his articulation impaired by paralysis of the palate and with too much pride to admit his weakness, he spent his official hours trying to whisper incomprehensible orders.

As for Mirza's limitations in the strong-man rôle, I recall the responses of a correspondent of an American news magazine, which was doing a piece on Pakistan and was relaying urgent questions by telephone to Karachi: Q. What is the people's pet name for Mirza? A. None. Q. What does the man in the street call him? A. Just Mirza, if anything. Q. What do people shout when he drives past? A. Nothing. Q. Then what is the local word for a benevolent despot? A. None, and they wouldn't apply it to Mirza anyway. This suggests one of Mirza's basic handicaps for the strong-man rôle—lack of touch with the masses and of capacity for projecting himself. Yet he had memorized the lines and knew some of the gestures and played the rôle well enough to convince at close quarters men of small discernment and large will to believe in a dictator. Behind the façade, however, imagination was lacking. Mirza understood the routines of administration, the negative business of maintaining order and the techniques of divide and rule. Politics as a business of producing consensus was beyond him—something fearful and strange.

A respectable measure of statesmanship would have perceived a solution in a higher level of political development, for both executive and legislature might have gained stature in a healthy and evolving state. This insight was beyond the grasp of the leadership prevailing in Pakistan. The focus was not on the growth of institutions but on a miserable quarrel over preferment. It led to a baleful series of plot and counterplot of executive against Assembly and vice versa, culminating in the forcible break-up of the first Constituent Assembly in October of 1954. It led likewise to Mirza's interposition against the Suhrawardy ministry in October 1957.

This last piece of folly was of determining importance. It violated the canons of a parliamentary order in removing a Prime Minister while denying him a test of strength in the Assembly. The action was taken on the basis of issues with respect to which the Prime Minister was clearly acting in the interest of national unity and responsibility in policy. It sent out of office the only

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available man with aptitude as a politician and giving reasonable promise of national leadership. It projected the President into the arena of political competition as protagonist of his own ambitions. It is clear in retrospect that it effectively foreclosed whatever possibility there ever was of holding national elections under the constitution. Such elections would have been difficult at best. They would most certainly have required the establishment of a national government well in advance of the vote so as to neutralize the impact of the electoral process. This in turn could have been possible only under a President epitomizing national unity. These things became impossible when Mirza arbitrarily brought down the Suhrawardy government.

Precisely a year intervened between the overthrow of the Suhrawardy ministry and the military dictatorship. The interval is significant in explaining the background of the coup. President Mirza said in October that he had decided a year ago upon the necessity of abrogating the constitution and had begun his plotting to that end. Thus inferentially he understood the inevitable results of his first action at the time he took it. Events have a way of looking inevitable after they have happened, and it has been this way with the overthrow of Pakistan's constitution, an event now being explained in deterministic terms: "There was no other way out," or "the President had to do what he did," and so on. This line of thought is contingently true. By the autumn of 1958 the political process had descended to a miserable, ruthless competition for place, and elections had lost promise of providing a parliament with a mandate. It is well, however, to remember the rôle of men in creating the necessities by which they profess to be compelled.

III

The separation of provinces ranks with the separation of powers as a disruptive issue in Pakistan. Unity within a federal structure comprising only two regions would be hard in any event, for one must tend to prevail and the other to come off second in any consensus cutting across them both. In Pakistan the problem has been aggravated by obvious factors—the language barrier, and the interposition of the Indian corridor a thousand miles wide between the two wings. Geographic outlook is as important as mileage; West Pakistan looks out upon the Middle East, whereas East Pakistan looks to Southeast Asia.

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No recollection of history and concord binds them. Even the fact of Muslim identity is insubstantial as a bond, for West Pakistanis, tracing their faith to Arabic and Persian antecedents, tend to look patronizingly on East Pakistanis as opportunistic Muslims embracing Islam in preference to outcast status in the Hindu structure. In West Pakistan relationships with Hindus fall in the category of foreign relations; in East Pakistan, with a significant Hindu minority, they are a domestic concern. West Pakistan feels more cleavage from India. The East Pakistanis are still drawn toward West Bengal and regard Calcutta as their metropolis.

Each region has its own concept of politics. A combination of the two might have got Pakistan somewhat along the road to political fulfillment. Instead the two points of view have repelled each other. In a useful oversimplification, East Pakistan is political; West Pakistan is governmental. Factors of aptitude and policy held the Bengalis to a slight rôle in the military and civil service of the British dispensation. The effect lingers. Despite recruitment policies aiming toward balance, the Pakistani civil service remains preponderantly a West Pakistani show at the upper levels. The military services remain even more so—and this is especially true of the army. East Pakistanis largely regard the military as an alien force imposed on their land from a thousand miles away. On the other hand, Bengalis, sometimes called the Irishmen of the subcontinent, are apt in competitive politics. Political consciousness and communication are intense in East Pakistan. Regional cohesiveness is high. These differentiate the one region from the other.

The interplay between the regional problem and the issue over locus of power is obvious. West Pakistan has dominated by virtue of executive and administrative preponderance; East Pakistan has counted on elections to shift the balance, sure in being able to hold its own or better in legislative competition and sure also that a directly elected legislature would have a sense of mandate and a better chance of holding its own against the executive.

Yet here again the question has been a rude one of the preponderance of one at the expense of another. In a combination of executive energy with legislative imagination Pakistan might have made something creative out of government, and both provinces would have benefited. The synthesis never occurred. Animosities between the provinces worsened bad relationships between the organs of government, and vice versa, and in this situation the

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creative possibilities of political life were missed altogether. As a friend of mine has put it, politicking was rampant but politics dead.

IV

The viceregal pattern—in which government is exempt from interference by courts and legislatures—returned with the military dictatorship. The provisional legislatures at the national capital and in the provinces were destroyed. Plans to elect new ones under the constitution were cancelled. The courts were walled off from jurisdiction over acts of the new régime. Though too early for conclusions, it is not too early for some interim estimates of the dictatorship.

It has produced some show of proficiency. The ease and quickness of the seizure of power have brought short-term satisfaction to generals, but an unresisted usurpation is obviously nothing to be celebrated by a nation. The régime harvested local popularity by an act of poetic justice in ousting and exiling the President responsible for bringing it in. It has made some gestures of a sort always available to new despotism in a run-down land—smartening up the bazaars, routing beggars off the streets, putting some well-known rascals in jail—actions in the category of making the trains run on time. These can be counted on for a good press abroad, especially in the United States, where strong-man and new-broom clichés are staples of journalism.

Bumbling also put in an appearance. For example, the régime initially turned a stern face at hoarding and high prices. Merchants outdid each other in establishing evidences of innocence. Buyers rushed in after bargains in foodstuffs and cleared the shelves of durable goods to be held for the inevitable rise to follow. The effect was to deplete stocks in a few days. Shops began to close. Prices moved higher than ever. Generals learned a lesson that orders are not a solvent for every problem.

Such instances whetted the anxiety of many in the régime to get the military extricated gracefully and soon—something easier said than done. In sacking a government and destroying a constitution the army acted—in the words of General Mohammed Ayub Khan, then its commander-in-chief and subsequently president, prime minister and generalissimo in combination—on the basis of its supremacy as guardian of the nation's interests and the people's welfare. Such sovereign claims, once made, would be

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hard to renounce. The military image, though reduced, apparently would have to remain a paramount factor. To create a new structure of government to take the place of the one cast aside would not be easy.

General Ayub has been described as having a clean blackboard but no idea of what formula to write on it. For such ideas the régime has been depending on its right bower, the civil service, which also has its limitations. Some civil servants have considerable proficiency in administrative routines. Most of them incline to regard these as being the sum total of government. As men of routine rather than audacity and imagination, they tend to have small conception of growth and change and would be beyond their depth in providing the rationale of a revolution or staking out an imaginative course of national development.

If the task were one involving West Pakistan alone, it might be easier, for West Pakistan was reported to have accepted the coup with relative equanimity. But hard as it is to keep in mind in Karachi, the majority of Pakistanis dwell in the East. Reaction there was sullen. The dangers of trying to continue on a coercive basis with a régime in which the larger section had small part and from which it felt alienated were obvious. The difficulties of trying to reach a new concord on anything other than a political basis, and even on that, would be enormous.

A press handout from the Pakistani Embassy in Washington has described the army coup as a working of the democratic process. Ayub himself was reported to have described it as based on consent—since there was no outcry nor violent resistance. This was small wonder. The régime relied on a military court apparatus empowered to give sentences up to the death penalty for a variety of oppositionist acts. Summary courts at the magisterial level were empowered to give sentences up to a year in jail and 15 lashes on the basis only of memorandum findings. The regular courts were walled off from review. Obviously such formidable sanctions, even held in reserve, would suffice to make claim of consent a jest. Moreover, the régime has made a big thing of cracking down—impounding and scrutinizing safety deposits and investigating even moderate bank accounts. In such a stringent economy, government has the determining hand in allocations. Obviously the signs of acceptance were easy to explain. They must be weighed against reports of general apathy and the telltale symptoms of anxiety found in the climate of dictatorship—the onset of

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the habit of a quick glance over the shoulder before saying anything.

v

Immediately after the coup d'état President Mirza did the expected thing by asserting Pakistan's intention to stand firm in its foreign alignments. After unhorsing Mirza, Ayub said a similar thing. These assurances do not answer the main question regarding the effect of the coup on Pakistan's external affairs. The question is not the intended, but the unintended, effects. It does, of course, make a difference for Pakistan's foreign engagements for that country to manifest such political weakness—to demonstrate that after eleven-and-a-half years it is still so far from being a going concern.

Pakistan also has reasserted accustomed positions on issues with India. Here again it would be idle to pretend that recent developments have made no difference. India's excuse regarding the difficulty of negotiating settlements with an unstable government has been underscored. Moreover, the Pakistani case for Kashmir has lost some force. The original juridic merits may remain unaffected, but the complaint about the tyranny of holding a people in military subjugation and denying it the benefits of a constitutional government of its own choosing has lost edge.

As for United States policy toward Pakistan, developments give new point to some old questions. They supply another demonstration of the folly—at least the perils—inherent in contracting with in-groups in politically underdeveloped states on the assumption that we are dealing with national governments really endowed with contractive capabilities. They supply new data on the fallibility of the strong-man myth underlying some of our undertakings and expectations regarding the fledgling states. They supply a new occasion for inquiring into the relationship of a military build-up to stability in underdeveloped areas. It is time to find out more about the implications of building up a military establishment hugely beyond the level of development of its country—especially, as in the case of Pakistan, a military establishment not national but provincial in its roots. It is time for a new perspective on our alliances and military aid—to see whether, in building enclaves of supposed military strength, we are not giving too little regard to deeper political requirements.

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TWENTY YEARS OF FRANCO

By Mildred Adams

GENERAL Francisco Franco, on Wednesday, October 1, 1958, drove to Madrid from the royal country house where he lives, and in the royal palace, carefully roped off so that no one could pass its walls on that side of the street, held audience in celebration of what he called the twenty-second anniversary of taking power. He also went to an official mass in the church of San Francisco el Grande. *ABC,* the leading newspaper, dedicated to the occasion a special section of its Thursday morning edition. The theme which it tried hard to drive home was the legitimacy of the Franco régime.

Both the date and the theme say more than may meet the eye. The Caudillo, as any number of records testify, won his present post in civil war; it was on April 1, 1939, that he declared the last vestiges of Republican opposition ended, and himself ruler over all Spain. But he prefers to celebrate the date when the Burgos Junta chose him over competing generals and put him in charge of what they called the Nationalist forces. This, to his mind, gives him two more years in power, and, like the inches added to a short man's shoes, makes him feel bigger. Similarly, having won power by conquest, he must claim additional legal sanction by a tortuous process of ratiocination which seems to tie him in to the long-postponed return of the monarchy. This insistence on his own version of the facts, this strange communicated sense of uneasiness before abstract bits of truth, is startling to a visitor who goes back after a considerable absence to see what the régime looks like and what Franco has accomplished in these 20 years. Like the armed squad cars ranged ready for trouble at night, they testify to a basic insecurity.

Yet it must be said at the outset that in physical terms a great deal has been accomplished, particularly since 1951. Madrid is almost twice as big as when it was surrendered to Franco in 1939. It is still pock-marked with shot in places, but most of its visible wounds of war have disappeared. A clean city, it is now crowded with motor traffic; it is handsomely gardened; and in the center, at least, it looks adequately dressed and comfortably fed. The old telephone building 14 stories high which was Madrid's prewar pride has been topped by two skyscrapers that tower 20 stories

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up. New banks were the city's symbol of prosperity in 1951; new apartment houses, grandiose government buildings and new factories on the outskirts of the city play that rôle now.

In terms of morale the changes are harder to measure. There is perhaps less arguing than a few years ago about the General or his policies, less attempt to explain what he is trying to do; cautious discussion has been replaced by a wry shrugging of the shoulders, as in the face of a natural phenomenon that must run its course. This does not mean that the people are content, but when were Spaniards ever satisfied? Political protests are made, and not only by the argumentative young. Political arrests are said to continue. But this is told by word of mouth—the newspaper reader learns no such heresies. Meanwhile, a generation that never knew the Civil War is growing up and old bitternesses are receding. The net effect is a curious passivity; if a volcano underlies it, the smoke shows only in thin spurts.

The socio-political structure is not so different from what it was. The army seems to be gaining in its struggle for power with the Falange and getting back its old strength. The Church, outwardly powerful, suffers internal divisions, distrusts the new civilian order of "Opus Dei" which has at least three members in the Cortes, of whom two are Franco's close advisers. The large landowners continue in possession of their hectares, the "frivolous" nobility "have learned nothing these twenty years." Labor is held in check by complex devices meant to placate and control. The new element is an active middle class.

Spain had a bourgeoisie in 1936—indeed its timidity and inexperience are blamed by some critics for the failure of the Republic to hold and consolidate its power. But the middle class that made the Republic, and lost it, was dominated by a group of idealistic intellectuals who drew their inspiration from the French Revolution. The newly-emergent middle classes have more money and less book learning. They also control a degree of industrial power which did not exist in Spain before the Civil War.

Economically—but that story is more involved, and comes later.

Against this sketch, the queries that loom are no longer whether the Caudillo has done well or ill with his self-appointed stewardship, but what kind of a Spain he has fashioned and what type of a rôle it can play in the second half of the twentieth century. The General is 66 years old, and questions which could be shoved aside

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in 1951 are pressing closer now. With Don Juan, son of the late King Alfonso XIII, living quietly in nearby Portugal, with his son Don Juan Carlos growing to maturity, it is no longer so easy to end all discussions about the future by saying that Spaniards have no choice except Franco or another civil war. They stated by vote in 1947 that they would choose to become a monarchy, "traditional, Catholic, social and representative," but the phrase leaves questions unanswered. If this vote and the Law of Succession hold, the king will presumably be Don Juan, unless Franco keeps the reins in his own hands for another decade, when Don Juan's son will be 30 years of age. On the other hand, there is the chance of another course, and this discussion always ends with a question mark.

With this matter of the succession goes the question of the form of government which will act within the cloak of monarchy. The recent history of Spain has given little hope that the democratic disciplines as practised in Great Britain or the United States would have much chance of success. In the past century and a half the Spaniards have made three tries at establishing a republic—in 1812, 1873 and 1931—with very little luck. At the same time, their experience with monarchy over the same 150 years has been turbulent and hardly happy. Their two periods of controlled peace, under General Primo de Rivera who acted as dictator for Alfonso XIII, and under Franco, make one wonder whether Americans are right in thinking military dictatorships always recessive and deplorable. The question is not meant to be frivolous or tendentious. Is the dictator-run corporative state a form that is sympathetic to the Latin temperament? Is it a transitional form, under which countries that have lagged can make the revolutionary move from an agricultural to an industrial economy? Is backward agriculture at the root of Spain's long pattern of internecine warfare between regions, creeds and classes, with the repeated expulsion of the losers so that Spain emerges from war impoverished not only physically but also humanly? Will the automobile, the paved road, the telephone and the factory make for a national unity such as Spain has not known since Roman days? And if so—the questions go around full circle—under what form of government will these modern unifying factors hold it together?

A further complication lies in the fact that while the answers are being worked out, Spain is embarking on an activity in international relations such as she has not had since she lost her em-

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pire. Castigated in 1946 by the United Nations as a country "potentially dangerous for peace," she has now been accepted as a member of the United Nations, the World Bank, the Monetary Fund and other international organisms. (Within Spain the reproof of 1946 is said to have united Spaniards behind Franco, much the way a family divided within itself closes ranks against outside attack, and to have kept him in power at a moment when he was tottering.) These new associations will require the government to submit to a new degree of reality in terms of bookkeeping and criticism. At the same time Franco will certainly try to exert influence in Mediterranean questions, in North African affairs, in Spanish-American matters—and all the while managing a young and still potentially fractious governing mechanism at home.

These are considerations for the future. In order to see them in proportion it is useful to scan at least the recent past from which they stem. Leaving behind the restless reign of Alfonso XIII, with its anarchist outbreaks, its too frequent changes in cabinet, its period of dictatorship (which left behind a skeleton of paved roads and an American telephone system), one comes to the still controversial Republic.

II

The Europe of 1931 was caught in the economic crises which had been building up since 1928, and which were to play their part in increasing Mussolini's power in Italy and bringing Hitler to power in Germany. That Spain should have undertaken in that ominous year a "bloodless revolution," dispensing with its hereditary monarch and putting its new Republican government into the hands of an inexperienced and contending group of intellectuals, socialists and trade-union men, has about it in retrospect a quality of pathos. Of the good intentions and sterling virtues of that first group of men who walked into power on an April morning in 1931 many people had, and have, no doubt; but good intentions and sterling virtues were not enough, even when combined with a fervent political idealism which stemmed from the desire to see installed in Spain an equivalent of the *liberté, égalité, fraternité* of the French Revolution. The move was a token of the distance which separated Spain from the rest of Europe—a distance in time rather than in space—and of the degree of unreality which afflicted the country's political thinking.

This is not the place to retrace the several tragedies of the Re-

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public, of which an essential element was the absence, from its ruling group, of people with adequate knowledge of economic forces and of the part they play in political events. The marvel is not that it went down, but that it lasted as long as it did and commanded as much of Spanish loyalty. From a practical point of view, it was quixotic and doomed to failure. Morally, it represented deep ideals that Franco has neither satisfied nor quenched.

When in July of 1936, after having put down the 1934 uprisings in the Asturias with iron severity and the use of Moorish troops, General Franco flew in from Africa to make war on a government which had been confirmed by popular elections five months earlier, the ruling pattern of Europe was by no means that to which the Republic had pinned its faith. Three dictatorships, in Portugal, Italy and Germany, seemed to represent the current ideal. The moment looked ripe for a general to follow suit in Spain. By September, General Franco had outwitted and outmanœuvred the competing fellow generals. On September 29 the rebel Junta in Burgos made him Caudillo (as Hitler was Führer and Mussolini was Duce) of the National Movement and Generalissimo of the troops of air, sea and land. After two-and-a-half years more of hard fighting he was in truth head of the Spanish state.

So much destruction has come to so many countries since 1939 that it is hard to give adequate weight to the situation he then faced. That it was a situation basically of his own making may have helped his morale, but did not lighten his problems. When the Civil War, which he had started, was over, he faced the task of governing and rebuilding a country mourning a million dead and half a million in exile; with its livestock decimated; the railway rolling stock cut in half and the motor vehicles two-thirds gone; roads and bridges broken up, thousands of buildings, both dwellings and public offices, destroyed; the merchant fleet all but gone; the public reserves spent on war materials. People were exhausted; the passions of civil war left apathy and bitterness.

Within the victorious Nationalist forces contending ambitions were by no means dead. The Falange, copied after the Fascist and Nazi parties in Italy and Germany, had come out ahead, and by virtue of a decree of July 31, 1939, became the basis of the new state; but the army, the Carlist Requetés and the monarchists were by no means silenced. A majority of the Church was with Franco, but the Basque priests were in exile. In 1937 a "Collective Letter" signed by the priests then in Spain warned him

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that "We would be the first to lament if in place of the irresponsible autocracy of a parliament there should be substituted the more terrible one of a dictatorship divorced from the nation."

To balance these internal elements of discord Franco may have thought he had the counterweight of aid from Germany and Italy, which had been so very helpful during his local war; but such illusions vanished very quickly. The German-Russian pact of August 1939, by which his most powerful ally appeared to join forces with the Communist power whose existence he had used to justify his own rebellion against the Republic, must have given him sleepless nights. Coming a month before he had set up the framework of the new Spanish state, it may have given him additional justification for assuming absolute authority over "the historic régime whereby Spain has acquired the possibility of realizing her destiny," and for making himself "responsible only to God and history."

That responsibility was to be sharply tested. The internal affairs of Spain during World War II are less clear than its external dealings, for the focus of American interest was not on how the Spaniards were licking their wounds and schooling themselves to peace but on what Franco was doing to aid or to impede the Axis aims. As early as the Munich crisis in 1938, he declared that in the event of a European war Spain would stay neutral. This was a recognition of Spain's impotence rather than a simple expression of desire. By temperament, training and the claims of reciprocity his sympathies lay with Hitler and Mussolini. The records of certain interviews with them make this clear, as do the memoirs left by British and American Ambassadors whose business it was to try to keep him from giving the Axis all it asked.

Meanwhile, internal affairs had been moving ahead somewhat jerkily under the spur of hunger and the Caudillo's need to rebuild his national house and hold his forces together. Various Republican ideas of reforms were undone—Catalonia and the Basque provinces were deprived of their hard-won home rule statutes, the Society of Jesus which had been expelled for dubious activities was invited back. Punishments were devised for all persons "guilty of subversive activities" since October 1934, or who had "opposed the National Movement in fact or by grave passivity" —a phrase which, letting loose a postwar flood of reprisals, may have taken men's minds off the fact that they were hungry. Economically, the first spartan plan had been to cut down imports,

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do without foreign credits, develop production and exports; but the task was too heavy. A loan of £2,000,000 sterling was arranged with England in 1940, wheat, meat and cotton were bought from Argentina in 1941, and Red Cross cargoes of food, clothes and medical supplies sent from the United States. Ten years later, a manufacturer, recalling those days, told how he had had to install a commissary in his factory and arrange clandestine night deliveries from the country in order to buy his workers food enough so that they would have strength to go on working. He himself lived on beans and chick peas measured out in the kitchen by his wife, not in cups but one by one.

Franco, whose skill in playing Peter off against Paul is one of his most valuable talents, emerged from World War II convinced that he had put both the Axis and the Allies heavily in his debt, and he prepared to make claims against both sides. Had he not given Hitler all that he demanded except the right to march through Spain and take Gibraltar? Had he not helped the Allies by keeping Spain inviolate and refusing that passage? The German diplomats still sat fatly in Madrid, where they were very comfortable. The Allies would surely show their gratitude.

Meanwhile he had the aid of a new commercial and industrial energy which, driven in part by hunger and in part by the break-up of traditional ways which war brings, was showing itself among middle class lads who had done little before the war but sit around cafés. To be an idle "señorito" was no longer fashionable or possible; the Falange motto "Todo por la patria"—"Everything and everyone for the fatherland"—included working for Spain as well as dying for it. This outburst of energy had various concomitants, not all of them happy, but it was one of the most important factors in creating the present Spanish spectacle.

To hold this new entrepreneurial force within bounds, and keep it working for Spain and Franco, changes had to be made. The "National Movement" had been set up in 1939 as a state within a state, in imitation of the Fascist and Nazi one-party régimes then in fashion. Holding the highest power, Franco began his civilian rule with the aid of a National Council, a Political Junta and the Falange. The task of the Falange was "to establish an economic régime over-riding the interests of individual group or class . . . to multiply wealth in the service of the state, of social justice, and of the Christian liberty of the individual."

That framework, simple in structure but complex in implica-

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tion, has been modified several times since it was set up, and always in the direction of added complexity. Franco is Chief of State, Prime Minister and the active source of power. He has a military-civilian Cabinet of 16 to help him in his executive tasks, and a Cortes of some 500 members, reëstablished in 1942 as "the superior organ of participation of the Spanish people in the task of the State," with its chief duty "the preparation and elaborations of the laws" but without interference with Franco's power. Some of its members are there by virtue of other offices which they hold, some are elected by towns, provinces, the National Syndicates and certain professional organizations; not more than 50 may be appointed by the Caudillo from the military, the Church, the administrative or social spheres, or because of "eminent services to Spain." Those who are elected hold office for three years and may run again, those who are ex-officio must leave when they lose the office that put them there, those appointed by Franco may be removed at will. Perhaps the most important thing which this body has done since its re-creation was the passage, in 1947, of the Law of Succession; with it went a listing and establishment of the fundamental laws of the nation. Regarded in the beginning as a rather unwieldy rubber stamp for the Caudillo, the Cortes, acting within the necessary framework of discretion, has shown enough backbone to win it a somewhat surprised respect.

Only one party is allowed, still called the "National Movement" and wearing the unwieldy title of "Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las JONS (Juntas Ofensivas Nacional-Sindicalistas)"—a name sometimes seen on placards but seldom heard in full. Within that single party the usual struggles for power go on, masked by pretense, but by no means stifled.

Apart from these conventional organs of government stand two other types which deserve more space than can be given them here. The first is the National Syndicates, which make it possible for Spain to call itself solemnly a Syndicalist State (a phrase which sets the unwary foreigner by the ears), and the second is the state corporation. These are not the Caudillo's inventions, but copied and combined from originals in Italy, Germany and Portugal. Between them, and in their very different ways, they represented Franco's answer to the twin questions of how to get production going again after the war and how to keep labor in hand.

The National Syndicates are of two types, those that represent

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the 23 basic industries and those that represent smaller groups of labor and industry in the provinces. Both are as strange to an American eye as though the A.F.L.-C.I.O. were put in double harness with the N.A.M. and told not only to settle their own disputes but also to agree upon a representative of both sides for election to Congress. In substance they are a form of labor-management organization, trusted by neither side but used at times by both. The industrial syndicates are set up vertically in each industry, from raw material production to retail sales. The more general area type of syndicate is set up by municipality first; the municipal syndicates elect provincial boards, the provincial syndicates elect a national board. Franco appoints their chiefs. Skeptics claim that this complex structure averts labor-management disputes by keeping everyone so busy operating its mechanisms that they have no time or energy to spend on more basic woes, but strikes, while illegal, are by no means unknown.

The national corporations are autonomous agencies, managerial organisms whose function it is to give private industry state aid and encouragement. There are said to be 900 of these, of which ten are big. The estimate of their value varies with the commentator, and some of them are openly accused of having lavished money on schemes more grandiose than practical; it is perhaps significant that one of the largest, which was getting about 4 billion pesetas a year out of the government budget, was recently told it must make its own loan arrangement with the banks.

Obviously the existence of a government structure of this size in a nation of only 30,000,000 people raises a multitude of questions which are emphasized by the number of vast new ministry buildings now being erected. Like the ornate tunnel-tomb which Franco had built between 1942 and 1958 (reputedly with the labor of political prisoners and at a cost said to exceed $200,000,000), it represents in part a legacy from the past. Franco is not the first ruler to try to solve an unemployment problem by creating government jobs. Also, the ill is an old one; the Spanish bureaucracy, like the French, has traditionally been as overstaffed as underpaid.

What the structure was supposed to do was first set forth in the 26 Principles of the Falange, now reduced to 12 "Principles of the National Movement," proclaimed by the Cortes on May 17, 1958, as a synthesis of the "Fundamental Laws" which the people affirmed in 1947. Their phrasing is grandiose, and hard for

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a practical mind to translate. The characteristics of the state which they presumably describe were summed up by Don José Castán, President of the Supreme Court, as follows: "First, a profound respect for the juridical and political tradition as root and base of the historic conscience which orients and inspires the Movement. Second, an organic concept of economic life, anti-individualist and anti-party, constructed with interventionist elements and of a moderate syndicalist type, strongly preoccupied with social meaning. Third, as the most dominant influence, the Catholic concept of life and the world, imposing recognition of the primacy of spiritual values over those that are material, and giving a sense of harmony to the diverse state structurings."

Behind the busy façade of syndicates and state corporations stands an ancient agricultural economy operating in a semi-arid country with rainfall too uncertain for safety and with practices belonging to a feudal age. Before the war Spain usually managed to feed itself according to its own standards of living, which were then 40 percent below those of other Western European countries. Average annual income was about $250 per person (it has now risen to $346). It is on this primitive base that General Franco and his aides have been trying to build an industrial complex worthy of the Caudillo's ambitions. In this they have been enormously aided by American assistance over the past eight years.

It has been the fashion in both Spain and the United States to play down the importance of American aid—in Spain for reasons of national pride, in the United States out of political, diplomatic and military considerations. But the facts speak for themselves. The difference between the Spain of 1951 and the Spain of 1958 is not to be explained away by a couple of good harvests, a year of abundant rainfall or an extra turn of the dictator's screw. Undoubtedly the expansion in apartment construction, the new factories, the degree of improvement in roads and even in railroads is not to be credited wholly to American aid. But it is equally clear that this could never have been accomplished without help from outside, and the help they had was almost a billion American dollars appearing in one form or another within the country.

The first loan went to Spain in 1951—a wheat loan of $62,500,000. It was followed by a series of smaller loans in 1952 and 1953, and then, as the big cash for American base construction began flowing, by aid and loans of various kinds. By now, $894,800,000 of public money has been spent in Spain; by fiscal 1959 the figure

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will top a billion; and there is no indication that that is all. Nor does this include private loans. In a country with an annual income which runs around $6 billion (an average figure for 1952–54, which inflation has increased), an average input of an extra $100,000,000 is by no means inconsiderable. Nor is the argument sound that because part of that income arrived in the form of wheat, or cotton, or earth-moving machinery, or as a generative force for counterpart funds, it should not be added in. The 1957 report of the Banco Nacional, describing the impact of American aid and recognizing that the bases were finished and that less would henceforth be spent, observed hopefully that by using the earth-moving machinery which was used for the bases, a relatively small expenditure of pesetas would make possible agricultural programs which would very quickly bring about an increase in the food supply. The question that nobody dares to raise is what will happen to Spain when and if American aid should cease.

This picture of a dictator holding power by playing one force off against another, of a top-heavy state, newly rich in the bulging cities, given to grandiose expenditures yet pushing ahead with industrialization in a spasmodic attempt to balance feudal fields with modern factories, is itself an answer to the question posed earlier as to whether a corporative state is a form that works well for Latins. The country is at heart, in history and religion, schooled to a hierarchial society with little movement back and forth between levels. It has enormous arrears of tradition which make an undifferentiated democracy seem to its people alien as well as difficult. Its present spurt of energy is due in part to the increased degree of mobility which war gave it, but this does not mean that it understands or desires equality between levels in the American sense. The present system of divisions into syndicates, and of election to the Cortes not only by towns but also by occupational and professional groups, is a recognition of this ancient factor in the national character. It is also, of course, a way to quiet controversy and to freeze dissidents in their places.

If one can peel away the layers of language that do so much to conceal the workings of this state, it appears as a curious compromise, somewhere between the simple dictatorship of Primo de Rivera with the monarchy behind him and the equally simple dictatorship of a Hitler or a Stalin with their respective parties behind them. If it has elements of state socialism in the syndicates, it also has elements of state capitalism in the corporations,

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the latter enforced by the degree of state control exercised over banks, trade and so on. Nevertheless, it is clear that the best economic thinking in this régime has come out of those banks, which means out of private initiative, and that is a balancing element. For the first time in many régimes the government has been infused with an active economic awareness which dictates many of the things it does, and while opinions vary as to the wisdom of its economic advisers, the results of their work show.

The chances would seem to be good that if Franco has the strength, the courage and the luck to manage the eventual transfer of power from his own hands to those of his successor in such a fashion as to avoid crippling violence, something of this energy and organization will carry over. The Law of Succession is, unhappily, a weak bridge. In order not to give away power or make himself too tempting for assassination, Franco has carefully arranged that the agreed monarchy is to be headed by someone of royal blood *or* another Spaniard at least 30 years old if the Council of the Realm so chooses. But the Council of the Realm will hardly be sitting in a vacuum, and while Spanish history is full of poor rulers who followed powerful ones, the activity of the new middle class may prevent a retreat to old despairs. The underpinnings, like the steel threads that hold together the new apartment houses, seem much too slender, and a few of the new buildings have been known to crumple. Perhaps it is a good omen that most of them survive thus far. Whether they would survive an earthquake, or whether the corporative state will survive Franco's eventual departure, is anybody's guess.

As for the Caudillo, he has undoubtedly grown in stature since American aid began pouring in. Where the initiative first came from, whether it was he who attracted the aid, or the Americans who persuaded him that permission to build bases was a quid pro quo worth accepting, is not quite clear, but like the late Huey Long, if he did not plan all this, he certainly knew a break when he saw one. Meanwhile he has, in Spanish terms, been riding a wave of the future that is carrying the country into the heady swirl of international conferences. His foreign policies have thus far had a mixed success, but for the time being, at least, he has put isolation behind him, and behind Spain. The result may astonish both.

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AUSTRIA DRAWS THE BALANCE

By Bruno Kreisky

THE big-power conflict is supposed to leave practically no room for small states to manœuvre and advance their own concepts of international policy. The example of Austria does not entirely confirm this proposition. In 1945, we had a government with limited authority over a small territory; a tinier and leakier ship of state could hardly be imagined. Yet it managed to steer clear of the powerful currents that might have carried it beyond the horizon of history, and safely reached the beckoning port of independence.

Generally speaking, however, it is of course quite true that all nations—and the smaller ones much more than others—find themselves buffeted and harried by conditions created outside their own sphere. In this era sheer bigness appears to hold the key to a nation's survival, and woe to him who has little weight to throw around. Still, whether big or small, all must make decisions; even the smallest cannot wholly escape responsibility for the decisions that are theirs, and theirs alone. Indeed, small countries must not abdicate this responsibility if their *raison d'état* is not to be questioned. While they must attempt to accommodate themselves to facts beyond their control, they will, if they exercise the prerogatives of sovereignty, derive strength and comfort from a political practice allied to principle, rooted in tradition and hardened by historical experience. Thus, even in the obscure realm of *Realpolitik*, they cannot divorce themselves from the motivating force of free government, which will in turn sustain them in their trials.

II

Such is the background against which I shall try to describe Austria's efforts after the war to achieve freedom. The story is important because at moments when we had to arrive at certain solutions, in a period of great stress, the reasons why we acted as we did were not always clear to people in the West.

When the Social Democrat, Karl Renner, then 75 years old, decided to form a provisional government immediately after the Russians had marched into Austria in April 1945, he wrote a letter to Stalin in which he said that he felt called upon "to assume the

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task of the liberation of Austria from Fascism." The prevailing opinion in the West—not surprisingly—was that such a government could be only a puppet régime subservient to the Russians. (Among the members of the provisional government were Adolf Schaerf, now President of Austria, Leopold Figl, the former Chancellor and present Foreign Minister, as well as a few Communists.)

To begin with, the government functioned only in the Russian zone. However, Renner and his colleagues soon renewed their contacts with political leaders in the Western zones. Their somewhat haphazard coalition was speedily transformed into a government of the whole of Austria. Taking into account the limited mandate handed down to the provisional government by the Russian high command, this was no small feat. Perhaps the Russians thought that nothing would deflect events from their preordained course—least of all the antics of a shadow government destined for quick oblivion.

Regardless of Western opinion, the Austrians could not afford to procrastinate. A government in the Western zone, established by the Western allies, might have frozen the demarcation line and made the country's division permanent. Knowing what has since happened in some other parts of the world, one must credit Renner with remarkable astuteness and foresight.

Renner's immediate task was to invest the government with greater authority, and to get recognition from the West. Quite logically, he sought first to secure a firm mandate from the Austrian people; he called the nation to the polls in the fall of the same year. As a result, Austria regained its political profile. The Austrian People's Party and the Socialist Party established themselves as the twin pillars of Austrian democracy; the Communists were reduced to 5.42 percent of the vote.

This configuration has remained essentially unchanged. As it happened, Austria's rock-bound political stability, based firmly upon the general elections of 1945, was the essential prerequisite for the State Treaty, which we won almost exactly ten years later. At the time when Renner was pressing for elections he showed a single-mindedness of purpose that frightened some of our friends abroad, who argued that the Soviet Union would never allow free elections to take place. But fortunately, the Russians had reports from their Austrian friends which promised a Communist landslide.

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III

Though this is not a history of the first 13 years of the Second Austrian Republic, certain aspects of it ought to be stressed.

There was a time when the cost of living went up, unemployment grew and food was severely rationed. Things came to a head in October 1950. The Communists thought their hour had struck: their home base was the Russian zone, their staging area the Russian-run industries. Their master plan called for wildcat strikes, spreading suddenly throughout the country, disorganizing key industries, communications and supply; demonstrators were to clash with the police; finally, the Communist forces would rally for a determined frontal assault against the security organs of the state. It must not be forgotten that the Soviet army had the obligation under the quadri-partite occupation statute to restore order.

Under these circumstances, the Communists thought they could not miss: the scaled-down Austrian police, honeycombed (in the Russian zone) with Communist cells, would be quickly thrown into disarray and, having lost control of the situation, would be superseded by the occupation forces. It was as simple as that. Their aim—to turn eastern Austria into a "popular democracy" oriented toward East Germany—seemed within reach.

The main thrust was aimed at the labor movement. Austrian labor rose quickly to the challenge: the unions called on the workers to stay on their jobs; they carried the fight right into the Communists' privileged sanctuary, the Soviet-administered plants. Workers drove a wedge between the Communists and the police; clashes were avoided; the police, restrained yet firm, handled themselves exceptionally well—thanks in no small measure to the fact that a top Socialist was at the head of the Interior Ministry and a former worker was chief of the Viennese police.

At the same time, the Socialist leaders implored the Western allies to keep their troops out of the picture. On no account must there be bloodshed between Western troops and Austrian workers. The attempted Communist putsch was to remain an entirely Austrian affair, with the Government in sole charge of security measures and with the workers manning the first line of defense.

There were, of course, quite formidable odds. To the Communists, this was a ready-made "revolutionary situation" straight out of their textbooks—a run-down economy; poor food supplies;

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a weak security force, with Communists in some key positions; two Communist governments, their troops armed to the teeth, a few dozen miles from the trouble centers.

As it happened, the Communists never got beyond the initial stage. I am not recalling the event simply out of pride but with a purpose. There exists a widespread notion that democracy, by definition as it were, cannot hold its own against a harsh, determined foe, that it is too delicate an organism to survive the constant pressures of grimly competitive coexistence. I submit the Austrian record in rebuttal.

IV

An authoritative pronouncement on Austrian neutrality was first made at the Berlin conference of 1954, when the stand taken by our delegation pointed clearly in that direction. "It is the desire of the Austrian people," the delegation statement said, "to live in peace and friendship with all nations." It emphasized that Austria had "no intention to join any military alignment. Austria desires to make the principles of the United Nations Charter her own and to become a worthy member of that great family of nations."

This statement was greeted with muted enthusiasm in Western quarters. Some detected an attempt on Austria's part to appease and mollify the Russians. It soon became clear, however, that on the basic question of independence Austria was not prepared to yield an inch. When Molotov proposed "to delay the complete withdrawal of the troops of the four powers until the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany," he was rebuffed by the Austrians.

The Berlin conference came to a dead end. As I wrote at that time:

> We do not want our country to become divided into two military districts, each dominated by one of the big powers. Therefore, the only state treaty acceptable to us is one that guarantees that all foreign troops leave. We do believe, however, that to give us such a treaty would require neither great sacrifices nor substantial concessions from the big powers; that on the contrary, they might as a result benefit from a lessening of international tensions, and from the resurgence of hope and confidence among peoples everywhere, far beyond our borders.

In 1955 the Austrian Government was invited to send a delegation to Moscow for another series of discussions on the terms of a state treaty. By now, the Russians had changed their minds.

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Mr. Molotov no longer attempted to tie the departure of troops from Austria to a treaty with Germany. He was adamant, however, on a firm guarantee against another Anschluss, which, per se, had long since ceased to be an issue either in Austria or in Germany.

There were, however, military implications in the Russian attitude: Russia would be satisfied only with a declaration of neutrality on Austria's part. This the Austrian delegation was quite prepared to render. Austrian neutrality was defined as follows:

> The Austrian Government, having already declared at the Conference that it will not accede to any military pact nor permit military bases to be established on its territory, will render a declaration containing a definite international commitment to Permanent Neutrality as practised by Switzerland.

Again there were some who reacted with pained surprise to the quick and seemingly effortless conclusion of the State Treaty. It appeared to them that we had acted hastily, that, once released from the plaster cast in which the four powers had held it, Austria would promptly lose its balance again. They argued that Austria's stability had been assured by the two big boys glowering at each other over the country's divided body.

To venture out into the open without having sought shelter with one of the blocs seemed fraught with grave consequences. Whatever the merit of this argument, it had the flaw of presupposing a choice which in fact did not exist. At the very best, we could choose between neutrality and the status quo. At no time could we choose between neutrality and alignment with a bloc. And in fact what did the status quo amount to? Was it not itself a form of passive neutralization—neutralization by occupation? Under the circumstances, what alternative was open to a nation which longed to be master once again of its own destiny?

V

What did the State Treaty bring us? Above all, the withdrawal of foreign troops. Their presence had made Austria one of the focal points of the cold war, with the threat of permanent division never far removed; they were a source of constant high tension, an irritant always ready to break out in a rash and inflame a wider area.

How has neutrality affected Austria's international policies?

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In the Moscow talks the Austrian delegation had laid great stress on the preamble of the draft treaty, in which the Allies had declared that they would support an Austrian application for admission to the United Nations. The Soviets, on their part, had held up Switzerland as an example for Austria to follow—and Switzerland, of course, is not a member of the United Nations. Did this mean, we had asked the Russian delegates, that the Soviet Union would insist upon having the relevant paragraph changed? The answer was no.

When Austria became a member of the United Nations on December 14, 1955, there once again were misgivings in certain quarters; and, indeed, the pitfalls were obvious. Austria, one argument went, might be wise to shun the spotlight of the international arena, where, despite much vain posturing and empty bombast, nations are called upon to stand up and be counted. Why not keep at a modest distance and wait until things had settled down?

We gave the matter much thought, knowing full well that membership in the United Nations would determine Austria's international posture for a long time to come. We also knew, however, that in addition to incurring some irksome obligations we would derive international recognition from membership. Such recognition implied a measure of security which we could not have found elsewhere. This was perhaps the decisive consideration.

There are several neutral countries in Europe, and the form their neutrality takes differs considerably. In contrast with Switzerland, Sweden does not have any constitutional commitment to neutrality and its status is not guaranteed by other powers. It simply is determined to follow in time of peace a policy that should logically result in a neutral position in time of war. Indeed, when Swedes describe their status they prefer the term non-alignment to neutrality.

Swiss neutrality, on the other hand, is a firmly established concept of international law. The powers which have given it recognition have also undertaken a commitment to guarantee the inviolability of Swiss territory. However, the Swiss themselves have never invited outside intervention or any sort of unilateral action by a foreign power in defense of their neutrality. This was clearly stated by the Swiss Parliament during World War I: "Switzerland reserves to itself the right to decide whether, and

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under what terms, the aid of foreign powers might be called upon."

Clearly, the principle of Austrian neutrality bears a strong constitutional resemblance to that of Switzerland, whereas Austrian practice—membership in the United Nations being a case in point—is not far removed from that of Sweden. One may suppose that Austria will develop its own variant somewhere between the Swedish and the Swiss. There are historical and geographical differences as well as similarities between Austria and these countries, and they will account for the differences in approach.

The general subject of course lends itself to any number of interpretations. Not even Swiss authorities on international law agree wholly on the precise relationship between neutrality and United Nations membership. In the case of Austria, there was one interpretation according to which membership would be "strictly speaking, incompatible with permanent neutrality;" another advanced more flexible views, arguing that the Charter recognizes neutrality by implication. The latter noted that Article 43, Paragraph 3, governing the participation of member states in sanctions, provides that agreements are to be negotiated between the Security Council and members but implies that in certain circumstances a state may exclude itself. Attention was also drawn to Article 48, Paragraph 1, stating that either all members or certain members may be called upon to act for the maintenance of international peace and security, as the Security Council may determine. Here again the implication is that neutral states can be excluded from participating in sanctions. This, incidentally, is also the opinion given by Professor A. Verdross, a leading Austrian expert in international law. He pointed to the fact that at the time Austria was admitted to the United Nations, Austrian neutrality had already received almost universal recognition, and that in consequence members are practically obligated to respect this status in case sanctions are invoked.

Actually, it is not accurate to speak of neutrality in peacetime, because what the term really means is non-participation in war. An attitude of indifference toward the ideological struggle has more properly been called neutralism (as opposed to neutrality). But this should not be taken to mean that neutrality does not impose any obligations whatever upon a country in peacetime. Such obligations can be summarized as follows:

1. A neutral country cannot join a military alliance in time of

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peace because in so doing it would destroy its ability to remain neutral in time of war.

2. Similarly, a neutral country must bar foreign military bases from its territory, since they would diminish its freedom of action —or, rather, non-action—in time of war.

3. A neutral country must not accept any obligations—political, economic or other—which would tend to impair its neutrality in wartime.

The Swiss concept is that a neutral state should attempt to gain a position of trust with both potential adversaries; its attitude to any international conflict must be determined by this basic rôle. How the foregoing rules are to be interpreted, however, rests with the neutral country, since all such matters are part of its sovereign right.

In order to avoid such a situation, the Austrian Government has repeatedly stressed that neutrality, as far as Austria is concerned, is exclusively a matter of its own determination in accord with its own foreign and, of course, military policies. The Neutrality Law was interpreted by Chancellor Raab, on behalf of the Government, as follows:

> This law does not diminish the basic freedoms of the citizen. Neutrality commits the state, but not the individual. The spiritual and political freedom of the individual, especially the freedom of press and the freedom of opinion, remains inviolate. Neither does the law imply a commitment to ideological neutrality. Military neutrality (such as undertaken by Austria) does not contain obligations of any sort in the economic or cultural field.

VI

Immediately after the conclusion of the State Treaty, Austria took the necessary measures to ensure that the Allied troops would leave no "military vacuum" when they withdrew. Here Austria followed the example of Sweden and Switzerland, both of which hold to the view that military non-alignment necessarily involves the creation of a certain military potential commensurate with the country's strategic position, but not, of course, exceeding its economic resources. Austria has no illusions on this matter. Needless to say, a country with 7,000,000 people and a G.N.P. of $4.6 billion can never create a formidable military establishment. However, such measures as Austria did take have proved beyond doubt that it is a country that means to defend its territory. The simple fact of being legally in the right has never in

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history saved any country from having its neutrality violated by another country which was determined on that course. At no time have we been in any doubt that Austrian neutrality is only a function of an international equilibrium, and that it would be in grave danger whenever this equilibrium was disturbed. It follows, then, that Austrian foreign policy must always aim to help maintain the balance of power by contributing in all ways possible toward lessening international tensions.

At the time the State Treaty was being negotiated, the policy of containment, as applied to the Austrian problem, was essential. Now, however, what seems to me of paramount importance is an international understanding on disarmament and, following that, a military disengagement. This, I think, would provide the maximum of stability for Europe and, consequently, of security for Austria.

When a delegation of the Austrian Government visited Moscow in July 1958 the thing that was noted with the greatest interest abroad was the heartiness of the welcome received by its members. The reason did not lie exclusively in Russia's anxiety to maintain and develop good relations with Austria; clearly, the good fellowship displayed was also meant to demonstrate in a rather spectacular fashion how much the neutral status of a country can contribute toward improving its relations with the Soviet Union.

However, the widespread opinion that the Soviets accepted the State Treaty because they meant to create a model for a subsequent solution of the German problem seems quite erroneous. The difference in the relative importance of the two countries means that the two cases can never be equated. It would even be fair to say, perhaps, that a solution applicable to Austria is almost by definition inapplicable to the German problem.

Rather, it seems to me, Austria was intended to serve as a model for some of the smaller NATO countries. It was a time, be it recalled, when important military installations were to be erected on the territory of some of these countries; and the Soviet Union considered them a threat to its security. Moreover, the nature of the American relationship with the European NATO countries was changing. When NATO was created, the United States itself was not exposed to any direct military threat. Its offer to extend its powerful military shield—in a gesture of solidarity, as it were—over its allies could then be properly called

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generous. Since then, however, the American continent is no longer immune to direct military attack. On the contrary, the first blows in any future world conflict would probably be struck against the United States itself. In consequence, the American bases in Europe no longer serve merely in the defense of the Old Continent but of the New World as well. As a result, America's European allies have gained much greater direct importance for her, and in consequence have become more important in the eyes of the Soviet Union as well.

Still another reason for the renewed importance of Europe should be mentioned in this context. Stalin had practically written off Europe as hopelessly afflicted with capitalism. In his scheme of things the primary task of the European satellites was to provide a *cordon sanitaire* around Russia's western frontier. In this matter the Soviet Union seems to have made an agonizing reappraisal of its own. Communist China's mounting importance, especially inside the Communist bloc, has created a phenomenon often called "polycentric Communism." As a result, Europe as a whole has again become important for the Soviets. I noticed, for instance, that during the stay of our delegation in Moscow the Soviet leaders spoke again and again of Russia as being, after all, the "biggest country in Europe."

Russian motives apart, it was—and is—in Austria's interest to maintain good relations with all nations; and if for no other reason than this, Austria was not in a position to reject the hand of friendship so cordially extended. At the same time, the Austrian delegation of course took great pains to leave absolutely no doubt in the minds of its Russian hosts about its determination to keep the most scrupulous watch over the country's economic independence and political freedom. There have been rumors that some sort of pressure was put on the Austrian delegation; this is quite wrong. There were absolutely no strings attached to the economic concessions which Austria was granted. In any case, these concessions solely concerned reductions in the delivery quotas under the State Treaty.

The Russians appeared anxious to avoid any topic that might be disagreeable for our delegation to discuss. It was impossible, however, to avoid the subject of Austria's relation to Hungary. The Soviet spokesmen stressed that they would like Austria to have the same sort of normal relations with its eastern neighbors as it has with Russia. In the case of our relations with Czechoslo-

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vakia, we were able to say that they were comparatively free of friction. Relations with Hungary, on the other hand, we had to stress, had deteriorated considerably for reasons outside Austria's control. It had been Austria's duty to accept the Hungarian refugees who had sought asylum in October 1956, and this had impelled the Hungarian Government to assume a hostile attitude. In addition, of course, we also made a point of stressing the lack of security along the Austro-Hungarian border which, again, was attributable to measures taken on the Hungarian side.

The brief discussion on this theme was concluded with the Austrian Chancellor's expression of hope that there would be a gradual improvement in Austria's relations with its eastern neighbors. And indeed there is some indication that the Hungarian Government is trying to get back into the good graces of world opinion. Above all, it seems intent upon avoiding the recurring discussions on the Hungarian problem before the United Nations. And Moscow gives evidence of believing that the way for Budapest to improve its foreign relations leads through Vienna, and that relations with Austria should be improved as a first step towards a more general accommodation.

Austria's attitude towards the defeated Hungarian revolutionaries was based on humanitarian motives and nothing else. Austria believes it discharged its mission to the best of its ability and to the limit of its resources. At the Thirteenth General Assembly, Austria repeated an appeal to the Hungarian Government for an amnesty for those who took part in the fighting. Austria had suggested in the Twelfth General Assembly that such a request be included in the resolution on the Hungarian question, but for some inexplicable reason it had been unable to make its voice heard. It therefore repeated the appeal on its own initiative. The message which we tried to get across was that the Hungarian Government, if it wishes to return in good standing to the society of nations, must offer some tangible evidence of its deference to the principles of the United Nations Charter.

VII

A matter of overshadowing importance today is the movement toward European economic integration. Two aspects occupy the center of the stage at present: one is the Common Market, the other is the Free Trade Area. The first is already on a firm organizational footing and realization of the program cannot now be

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very far off. The Free Trade Area, on the other hand, is still a subject of controversy. The importance of both to the Austrian economy is self-evident. The six countries of the Community absorb 50 percent of our foreign trade and account for 54 percent of our imports. The Free Trade Area would receive 66 percent of our exports and would supply 71.6 percent of our imports.

In case it should not be feasible to gear the unfolding Common Market to a simultaneous move toward a Free Trade Area, a new preferential tariff bloc will undoubtedly be created in Europe. Such a development cannot fail to result in discriminatory practices against the "outsiders," *i.e.* the eleven remaining member nations of the O.E.E.C. This might destroy the valuable achievements of the O.E.E.C., won in a tenacious uphill struggle—among them the elimination of bilateralism (in which the European Payments Union has been instrumental) and the liberalization of trade between Western and Central Europe. Of course, the proponents of the Common Market argue that there is no need to worry about the outsiders, as the Common Market will be glad to invite them in—on prearranged terms. This, however, begs the question, as it is quite obvious that several of the possible members will be unable to join for vital reasons of their own.

Let me cite one example. The draft statute of the Common Market would associate all members with the overseas territories and possessions of some; in making the necessary arrangements, the Community would be guided (according to a highly competent source) "solely by an enlightened concept of the general welfare of the populations of these territories." But, alas, one man's enlightened concept of a people's best interests is another's idea of merciless enslavement—as today's colonial and semi-colonial conflicts demonstrate. Thus this problem also becomes involved in the common enterprise.

According to its President, Walter Hallstein, the Common Market will be a distinct political entity, not a mere coördinating body. "There can be no doubt," he writes, "that, in the last analysis, the creation of a federated state, or a federation of states, is the ultimate aim of the philosophy underlying the Common Market idea." Pursued to its limits, then, the idea of an enlarged community appears as the precursor of a political alignment grouped around the hard core of the Six, already tied together by military bonds.

In view of these considerations, the Free Trade Area, which

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would not impose intolerable limitations upon the sovereignty of its 17 members, would be a more practical solution for neutral countries. It would provide a complementary framework, linking the Community of the Six—the insiders—with the outsiders on mutually acceptable terms.

I believe that neutrality and integration do not necessarily exclude each other. We should approach these problems empirically, determining in each case the precise area of integration in view, whether it be military, economic, cultural or political, and formulate our policies accordingly. In this connection we should not forget that a nation which withholds coöperation in a necessary venture in economic integration may suffer some degree of economic atrophy and in consequence, as recent history has shown, lose its independence.

VIII

The foregoing is no more than a thumbnail sketch of Austria's foreign affairs but it may have indicated that many things look somewhat different in the perspective of Vienna than they do from Washington, partly, no doubt, because Austria is a very small country, partly because we are "closer to things." Our predilection for short-term solutions may at times irritate the architects of grand strategy. We nevertheless hope they will understand and bear with us. We on our side realize that Washington must carry heavy responsibilities all over the world, and so we give American policy understanding in distant areas, Asia for instance, even though sometimes a little chill may creep down our spine.

The peoples of Central Europe have been the raw material of history, pushed hither and thither according to the whims of superior powers. An Austrian born at the turn of the century grew up in the Danubian monarchy, came of age in the First Republic and saw it sucked into the Third Reich in time to participate in its decline and fall. The Second Republic rose from the ashes, but it was for a time a focus for the conflicts of the big powers. For Austrians, then, the first concern is for peaceful solutions, even if they seem makeshift and even if they may prove temporary. It is not only the grand design that matters; the little steps on the path of progress count also.

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THE THREE WHO LED

By Herbert Feis

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE U.S.S.R. AND THE PRESIDENTS OF THE U.S.A. AND THE PRIME MINISTERS OF GREAT BRITAIN DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF 1941–1945. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957, 2 v. in English. (American source for purchases, Chicago Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc.)

NOTE the title of these volumes! Throughout the Western world the recent struggle is known as the "Second World War." But in the Soviet glossary it is called "The Great Patriotic War."

This project of publication was first conceived, I am informed, while Stalin, sender and recipient of these missives, still held sway over the Soviet Union. It was suspended during the period when Khrushchev was repudiating the course and conduct of his predecessor. But when Khrushchev recanted, or found it prudent again to show respect for the memory of Stalin, the decision was made to release this full record of his correspondence with the Presidents of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain.

In the foreword a reason for doing so is avowed. "Tendentiously selected parts of this correspondence were published outside the Soviet Union at different times resulting in a distorted picture of the Soviet attitude during the war years. This publication is to help restore historical truth." The sponsors of this publication do not explain or particularize their accusation. And the contents do not contain evidence which justifies it. We may rejoice that the Soviet authorities, who have without any scruple rewritten and fabricated history whenever it suited them, have now developed a devotion to "historic truth." But still we may regret that it was left to the Soviet Government to appear to espouse that worthy cause by being the first to present in systematic form the complete collection of the written communications between the three leaders of the great war coalition.

Why did neither the American nor British Governments do so? In search for an answer the historian is compelled to wander among surmises; those who really know are not apt to explain. Except when defending themselves, governments abstain from competition and rivalry in priority in the publication of recent

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historical records; they usually see no reason for hurry and many reasons for taking their own time. The latter are variable. The archivists of all countries in whose custody such documents as these repose are more comfortable when recent records are locked up in their files than when they are released to roam in this predatory world. They may be criticized (or even lose their promotion or jobs) for permitting some revelation which an influential official or member of a legislature may judge unpatriotic or distasteful. A similar sense of caution constrains Foreign Offices—watchful lest some useful source of information should be stilled thereafter, worried about possibly providing some unfriendly foreign commentator with material that could be used to disadvantage, inclined to regard themselves as the custodian of national security, and mindful of the sensibilities of friendly foreign governments. Even more deeply ingrained is the caution of the military authorities (few more so than the American and British Chiefs of Staff) who resist all entry of outsiders into their records.

But perhaps no less pertinent in explaining this particular occurrence is a substantial professional reason. The historical sections of the American and British Governments who are responsible for the editing and publication of volumes of public documents appreciate that no collection of correspondence such as this can, *by itself,* convey an adequate or reliable version of the events and policies discussed. Important as the messages exchanged between heads of governments in wartime may have been in shaping the decisions and influencing relations of their countries, even these do not stand *by themselves* as historical records. For balanced knowledge of what was done and why, there is need to know much more; to have in hand at the same time the notes and documents which were the sills on which the top-level correspondence rested, the internal records of the decision-makers in each of the several governments, the memos of talks between diplomatic and military representatives and the messages exchanged between lesser government officials. All these crossbeams and uprights are properly deemed essential by the students of documents to arrive at a balanced knowledge of the structure of historical truth, and for critical judgment. This professional conception has determined the ordinary pattern and schedule of publication of the American and British diplomatic correspondence.

Historians are trained to defer to the expectation that historical realities are to be known in their fullness only long after they

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were current actualities. But in this instance I do not think it would have been imprudent, and it would have been more pleasing, had the first issuance of these documents borne an American or British imprint.

Taken by and in themselves, the volumes are reputable as a source. The collection is complete except for a few items of minor interest. There has been no tampering with the text nor any other sort of deformation of the originals. Nor, I have been informed, are there any distortions in translation of those which were written in the Russian language.

The Soviet authorities have not found it necessary to chaperon the correspondence by interpretive commentary. The footnotes which are clustered in the rear of each volume are short, factual and pertinent; they aid in identifying events, places, dates or persons referred to in the published messages. The treatment of the record, as well as the natural use of the English language displayed in the foreword and in the footnotes, suggests that the publication may have been edited or supervised by a person or persons trained in American or British universities or in their governmental departments. Could it be that a Burgess or MacLean lent his talents to the task?

II

How much do these volumes add to what is known by historians and informed officials of the West? Of important information, little—just some interesting filaments of detail about turns of relationship within the coalition and some elucidation of the causes of the growth of mutual dissatisfaction. Their character and range can be indicated by a few selections.

There is confirmation in one of the earlier messages from Stalin to Churchill (July 18, 1941) that despite the well-authenticated warnings which both the American and British Governments had passed on to him long before the event, Stalin did not believe that Hitler was going to turn against the Soviet Union.

> It may not be out of place [he wrote the Prime Minister a month after the assault began] to inform you that the position of the Soviet troops at the front remains strained. The results of Hitler's *unexpected* violation of the Non-Aggression Pact and the *sudden* attack on the Soviet Union, which have placed the German troops at an advantage, are still affecting the position of the Soviet armies.

The two words which I have italicized sustain the surmise that

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the reason the Soviet authorities did not defend their frontier regions effectively was not because of deliberate policy of strategic retreat but because they had failed in necessary preparations.

Another of the newly published messages similarly aids understanding of a British error in judgment—the ready acquiescence of Churchill and his colleagues in the summer and autumn of 1944 in the location of the boundary between the zones of occupation in Germany allocated to the Soviet Union and those assigned to the West. The accepted line runs well west of Berlin and of the areas reached by the American and British forces before the war ended, and later the Prime Minister sought intently to alter it. His comments on the progress of combat, such as those in the message sent to Stalin on July 1, 1944, clearly evidence that at this time the Prime Minister's unalloyed desire was to have the Red army continue to crush the German armies everywhere, and his anticipation that they would reach Berlin before the Western armies. He wrote:

> This is the moment for me to tell you how immensely we are all here impressed with the magnificent advances of the Russian armies which seem, as they grow in momentum, to be pulverising the German armies which stand between you and Warsaw, and afterwards Berlin. Every victory that you gain is watched with eager attention here.

By then the cross-Channel invasion was well under way. But Stalin had shown himself equally eager the summer before to have the Western Allies land in France and fight their way eastward into Germany as far as possible. This is vividly shown by the reproaches and rejoinders that passed between Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt during that summer before the final decision to venture on the postponed cross-Channel invasion. In these volumes there is printed for the first time the texts of the aggrieved messages which Stalin sent to Churchill and Roosevelt. The full force of them can be suggested by extracts from one sent from Moscow on June 24, 1943. After reciting his version of what had gone before, Stalin went on to say:

> It follows that the conditions for opening a second front in Western Europe during 1943, far from deteriorating, have, indeed, greatly improved.
>
> That being so, the Soviet Government could not have imagined that the British and U.S. Governments would revise the decision to invade Western Europe, which they had adopted early this year. In fact, the Soviet Government was fully entitled to expect that the Anglo-American decision would be carried out, that appropriate preparations were under way and that the second front in Western Europe would at last be opened in 1943 . . . .

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I shall not enlarge on the fact that this responsible decision, revoking your previous decisions on the invasion of Western Europe, was reached by you and the President without Soviet participation and without inviting its representatives to the Washington conference, although you cannot but be aware that the Soviet Union's role in the war against Germany and its interest in the problems of the second front are great enough.

There is no need to say that the Soviet Government cannot become reconciled to this disregard of vital Soviet interests in the war against the common enemy . . . .

I must tell you that the point here is not just the disappointment of the Soviet Government, but the preservation of its confidence in the Allies, a confidence which is being subjected to severe stress.

It was left to Churchill to correct Stalin's review of the record and repel his unjust assertions. Roosevelt did not pursue the argument. Perhaps he was mindful of the Washington press release which he had authorized after his talks with Molotov in the spring of 1942—a public statement that had the surface of a promise—or perhaps just because he saw nothing to be gained by doing so. The nature of Churchill's indignant, but restrained, response is conveyed in the answer that he sent to Stalin on June 27, 1943:

I am sorry to receive your message of the 24th. At every stage the information I have given you as to our future intentions has been based upon recorded advice of the British and American Staffs, and I have at all times been sincere in my relations with you. Although until June 22nd, 1941, we British were left alone to face the worst that Nazi Germany could do to us, I instantly began aiding Soviet Russia to the best of our limited means from the moment that she was herself attacked by Hitler. I am satisfied that I have done everything in human power to help you. Therefore the reproaches which you now cast upon your Western Allies leave me unmoved . . . .

Thus not only on the one hand have the difficulties of a cross-Channel attack continually seemed greater to us and the resources have not been forthcoming, but a more hopeful and fruitful policy has been opened to us in another theatre, and we have the right and duty to act in accordance with our convictions informing you at every stage of the changes in our views imposed by the vast movement of the war.

What, now that we have the complete survey of arguments back and forth, can be said about this generating cause of friction? The assurances given Stalin that the Western Allies were going to attempt some sort of cross-Channel operation in 1942 were vague and conditioned on further measurement of available means, probable results and competing combat demands and opportunities. But he was given more reason for believing that the operation would be launched in 1943, though still only provisional warrant for this anticipation. It was made easy for him to mistake expressions of desire and intent for promises or military forecasts.

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However, he was experienced and wise enough not to have done so. His protests no doubt expressed genuine disappointment; but it is probable that they were also inspired by the thought that by putting the Western Allies in the wrong the Soviet Union might gain advantage, somewhere at some time. Certainly Stalin was willfully unfair in his efforts to get the responsible British and American authorities to disregard or underestimate the difficulties, obstacles and risks that properly had to be taken into account. And he was also unfair in failing to accord due recognition to the efforts which the Western Allies were devoting to other operations against the Axis during the time which they judged themselves unready and unable wisely to attempt the cross-Channel operation. He did not recognize the heroic battle to retain the use of the sea lanes to Europe; the compressing campaigns which resulted in securing control of the whole of North Africa, gradually bringing France back as a competent ally and driving Italy out of the war; the crescending air assault on Germany; and, above all, the vast grappling and bloody struggles in which American forces confined Japan in the Pacific.

Stalin during this same period did not feel called upon to justify to his allies the Soviet decision to be neutral in the war against Japan; his own view of Soviet capabilities and tasks seemed enough. Just so, Western commentators will not, now that they have the fuller record, find reasons in it for inferring that Great Britain and the United States allowed their Soviet ally to bear more than its necessary share of the agony of the war either by intention or because of their heedless preference for other and more manageable operations.

The Russians, by entering into the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, had unleashed the Germans towards the West. But when, despite the grovelling Soviet efforts to mollify Hitler, the Panzers turned toward the East, the Russians demanded as a matter of right that the Allies ward them off, no matter what the consequences. What fools we and the British would have been to venture on the cross-Channel invasion until the military chances were acceptable!

III

Let me turn from these selections which concern military matters to those which add to our knowledge of the perplexing questions of what happened to an interesting political proposal made by Stalin. During the summer and autumn of 1943 he became

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aggrieved and aroused because he believed that the American-British combination was denying the Soviet Union a merited right to be fully informed about the policies being pursued in North Africa and Italy, and the chance to share in determining them. Thus, in connection with his complaints over the way in which negotiations for Italian surrender had been conducted, he informed Roosevelt and Churchill that he thought

> the time is ripe for us to set up a military-political commission of representatives of the three countries—the U.S.A., Great Britain and the U.S.S.R.—for consideration of problems related to negotiations with various Governments falling away from Germany . . . . I propose setting up the commission and making Sicily its seat for the time being.

Neither the President nor the Prime Minister repelled the proposal; rather the contrary. But the President stayed on guard. In contrast to his (and Secretary Hull's) later support for the principle that the policies pursued toward and in the defeated Allies of Germany should be determined jointly, at this juncture he preferred to retain flexibility. The purposeful interest which the Soviet Government and the French Communists had shown in North Africa had troubled him. And now Eisenhower and the American and British commanders under him who were fighting the campaign in Italy were worried about possible Soviet interference in their operations and policies. So Roosevelt tried to sheer away from immediate decision by proposing instead that the Soviet Government send an officer to Eisenhower's headquarters to join in the discussion of a settlement with the Italians.

The Prime Minister was no more ready than the President to grant the Soviet Government a veto right over the conduct of operations or the direction of political or social affairs in Italy. But he assented to Stalin's proposal—if it could be made to mean what he thought it ought to mean. It would have been understood, he explained in his response to Stalin, that the commission would not have the power to make final decisions; that would remain with the governments. It would have to be agreed that the commission would not interfere with the military functions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. It would seem advisable that the commission should, in the first instance, handle the Italian question only; and when other cases arose, experience would have shown whether this or some other organ would be the best medium for arriving at joint views and plans.

Here the further trail of discussion of this consequential proposal cannot be followed through the rather dense forest of diplo-

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matic foliage. But messages in this collection make it easier to follow it up to the Conference of Foreign Ministers (Hull, Eden, Molotov) in Moscow in October; for the terminal stage, however, the student will have to consult records of that Conference and the correspondence about the Advisory Commission for Italy.

In the outcome the President and the Prime Minister had their way. The commission that was constituted was authorized only to advise, not to determine, what was done in, for and to Italy. And later on, Stalin was wont to defend his refusal to accord the Western Allies an effective voice in the control of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania on the score that similar Soviet claims in regard to Italy had been rejected. When another commission was later established in London (the European Advisory Commission) to consider policies to be adopted for surrender and control of Germany's other satellites, it also was authorized only to propose, not to dispose. Through it the procedure for joint consultation was regularized; and by it many of the main accords regarding treatment of the Axis members were developed. But fortunes of war, relative military power, national and political purposes and geography—rather than principle—determined the measure of influence exercised by each of the three main Allies in each separate situation. Roosevelt and Hull never reconciled themselves to the rule of such realities. Churchill however did so. A year later he entered into an understanding with Stalin about the measure of their respective influence or "responsibilities" in the smaller countries of Eastern and Central Europe except Poland.

It is, then, for providing more or less new information about such matters that these volumes will be valued by the historian. But the interest of others will circle rather about the general impressions of the nature and views of the three correspondents which linger in their lines.

IV

Of the literary style and mode of expression of the signatories of these messages, those who lived through the period will find only familiar repetitions. Even the most routine of those sent off by Churchill were zestful, fluid and sparkling with the dew of his personality. Those bearing the name of Roosevelt were usually flat and friendly—the phraseology being the standard usage of diplomacy when the original draft was prepared in the State Department, stiffly lucid when it was produced in the Pentagon. Those of Stalin are dun-colored, purposeful, not wasteful of a

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word; even those conveying congratulations read as though they were taken out of a manual used by the authors of greeting cards.

Roosevelt and Churchill often expounded the aspirations and principles of democracy. Stalin rarely made similar attempts to secure approval of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

All three men deeply felt that they and the nations for whom they spoke were engaged in a noble struggle against evil and base cruelty; none had twinges of doubt that the agony of the war was well endured for the sake of preserving a conception of decency in human life and affairs.

This vital sense of good purpose ought not to be erased from memory by later regrets, in the way that some old frescos done by great Renaissance artists were covered over in duller times by duller tones.

Despite this common bond of detestation of the enemy, the only period when Stalin and his associates might have been induced to curb their aggressive temper and circumscribe their aims out of deference for their allies was in 1941–42, when the Soviet Union was in dire need of Western support and coöperation. Then, greatly suffering, on the verge of being forced to yield, the Soviet Government might have restrained its desire to extend its control far beyond its boundaries. Did not Stalin urge Churchill in 1941 to come with all available force into the Balkans? And did he not tell Sikorski that he would be content with only small changes in the Soviet-Polish boundaries as they had been before Germany and the Soviet Union had divided Poland between them? But after the Soviet rulers became reassured of their power to survive the German assault, and as the paths for expansion became cleared, diplomacy, no matter how skilled, could not, I believe, have induced them to restrain themselves. Their later course shows the revival of their determination to regain everything they had obtained as a result of their deal with Hitler; and to strive to get those further extensions to which Hitler had refused assent, such as the establishment of military bases within range of the Dardanelles. The change in the expectations of Stalin and his associates of what they could secure by the exercise of Soviet power is reflected in the change in tone of Stalin's messages —from amiability—to reserve—to bluntness—to bold rudeness.

The flow of these communications confirms the opinion that after the American Government had sent combat forces to Europe it could not, unless it had reached a definite understand-

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ing with the Soviet Union about war aims, have exercised a determining influence upon the course of most postwar developments in Europe. But it supports the belief that it might have done so in the Far East. For in that region we had by far the strongest and most flexible military force, and the conformation of the war in the Pacific enabled us to have our way in matters both of strategy and diplomacy. But we wasted our opportunity —most of all by clinging to the formula of unconditional surrender for Japan, and by publicly proclaiming our intent not only to expel Japan from the mainland of Asia but also to deprive it of all the rest of its empire, before we could know whether China and Russia would be permanent friends. If Roosevelt and Hopkins had had a more real and correct understanding of Stalin's nature and techniques, and if Marshall, MacArthur and Stimson had not attached undue importance to Soviet participation in the Pacific war, the whole scene in that region might be far more satisfactory today.

Now with our retrospective knowledge and chance to reëxamine the whole past, the prevailing American optimism regarding the possibility of dealing with Stalin on friendly and frank terms in a spirit of good faith and in a belief in his moderation is amazing. How did Roosevelt, how did most of the American nation, fail to grasp, or ignore, or overlook the traits which had enabled Stalin to get and hold supreme power in the Soviet Union? Among the variety of explanations that have been attempted for this fault of judgment, I believe one is of more importance than is usually recognized: it was that our perceptions were blurred by the more intense glare of Hitler's evil light. But considering again in our own day the inner history of Stalin's career, as known to many Bolshevik associates whom he mastered, how clearly the dominant traits appear: opportunist, sly, malevolent, persistent, most skilled in the graduation of pressures, ablest of all dissemblers, a person about whose every statement his familiars were apt to ask: what skein is he going to wind around that bobbin?

Churchill, of course, had a more caustic feeling about the nature of the Soviet régime and a more real grasp of the nature of the men who controlled it. But he failed to bring about a correction in the American view. This was partly his fault—partly ours. Roosevelt and those who shared his feelings and purposes were determined not to allow their hopeful belief in the possibility of coöperation with the Soviet Union to be destroyed; for unless this could be

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made to come true, they foresaw only grim disorder in the world. This devotion to a great political purpose inclined them to attribute prejudiced and nationally selfish motives to the advice of the British Prime Minister when he advocated bolder resistance to Soviet claims or actions. But Churchill's effectiveness in persuasion may also have been reduced by American memory of the effort he had made after the 1917 Revolution to bring about intervention in Soviet affairs, an effort which for many years had deterred any tendency toward reconciliation between the West and the Soviet Union; the Americans were afraid of being led into a repetition of this failure. Then also his reactions to Soviet actions and to Stalin's personality were deemed at times intemperate. They fluctuated over a wide arc of feeling and judgment. His rejoicing over Soviet military achievements inspired messages to Stalin of unqualified admiration. His satisfaction when some quarrel was adjusted found expression in messages which seem brimful of trust. But many more were devoted to contesting some Soviet action or tensely conveying his fears and criticisms.

As for Stalin, he was always measuring Roosevelt and Churchill. He never became so absorbed in his relations with them as to be distracted from essential Soviet purposes. He remains on every one of these pages a member of the Politburo.

It is permissible to imagine that these volumes might be reissued, say 25 years from now, under another title, "The Correspondence of the Three Men Who Presided over the Great Upheaval." By then, while the details of the correspondence will have diminished in interest, the significance of the events to which they relate will have grown. During this war period the dissolution of the British and French empires was hastened, the way was opened for the vast expansion of the realm of Communist control and power, the energy within the atom was released for weapons of destruction and for tasks of production; and the nations sought with a moving sense of longing to create a new and livable basis of association with each other in the United Nations. It is becoming that the mind should indulge in the prayerful hope that in that later time the upheaval will have subsided into a reliable state of stability.

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ECONOMIC REFORM AND RETREAT IN JUGOSLAVIA

By John Michael Montias

LAST spring the Soviet leaders, aroused by the solemn reiteration of Titoist principles in the draft program of the Seventh Congress of the Jugoslav Communist Party, chose to open a second ideological crusade against the Belgrade heresy. Surprisingly enough, Soviet recriminations, set forth in considerable detail in various issues of the Soviet magazine, *Kommunist,* made no direct mention of Jugoslav economic policies, permeated as they were with "revisionist principles." The battle against revisionism had to be waged by more subtle means: the Kremlin word-mongers aimed their invectives at Tito's notion of the "gradual withering away of the state" under socialism—a notion, of course, patently at odds with Stalin's old teaching about the need to strengthen the state in the period of transition to Communism in order to repress counter-revolutionary forces.

Tito's gradualist views had provided theoretical support for his policy of loosening the bureaucracy's hold over economic life. His doctrinal error could be assailed with impunity by the Soviets, whereas attacks on specific economic reforms ran the risk of backfiring if discerning Soviet readers happened to find the Jugoslav scheme of decentralization more consequential and more attractive than the one the Politburo had been seeking to impose on the Soviet economy since 1957. Already the idea of workers' management, which had been given concrete shape in the Jugoslav workers' councils, had been far too popular in Poland and Hungary after October 1956; and the other satellite economies would have been seriously contaminated if strong repressive measures had not been taken by the local Communist authorities. All in all, the Russians were wise to keep these infectious cultures as hermetically bottled as they could.

Even during the course of their first propaganda campaign against Titoism, which, starting in 1948, began to taper off only after the death of Stalin in 1953, the Kremlin agitators had steered away from serious debates over the merits and demerits of decentralized socialism.

At first, in the months following the Cominform resolution of June 1948, the Jugoslavs offered Stalin no ground for criticism of

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revisionist activity in the economic sphere. Central planning by administrative fiat still reached into every nook and cranny of economic life; rationing of consumer goods prevailed; and a class war was being waged which bore hard on the remains of private trade and industry. If anything, the Jugoslavs were guilty of leftist deviations both before and just after the 1948 break: the Cominform sheet, *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy,* declared in July 1948 that the nationalization of medium and small-scale industry had been carried out too hastily in Jugoslavia and had worked hardships on the urban population. It was also argued that the newly introduced grain tax, aimed against the richer peasants, would tend to disrupt food supplies.

Tito's forced collectivization drive of April and May 1949 also failed to please the Russian critics who objected to the peasants being pressed into collectives before Jugoslav industry could furnish the tractors and agricultural machinery essential to the efficient operation of large-scale farms. Ana Pauker, in a mid-1949 article written for the Cominform organ, noted with ill-concealed satisfaction that cattle had been slaughtered en masse during the months of April and May when the number of collectives had been doubled. Other writers harped on the revisions of late 1948 in the Jugoslav Five-Year Plan, which demanded still more sacrifices from the population for the sake of hastening the completion of key investment projects and for stepping up defense production.

The stress on accelerated industrialization had more complex origins than the Cominform papers could afford to disclose. Soviet Russia, soon after her dispute with the Jugoslav Communist Party had broken out, cut her own commercial ties with Jugoslavia and prodded her allies to do the same. Jugoslav trade with Eastern Europe, which had made up about half of the total volume of imports and of exports in 1948 (as against less than 20 percent in the late 1930s), dropped by seven-eighths in 1949 and came to a near standstill in the following years. Domestic industry had to plug the gap, at least until such time as trade could be switched back toward the West, with its more rigorous specifications and commercial terms. But even if trade ties had not been slit, Tito would have turned his political autonomy to account by building up Jugoslav industries to lessen dependence on Soviet-bloc imports. It was a common cause of complaint against Russia in official circles that Stalin, before the break, had wished to turn Jugoslavia into an agrarian dependency. No wonder the slo-

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gans of the first May Day after the original Cominform attack exulted over the newly-launched manufacture of trucks, which had formerly been imported from Czechoslovakia.

The collectivization drive and the more pronounced trend toward autarchy might not have seemed entirely out of keeping with past policies; but certain reforms proposed at the Second Plenum of the Central Committee of the Jugoslav Communist Party in January 1949 clearly pointed in a new direction. In his speech, Boris Kidric, who was to become one of the chief architects of the transformation of the Jugoslav economic system, first ridiculed the "fetishism" of administrative planning and then went on to argue that it should be possible, at least in the consumer goods sector, "to make supply and demand serve as instruments for planned distribution." The resolutions of the Plenum noted that the chief obstacle to improving the quality and the choice of goods in socialist trade was the persistent reliance on administrative rationing. Free sales could achieve the goals of rationing, provided the purchasing power of households did not exceed the value of goods placed at their disposal. The proportion of the output of state-run plants earmarked for unrestricted sale —at government-regulated prices—should therefore be increased.

Starting with this modest step, the Jugoslavs proceeded in the course of the next four years to dismantle the elaborate economic structure they had erected since the war. The economic appendages of the state had already begun to wither away.

In the second half of 1949 and in early 1950, nationalized enterprises in the textile, rubber and leather, coal-mining and power industries were transferred from federal control to the supervision of the five constituent republics. At the same time many plants of secondary importance formerly attached to the republics were entrusted to local peoples' councils. Several of the "General Directions," government agencies exercising operational control over individual industries, were liquidated. Economic ministries were reorganized into inter-industrial councils in which both federal officials and republican ministers were invited to participate. The idea behind these shifts, according to Kidric, was to vest operational controls in lower administrative organs and at the same time to strengthen "over-all planning" by relieving the planners of laborious detail.

In 1950, a move toward decentralization was also made in the socialized sector of agriculture: all tractors and agricultural ma-

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chinery were sold by the machine tractor stations to the collective farms, eight years before the Politburo thought fit to introduce a similar measure in Soviet Russia.

It soon became evident that more drastic measures to free internal trade would have to be taken if recurrent breakdowns in the provision of consumer goods to the population were to be averted. For the devolution of planning responsibilities to republican and local agencies seemed of no avail in correcting the uneven distribution of rationed and free goods: deliveries to retail outlets were seldom made in season or in the locality where they were most urgently needed. In the light of these observations, it was ordered in April 1950 that all goods not on the rationed list were to be sold "at prices corresponding to market conditions," which could vary according to time and place as supply and demand would dictate. Trade in these commodities henceforth was to be free, "unfettered by planned distribution or by any restrictions on sales within a given region or locality."[1] Though directors of wholesale trading enterprises were nominally empowered to fix prices, for at least a year federal and republican agencies continued in practice to have the last say in price-setting. Additional legislation had also to be enacted before retailers in the socialized network of distribution could choose their suppliers freely from among the nation's producers and wholesale outlets.

The most publicized reform of the year 1950 was the creation of the workers' councils in June. These councils, whose members were elected from among the entire staff, were charged with the analysis and approval of production and financial plans and with the general supervision of the enterprise's activities. The day-to-day business of workers' management was carried on by a "management board" of 3 to 11 members representing the unwieldy council (which sometimes numbered over 100). The director of the enterprise was responsible for all operational decisions, but his policies were subject to review by the management board. The workers' council could also instigate dismissal proceedings against the director if his management seemed unsatisfactory.[2]

As long as firms were bound by federal, republican and local plans, which predetermined most technical and financial decisions, workers' management remained a near-empty shell. This

[1] *Sluzbeni List*, 1950, No. 252.

[2] For an official view on the workers' councils and, generally, on Jugoslav economic reforms, see "Evolution in Jugoslavia," by Edvard Kardelj, *Foreign Affairs*, July 1956.

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shortcoming was stressed by Kidric in August 1951 upon introducing to the public a sheaf of new reforms, which, more than any previous or subsequent legislation, were to shunt the Jugoslav economic system away from the Soviet economic "model."

This time it was not just a matter of delegating responsibility for detailed planning to lower organs in the administration. Operational planning was scrapped along with its paraphernalia of allocation and production orders, its fastidious inventory checks and its incessant controls. Eventually even the all-powerful Planning Commission was deprived of its executive powers and turned into an advisory council of the Government for drawing up long-range development plans and analyzing current economic conditions.

By whom or by what agency were the output and consumption decisions of producers to be coördinated now that the authorities had resolved to do away with the bureaucratic supervision of the economy? Coördination was to be achieved through a flexible price mechanism, which would keep markets in balance, while the state, through indirect financial controls and its centralized investment policy, would nudge the economy along toward the long-term goals approved by the Party.

Prices were freed in three steps. First, the planners worked out new "economic prices" for raw materials and semi-fabricates. These prices were roughly on a level with the free prices of non-rationed consumer goods (which far exceeded the former prices of administratively rationed producer goods), while imported materials were priced according to a higher, more realistic exchange rate. Second, after January 1, 1952, all producers, wholesalers and retailers of manufactured goods were invited to set prices for their products on the basis of market demand and costs, in line with the recently established level of material prices. In the third phase, which was put off until May 1952 to avoid upsetting the freshly established markets, prices of raw materials and semi-fabricates were finally allowed to seek their natural level.

The stimulus given to the management and staff of socialized enterprises to mind costs and profits and take advantage of the new freedom to set prices was supplied by more generous regulations with regard to the allocation of profits. Formerly the state had arrogated to itself all but a tiny share of profits left to the enterprise as guerdon for its efforts. Now the state and the enterprise were to share accrued profits more equally, according to pre-

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determined percentage shares. Certain surtaxes could be levied on "surplus profits" (windfalls due to price changes), but not so indiscriminately as to cripple profit incentives. As the system developed, workers and employees of most industrial firms managed to earn the equivalent of one or two months' extra pay a year from the profit fund earmarked for distribution to the staff.

Other liberalizing measures were introduced at about this time. The remains of consumer rationing were eliminated toward the end of 1951 and in 1952, as were also compulsory deliveries of agricultural products by peasant farms. In January 1952, the allocation of foreign exchange to importers was decentralized by the creation of autonomous pools for the different sectors of the economy; in July, exporters, for the first time, were authorized to retain a substantial part of their foreign exchange earnings (nearly half), from which they could draw for their own import needs or which they could sell on a government-sponsored exchange market at higher than official rates.

The adoption of these measures was undoubtedly facilitated by the receipt of foreign credits and outright grants from the United States, the United Kingdom and France. This tripartite aid had gotten under way in 1949 but it had been greatly expanded starting in 1951.[3]

It took at least until the middle of 1952 before the old contractual and routine ties that had been knit between socialized firms under the defunct planning system had been loosened sufficiently to allow the new system to operate. By that time producers and distributors began to look around in the market and found ways of improving their profits by supplying items in demand and by substituting cheaper materials in their production process. They also began to take advantage of their freedom to set prices. Toward the end of 1952 prices of steel and non-ferrous metals already showed a marked upward trend. But by and large the price level for industrial consumer goods remained remarkably steady throughout 1952. This absence of any violent price movements in the wake of a complete transformation of the economic system bears witness to the care and ability exercised by the top planners in carrying out their reforms.

Still, it is fair to point out that the policy-makers would probably have been less successful if they had not kept a firm grip on

[3] From 1951 to 1955, the Jugoslavs received on the average nearly $200,000,000 a year from abroad, largely in the form of grants-in-aid and agricultural surpluses from the United States.

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the centralized investment budget (with an eye on the level of purchasing power) and on export licenses (making sure that goods in short supply did not leave the country). By taxing producers roughly in proportion with their wage bills, the authorities bore directly on production costs and influenced prices and output. The banking system, which now became the main vehicle for direct government intervention in economic affairs, was in a position to grant or refuse short-term credits to traders and producers for holding inventories in keeping with the central Government's price-stabilizing policy. By moral suasion and by threats of outright controls the Government also exerted pressure on managers of firms intent on raising prices; many firms were in a monopolistic position and would have manipulated prices to their advantage if it had not been for these inhibitions.

With these numerous qualifications in mind, we must still marvel at the temerity of the Jugoslav leaders in going ahead with sweeping reforms in 1952, a year in which the balance of payments was expected to deteriorate and the level of real wages of the population probably could not have been maintained, even if harvests had been normal. As it turned out, long stretches of drought plus spring frosts cut down yields of grain, vegetables and fruits by nearly 50 percent. Even with the economic aid proffered by the Western powers, which covered around 40 percent of imports, the Jugoslav Government was not able to forestall a 20 percent reduction in food consumption per inhabitant. Fortunately, industrial consumption fell off very little, at least until the last months of the year when imports of cotton, wool and leather had to be cut drastically to permit increased food purchases abroad.

Under these calamitous circumstances, it would not have been surprising if rationing had been reinstated for both consumer and producer goods. Actually, the measures taken by the Government to keep home markets in balance were relatively benign: export controls were tightened, the proportion of foreign exchange that exporters were allowed to retain out of their earnings was cut from 45 to 20 percent, and taxes were raised on the surplus profits of socialized enterprises.

The Government's liberal policy gained further momentum in 1953. Near the beginning of the year, Vukmanovic-Tempo, who played a decisive rôle in economic affairs at the time, called for the removal of the last vestiges of bureaucratic control over enterprises, stressing the job still to be done in giving managers

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more autonomy from arbitrary taxation and in contriving more flexible foreign trade regulations.

As a result of these general directives, the financial obligations of an enterprise toward federal, republican and local organs were fixed in such way that it became the residual claimant of profits rather than an equal partner with state organs in sharing these profits as it had been in the past. Measures were also taken to put the National Bank's credit extension policy on a more strictly commercial basis. Credit-worthiness was no longer to hinge on the priority of an industry in the general development scheme of the country or on some mechanical check of the applicant's sales-to-working-capital ratio but on its proved ability to repay and on its willingness to offer a high rate of interest for loaned funds. Sealed bids were submitted for (decentralized) investment credits and for working capital to the various branches of the National Bank and, later, to the newly founded Investment Bank, which were instructed to turn down applications offering less than a minimum interest rate. This minimum was not set in advance but depended on the supply of funds to be auctioned off and on the range and distribution of bids tendered. It is doubtful whether commercial loans were ever awarded by capitalist banks on such simon-pure competitive terms.

The auction principle for allocating scarce factors of production was highly popular between 1953 and 1955. Large quantities of wool, raw hides, rolled and forged steel products, lumber and citrus fruit, of both imported and domestic origin, were at one time or another sold publicly in this manner. It was found that the geographical allocation of the materials, which resulted from the auctions, differed radically in certain cases from the allocation that would have been achieved through the old administrative "key" for breaking down rationed quotas by region. This was a telling point against bureaucratic meddling, as long as the price system was thought to function sufficiently well: for otherwise the successful bidders might neither be the firms that were in most acute need of the auctioned materials nor those that could turn them into the most valuable commodities in the authorities' scale of social priorities.

Indeed weighty arguments had to be found to defend the auctions, as by 1955 the shifting winds of policy had already begun to erode the established principle of non-interference in domestic markets and in price formation. Back in May 1954, the state had

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imposed a ceiling on a few raw materials. By mid-1955, the list numbered 40 materials, including steel, coal, gasoline, copper and lumber, altogether amounting to some 50 percent of the total value of materials bought by industry. The reason for these controls, according to one commentator, was that all attempts to curb price increases had failed and no other course availed but to resort to administrative measures. Producers would not have been in a position to boost prices if it had not been for inflationary pressures which had upset the financial equilibrium of the state plans. Contributing causes to this inflation were a harvest failure in 1954, delays in the scheduled completion of investment projects, above-plan increases in the wage bill and the need to force a higher volume of exports in order to meet foreign obligations.

The increasingly overt use of monopoly power by producer-goods industries also helped to call forth the Government's repressive measures, though one might argue that the authorities would have been better advised to break up the monopolies than to obliterate the symptoms of their power. The industrial associations of socialized firms that had come into being more or less spontaneously in 1953 and 1954 should perhaps have been squashed at an early stage (irrespective of the contribution they made to technical progress by disseminating information among members). For they turned out to be the focal point for formal and informal agreements of a collusive nature that might otherwise have proved unworkable. After the state had fixed maximum prices, the associations could hardly be dissolved, for they now performed an essential bureaucratic function: wherever prices were too low to ration off the demand of consumers, the association was relied upon to allocate available supplies to consumers according to the order of priorities recommended by the state.

The officials of these associations with whom I talked in the summer of 1958 claimed that consumers preferred to be at the mercy of their suppliers rather than of a centralized governmental agency; at any rate, they urged, all interested parties were represented and their needs most carefully considered when materials in short supply were meted out. Serious complaints were said to be infrequent. These rosy views of the distribution process should be regarded with caution, in the light of frequent references in Jugoslav trade papers to the neglected needs of certain classes of consumers (particularly wholesalers).

Backsliding toward administrative methods proceeded apace

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throughout 1955 and 1956. Exporters were compelled to yield up to the state all but about 2 percent of their foreign exchange earnings. The interest-rate auctions for working capital and for short-term credits were gradually allowed to lapse; the auctions for investment credits survived, but only *pro forma*, as by 1956 the interest rate bid by prospective borrowers no longer counted for much in a bank's final decision to approve or to reject applications. To an increasing extent, administrative criteria—including judgments of social priority—again began to shape credit policy.

In agriculture the liberal phase of government policy got under way later than in industry, but as yet there have been fewer retrenchments. The number of farm collectives had shown a gradual fall from 1950 on, but it was not until 1953 and 1954 that peasants were allowed to desert these unpopular institutions in droves (the number of collectives dropped from 4,524 in March 1953 to 1,107 in 1954). Credits were also extended to private farmers in 1954. Soon after, free trade in land was restored; but the maximum number of acres a peasant might legally own was about halved (it is now anywhere between 22 and 33 acres).

Not all moves in the spheres of industry and trade have been retrograde in the last three years. As a matter of fact, it is argued by some Jugoslav economists that selected physical controls had to be reinstated *because* the authorities were willing to sanction more autonomy in the investment field, letting the organs of local government and socialized enterprises themselves take on the prime responsibility for husbanding the nation's capital resources. In the late 1940s, almost all investments had been funnelled through the state budget; by 1957 the republics, the local peoples' councils and socialized enterprises accounted for two-thirds of the total investment program. This financial decentralization reduced the state's power to steer the economy along the course mapped out in its long-range plans. Investment projects sprouted in all parts of the country, which had no place in the planners' timetable, but added their bit to the pressure of inflation.

There was also a more subtle disadvantage to letting communes and districts do their own capital budgeting: local organs, pressed for revenue, taxed the output of industrial producers and encouraged them to raise their prices. This was one of the chief arguments brought forward by Jugoslav economists early this year in favor of widening the scope of price controls.

The inflationary problem had been aggravated during the ex-

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cellent harvest year of 1957 by the spilling over of purchasing power into the hands of the peasants who bid up the prices of industrial goods and building materials. The Government's solution took the form of an executive decision, dated February 15, whereby industrial producers and wholesalers in socialized trade would from now on have to justify price increases for most products to a Price Office (*Ured za Cene*). Within a delay of 30 days after receiving the papers vindicating the firm's decision to raise its prices, the Office could "recommend appropriate measures" to superior authorities. In practice, this meant that the Office had veto power over price increases. The peoples' councils of industrial centers might also decree maximum retail prices for essential food products in their locality. After a number of applications for price increases had been rejected in the first months of operation of the Price Office, this potential veto acted to inhibit the price policy of potential "speculators"—as well as of enterprises with cogent reasons for adjusting their prices to new market conditions.

Regulations came out last October which went even further toward balking any price increases. Aside from the Price Office, the State Secretariat (ministry) in charge of trade has been made responsible for the over-all supervision of price controls. Local peoples' councils have been given far-reaching prerogatives in controlling prices of both socialized firms and private handicrafts. Illegal price boosts are to be treated as "speculation" and the persons responsible (among others, the managers of socialized enterprises) are to be punished according to criminal law. The level of local taxes, the land and real estate rents accruing to the communes and the prices charged for communal services are frozen at present levels.

This is where matters stand now; though I fear that all this tampering with the price system must make for still more administrative encroachment over the remains of market freedom. Once prices no longer reflect the state of market demand, they cease to be valid indicators for making investment decisions or for allocating other resources. They can no longer give expression either to consumer desires or to the priority scale of the authorities, so that the planners must step in with more physical controls to block the market forces which artificial prices have brought into play.

Can inflationary forces in 1958 be so much stronger than in 1952, when the country faced starvation and the burden of war production and investments was crushing the population, as to

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warrant a retreat from the courageous reforms hammered out in this trying period?

Consider how far the Jugoslav economy has traveled since 1952. Industrial production, which had failed to rise in 1951 and 1952 because of a shortage of imported raw materials, has just about doubled in six years, according to the fairly creditable official index. A crucial point is that the growth of consumer industries has lagged only a few percentage points behind the growth of heavy industry, in marked contrast with the situation in the economies of the Soviet bloc—where the gap between the two indexes has usually been wide. The productivity of labor in industry has risen about 25 percent (nearly 9 percent in 1956, when a drop in the investment budget and in purchasing power spurred industrial enterprises to trim their labor costs). In 1957, the physical volumes of imports and exports were both up 65 percent over 1952. Observers who have watched at close hand the evolution of the Jugoslav economy in the last three years agree that there has been a remarkable improvement in the supply, the quality and the choice of goods available to the population.

This information makes it evident that the decentralization of economic activity has not stunted the growth of industry in Jugoslavia as some Polish critics have contended. If anything, local government organs and enterprises have been too eager to spend their money on investment projects, for immediate gains in productivity, and on "social overhead," such as roads and communal services, promoting long-range growth.

In point of fact, the inflation has been only moderate; it has almost exclusively affected the prices of foodstuffs, which are about 60 percent higher than in 1952. Textiles are cheaper on the whole than they were in 1952. The prices of most producer goods not subject to control have shown only small increases. Since movements in the general index of retail prices seem to be most closely associated with fluctuations in agricultural output, ceilings on industrial prices are not likely to help materially in stabilizing the cost of living.

On the contrary, conditions have never been as good for the further liberalization of economic life. Jugoslav officials are the last to deny the accomplishments of the reforms of 1952 to 1954: the far smoother and more efficient channels of distribution, the revived emphasis on economic calculation, the more-than-perfunctory care for socialized property induced in workers and

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management by the profit incentive, and the greater effort now made by producers to cater to the desires of consumers, whether they be purchasers of lathe-turrets or of high-laced boots. Yet these officials sometimes forget how much remains to be done. Many industries—including steel and non-ferrous metallurgy and heavy chemicals—are not behaving competitively. Directors of enterprises have insufficient power to hire and fire workers (when firms are forced to curtail output, many inactive workers are kept on the payroll who could be employed more profitably elsewhere). There is still not enough incentive from profits to spur managers and workers to put all their talent and energy at the disposal of their enterprise. Investment resources are frequently denied to those industries and firms that could utilize them best by the standards of the market. Finally, the Jugoslav market has been insulated from world prices by means of a multitude of exchange rates (one for each major product or group of products), so that even prices of goods not subject to direct controls have tended to be out of line with their relative scarcities.

These are things that could be set right, given the will to perfect the Jugoslav model as it was conceived in 1952.

Otherwise the Jugoslav economy is in danger of backing up into the sort of mixed system that prevailed in 1950 and 1951: administrative decentralization with reduced coördination of physical plans at the top level and no flexible price system to take its place. If it came to this, the Jugoslavs could join hands with the Poles, the Czechs and the Russians who, starting out from the other end, have reached a similar stage of decentralization—but are still entangled in their own red tape.

A lesson may be drawn from the Jugoslav experience with institutional reforms. When all the reins of political authority have been gathered in a few hands and jobs have been created for a luxuriant officialdom, the dispersion of economic power requires conscious effort and determination. For government-decreed decentralization is not a natural order, toward which all artificial deviations tend to revert; its delicate balance is perpetually undermined by bureaucratic interference and it forever threatens to slip back toward the opposite pole of hypercentralized authority. It is to be hoped that the Jugoslav leaders, alive to this danger, will meet the current propaganda assaults of the Soviet Union, not with compliance and backsliding, but with the vigilant preservation of the goals already achieved.

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THE GRECO-TURKISH FEUD REVIVED

By Panayotis Pipinelis

FOR many years after the tiny new Greek state came into existence in 1828 it was unable in the nature of things to pursue a policy dedicated to the maintenance of peace. Its main aim had to be to liberate from the Ottoman yoke all the many regions where the Greek element was in an overwhelming majority. Only later could peace and security become its main objectives. At the time, the very *raison d'être* of its existence compelled it to become the nucleus of a national commonwealth wherein the whole Greek race could be reassembled and unified. The seven-year War of Independence had been fought under this banner, and the vision of a resurrected Byzantine Empire was in everybody's mind. In such circumstances the ensuing peace could have no other meaning for Greeks than a truce. Indeed, hardly had the new monarchy set up its provisional capital at Nauplia than it undertook strenuous diplomatic activity aimed at uniting all Greeks under the crown. In the young foreign office, departmental divisions were established corresponding to the provinces of the Ottoman Empire to be liberated, notably Thessaly, Epirus and Crete.

Obviously such sweeping claims could hope to receive satisfaction only in conjunction with the outbreak of a major war, and in view of the tensions created by the continuing crisis between Egypt and Turkey this did not seem very far off. But as time passed the chances of a general conflict seemed to recede, so that one of the most well-balanced of the Greek envoys of that day, Spiridion Tricoupis, representing his government in London, had to report in 1835 as follows:

> We must not expect much from the European powers who, in their earnest desire to secure the annulment of the Turco-Russian treaty of 1833, are ready to accept any concession agreeable to the Sultan. On the other hand the Philhellenic feelings of the years of the War of Independence are on the decline all over Europe.

In view of this melancholy state of affairs, Tricoupis urged his government to lose no time in undertaking extensive naval armaments with a view to an eventual *coup de main* in the Aegean.

I mention this proposal because it expresses vividly the spirit that pervaded Greek foreign policy in its early stages. It con-

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tinued to prevail through the nineteenth century and into the first two decades of the twentieth, undaunted by disappointments and reverses. Through all this period Greece always championed the principle of nationality, ready to exploit any opportunity with a view to promoting her national aspirations. Everything else—economic development, social well-being—was subordinated to this one purpose.

The price paid for such a national policy was high, but nobody demurred, and in the long view the returns were not disappointing. Slowly but steadily, Greece's territory was enlarged by the incorporation of the Ionian Islands in 1864, Thessaly in 1883, southern Macedonia, Epirus and the islands of the eastern Aegean in 1913, and finally western and eastern Thrace, together with the Smyrna area, in 1920. This policy of national unification was aided by several important factors: the undisputedly Greek character of the liberated territories; the state of decay and unrest in the Ottoman Empire; the economic and cultural superiority of the Greek race as compared with the other racial elements in the Balkan Peninsula at that time; and the mutual antagonisms of Great Britain, France and Russia in that part of the world.

II

The Treaty of Lausanne of July 1924 marks a turning point, at the end of this long period of national resurgence and expansion. The territorial and economic provisions of the treaty are well known, but equally important are their political and national implications and their psychological impact on the minds of two of its principal signatories, Greece and Turkey.

For Greece, the Treaty of Lausanne did not represent just another truce in the long struggle against the Turks. It meant a *final arrangement*, implying the wholehearted acceptance of the new status quo and the willingness to abandon forever all aspirations to revive the Byzantine Empire. It meant a complete reappraisal of the Greek position in southeastern Europe in the light of the new circumstances.

During the period 1912–1922 Greece had, indeed, reached the extreme limits of her military and political potentialities. Against the better judgment of King Constantine and his military advisers, she had deliberately entered the war by the side of the Entente in 1916, in anticipation of further territorial aggrandizements. Encouraged by initial successes, she had embarked on her

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ill-fated expedition in Asia Minor, where the Turkish element constitutes the great majority of the population. By overstretching her military capacities while she was divided internally by political and constitutional controversies, and being left to fend for herself after the repudiation of the Treaty of Sèvres by its principal signatories, Britain, France and Italy, she consumed all her energies and finally collapsed into disaster. Further, the evacuation of more than a million refugees from Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor and their settlement in Greece faced the country with a new set of formidable problems, economic, technical and demographic.

Meanwhile the emergence of new and vigorous national states in the vicinity—Jugoslavia, Bulgaria and Turkey—made it impossible for the Greek element in the Balkan Peninsula to think any longer of dominating the whole area by virtue of the economic and intellectual superiority which it had enjoyed in the time of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires. The economic and military conditions that had made the Byzantine Empire possible in the remote past had ceased to exist and Greece had to accept the new situation. It was because a considerable part of Greek public opinion headed by King Constantine realized this fundamental change that it opposed the expansionist program of Venizelos in Asia Minor. For a time, nevertheless, the brilliance of Venizelos' leadership concealed the weakness inherent in his policy. But the military disaster in Asia Minor revealed beyond any dispute the basic change in the position of the Greek nation and inevitably led to a general reassessment of Greek policy.

There is surely an element of personal drama in the fact that the historic task of carrying out this reassessment fell upon Venizelos himself, the very man who had inspired his country in its last and most brilliant achievement of national expansion. Addressing the Chamber in the course of a debate on naval rearmament on February 10, 1930, he referred to Greece's new relations with Turkey, and concluded his speech as follows:

> Greece accepts in good faith the contractual obligations that put an end to the late war, both those which are favorable to her and those which are not.... So long as the concept of Greater Greece determined our policy, we were compelled to bend our energies to securing naval supremacy in the Aegean. But, since we have accepted the frontiers fixed in the last treaties, and as we are firmly decided to live within these frontiers, the necessity of naval supremacy in the Aegean no longer has any foundation.

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This was no mere oratorical statement. For not only was it accepted by all political parties but, as already mentioned, it corresponded to the hard facts facing a country ruined by war, threatened at many points along its long northern frontier and struggling against overpopulation and misery. The profound social changes consequent on the war and defeat facilitated this diplomatic and intellectual realignment. A new ruling class, mainly recruited among the rapidly expanding industrial and commercial ranks of society, and a corresponding development of the working class, directed public interest towards new and pressing problems of an economic and social character. The very foundations of expansive nationalism were shaken.

At the same time Turkey was also undergoing a similar process of readjustment of her national aims. The theocratic and imperial concept on which the Ottoman Empire was founded had been superseded by Ataturk's new national and lay state. Defeat and foreign domination had also demonstrated in Turkey's case the impossibility of domination over other neighboring peoples. Moreover, the coalition of the Western powers opposing her had decided against her total dismemberment only because of the military and political eclipse of her formidable northern neighbor; and this brought home to the new Turkish leaders the necessity of more safeguards on their country's western frontier. At the Lausanne Conference, although Turkey stubbornly defended her claims, she gave ample evidence of this awareness. This made possible the final settlement on the basis of the new concept of national states. Turkey and Greece found themselves on common ground with regard to their respective policies, confirming their reciprocal claims within the limits of their indisputably national territories.

III

A long and protracted period of readjustment followed the acceptance of this new concept of policy.

In the north, Jugoslavia had to become reconciled to the new state of things in Macedonia. By their exorbitant demands concerning the free zone in the port of Salonica overconfident Jugoslav statesmen had alienated for a time Greece's long-established friendship. Bulgaria, resentful and still unrepentant after her last two defeats, maintained a state of undeclared guerrilla war on the Greek frontier. Fascist Italy, having already set foot in

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Albania, threatened Greece from the northwest. And the exchange of populations with Turkey created many difficult problems, both financial and political.

It is to the credit of Venizelos that by a series of imaginative agreements he succeeded in reducing tension with Italy, effecting a reconciliation with Jugoslavia, and, last but not least, wiping out the remaining differences with Turkey. This persistent effort culminated in the signature of a pact of friendship with Italy in September 1928, a pact of friendship with Jugoslavia in October 1929, and a general settlement of outstanding questions with Turkey in June 1930, followed by a treaty of friendship and a protocol for the limitation of naval armaments. This network of friendships, old and new, served equally well the interests of all the countries concerned.

At the time these readjustments were being completed the world-wide implications of Fascist and Communist designs were not fully discernible, and Hitler's aspirations had as yet no solid foundation. The Balkan agreements of the period were based on the assumption of neutrality vis-à-vis the European powers. The slogan "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples" was a generally accepted if not explicitly stipulated premise. But as Fascist and then Nazi aggressive policies took on more definite shape it became evident that the agreements of 1928–1930 should be supplemented by a common defense policy. After long negotiations, new defensive agreements were signed in the years 1933–38, but their scope was limited to a local Balkan *casus belli*, namely a potential Bulgarian aggression. Greece and Turkey were reluctant at that time to enter into military agreements of a wider character lest they arouse Italian or Russian susceptibilities. This limitation, agreed upon and recorded in secret documents annexed to the main treaties, proved to be fatal. When Italy attacked Greece, and when later Germany took military and diplomatic action in the Balkans in order to support the badly-shaken Italians in Albania and at the same time to secure the southern flank of her armies in preparation for her attack on Russia, the inadequacy of these agreements became apparent. The whole defensive system disintegrated and one after the other the Balkan countries fell beneath the Nazi sway.

The lesson from this failure did not pass unnoticed. When a new danger, coming this time from Russia and her satellites, loomed up after the war, Greece and Turkey turned to their war-

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time allies and asked to be admitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The isolationist concept of "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples" had obviously become out of date as a consequence of the new strategic situation in the world. Peace and security could be bought only at the price of subscribing to reciprocal agreements with the rest of the free world.

On the other hand, the geographical and military position occupied by Jugoslavia, Greece and Turkey formed an important link in the defense of Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Its strategic implications, from the point of view of both defense and attack, were summarized by Major General William H. Arnold before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during its investigation into the implications of the Mutual Security Act in March 1952, as follows:

> Greece and Turkey occupy extremely strategic positions. The loss of Greece would provide the Soviets with an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea, threaten the flanks of both Turkey and Italy, expose the southern boundary of Jugoslavia, and cause further unrest in the Middle East. Geography has placed Turkey in the most strategic position of any member of NATO on the Soviet periphery. She faces Bulgaria on the west, controls the vital Straits and borders the Soviets for some 200 miles on the east. Turkey is NATO's anchor on the south, a position that requires great strength.
>
> Both Turkey and Greece are poor when compared with other members of NATO. Luckily this poorness applies only to material things, for both countries possess a priceless wealth in fortitude and stoutheartedness, spelled simply g-u-t-s.

In fact, the adherence of Greece and Turkey to NATO was welcomed as an important contribution both to their own security and to the general defensive system of the alliance. Had it not been accepted in time, the present Russian drive into the Middle East would have been directed eventually towards the Bosporus and the Aegean and, from a military viewpoint, there would have been practically nothing to oppose it.

IV

Recent developments have considerably reduced the effectiveness of this defensive system, to the detriment of both Greece and her allies.

The increasing tension between Jugoslavia and the Soviet bloc reflects the difficulties and uncertainties inherent in Tito's tightrope policy between East and West. Not being a member of NATO, Jugoslavia cannot be counted on as a potential ally in

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case of open Russian aggression in the Balkans. Nevertheless, her determination to defend her own territorial integrity against any threat or infiltration reinforces the military position of Greece and Turkey in the event of an all-out Russian attack in that area. Moreover, the use of the Bulgarian corridor by an invader from the north for a limited attack on Turkey or Greece, with an uncertain Jugoslavia on Bulgaria's flank and rear, would be a risky undertaking. It was precisely for this reason that Hitler, after the Belgrade coup d'état of March 27, 1941, had to delay the advance of his armies through Bulgaria into Greece until he had first disposed of Jugoslavia. The consolidation of Jugoslavia's present attitude as an uncommitted country thus contributes to the defense of the Balkan sector. But precisely for that reason—not to speak of the existing ideological controversies between Soviet and Jugoslav Communists—it is unlikely that Russia will ever really put up with the present situation, whatever the vicissitudes of her official relations with Tito's régime. The long and tedious dissertations on the merits of "many roads to socialism" or of "socialist solidarity" in which the Cominform countries indulge in the course of their attacks against Tito can hardly conceal the real issue. In any case, the deterioration of the situation in this quarter places Greece and Turkey in a position of great uncertainty.

It is all the more to be regretted that Greco-Turkish coöperation, so painfully achieved after years of hostility, is now undergoing the heaviest strain in its short but fruitful history as a result of the Cyprus issue. Viewed from the angle of the common strategy of defense, the revival of the century-old Greco-Turkish feud constitutes a distinct setback.

It is idle to disguise the fact that the Cyprus dispute has by now gone beyond the limits of the original controversy and by reviving old suspicions and smoldering antagonisms has brought us back to the state of things which existed prior to the Greco-Turkish arrangements of the 1930s. This has to be fully realized if the implications of the Cyprus issue are to be understood at all.

As long as the controversy was limited to a legal and diplomatic debate on granting Cyprus the possibility of exercising the right of self-determination, with Britain as Greece's main antagonist and Turkey remaining resentfully silent in the background, Greco-Turkish relations were only slightly affected. The press on both sides confined itself to polite warnings and more or less

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friendly complaints, while the Turkish Government restricted its interference to tactful reminders that to raise the issue in the United Nations would seem "ill-timed." This Turkish attitude was misconstrued by over-optimistic Greek diplomats as amounting to conditional acceptance of the Greek view. A more positive démarche of the Turkish Ambassador, for some odd reason, never reached the highest quarters in Athens. The Greek Government remained under the impression that, however severely the Cyprus issue might affect Greco-British relations, the Turco-Greek friendship would not be seriously affected, the more so since relations between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus itself had remained friendly for centuries in spite of the permanent state of hostility between the mother countries.

In course of time, as Turkish intervention became more outspoken and stiffer, Greek public opinion grew more restive and indignant, suspecting—perhaps not entirely without reason—that the Turks were acting under British instigation. This Turkish intervention in opposition to a national claim concerning an island by all standards overwhelmingly Greek, and in regard to which Turkey had formally given up all rights by virtue of a treaty signed by her at the end of a victorious war, was deeply resented in Greece. To the Greeks, it seemed hardly conceivable that the pledges of the United Nations Charter should not be applicable to a population whose political and cultural level is far higher than in many countries long ago accorded self-determination. After the savage outburst of anti-Greek fanaticism in Istanbul and Smyrna in September 1955, resentment gave place to open hostility and the long heritage of national enmity once more came to the surface in all its crudity and bitterness.

In Turkey, on the other hand, Greece's insistence on self-determination for Cyprus has been interpreted as a revival of Greek expansionism with all its sinister implications. The alleged importance of Cyprus for Turkey's security can be understood only if seen against this background of suspicion. In the hands of a friendly nation—as Greece sincerely and unreservedly wants to be—Cyprus could hardly be used otherwise than in the interests of the common cause. But the memories of the Greek invasion of Asia Minor after the First World War still cast their dark shadow on the Cyprus issue. A certain element of bargaining for diplomatic advantages may also have come into play.

As a result of the interplay of these intricate motives, the

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Cyprus dispute has taken on the aspect of a real tragedy. The elements in it which are irreconcilable do not lie in the issue itself but in its historical background and in the formidable national problems it raises. That these problems are in fact little more than an echo of old conflicts very few will seriously contest.

That this could ever occur reveals the fragility of the Greco-Turkish reconciliation of 1930. Time had not yet permitted the work then achieved to become consolidated, and the deep emotional undercurrents which agitate this part of the world have frustrated the efforts of individuals. All the nations in this area have been in turn the nuclei of great empires, and the memory of past glories, defeats and humiliations still survives. Only after a long period of stability and peace would it be possible for the embers to be extinguished and covered at last by the dust of time. But on each occasion, long before that could happen, fresh conflicts, invasions or internal convulsions would intervene to destroy what had been done to establish peace and stability. This is what gives the whole area the distinct shade of tragedy which matches the barren austerity of its landscape and is revealed in the gravity of look and demeanor of women and men and in the plaintive melodies of their songs, despite radiant skies and serene seas. It compensates for many other deficiencies, but it also makes life arduous and policy often sterile.

V

How far can this situation now be redressed, if that is at all possible?

An improvement in Greco-Turkish relations presupposes at least a temporary or limited solution of the Cypriot problem, and this in turn postulates a revival of mutual confidence. No wonder, therefore, that a great deal of diplomatic skill has been wasted in the idle effort to square the Cypriot circle. Nevertheless, recent diplomatic developments may indicate some encouraging changes which should not be lost to sight. Are they due to an increasing awareness of the risks involved, or merely to the miraculous effects of Metternich's cynical axiom, "Eventually, every affair will somehow find its end"?

Whatever the reason, both Turkey and Greece, while firmly upholding their respective positions concerning self-determination or partition, have in fact moved somewhat toward a de facto agreement. A careful study of their respective attitudes vis-à-vis

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the Macmillan plan of last June seems to corroborate the emergence of a few preliminary points tacitly or even explicitly accepted by the three main parties to the dispute. These points of more or less general agreement can be summarized as follows:

1. That under present conditions a final settlement of the Cypriot problem is hardly possible and that in its absence a temporary agreement for the administration of the island should be worked out.
2. That this agreement, covering a limited period, say seven years, should be based on integration of the two communities, with a clear majority of the Greek element in the organs of central government.
3. That this agreement should in no way prejudice the final settlement of the problem.

In his reply to the Macmillan proposals, Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu pledged his Government's willingness to collaborate in the implementation of the British plan, while at the same time pointing out that in his opinion this plan "was not irreconcilable with partition."

In his turn, Sir Hugh Foot, the Governor of Cyprus, pointed out unequivocally in his statement of August 1, that "there must, therefore, be a course set for a period of years, which leaves the final solution open."

On the other hand, M. Karamanlis, in his statesmanlike letter of August 19 to the British Prime Minister, while firmly upholding the Greek Government's attitude regarding the introduction of democratic self-government in Cyprus, clearly implied the acceptance of a provisional régime on condition that all provisions leading to partition were dropped from the plan. "In general," M. Karamanlis concluded, "our observations, as Your Excellency will notice, seek to remove from your plan those elements which divide the Cypriots in an almost organic way instead of promoting concord and coöperation. . . . I am afraid, Mr. Prime Minister, that the plan put forward by the British Government, without the modifications of the Greek Government, will not serve the purpose which you have proclaimed."

Thus the whole problem boils down to the question of devising appropriate constitutional machinery for a provisional administration of the island which, while it secures the widest possible measure of integration and self-government, will at the same time

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rule out both partition and Enosis (Union with Greece). Given good will and mutual confidence, it should not be impossible to work out a constitutional formula adapted to the circumstances. The real difficulty resides precisely in the lack of confidence which is even more indispensable when it is a question of securing the coöperation of two separate ethnic groups, destined to live together and collaborate in the administration of their common country.

Viewed in this context, it seems of paramount importance that any reference to Mr. Lennox-Boyd's statement of December 1956 concerning partition should be eliminated. The coöperation of neutrals in the machinery of government will also be of a great help for reëstablishment of confidence. The reorganization of the police force and the administration of justice under the supervision of neutral commissioners would help to foster general acceptance of the new administration. The nomination of the members of the High Court, which constitutes an essential part of the Macmillan plan, should also be entrusted to an independent body, for instance the World Court.

The new experiment, if ever carried through, will certainly exceed in importance its immediate aims. It will provide administrative machinery which will serve the needs of the Cypriot people even beyond its time limit, and which will continue to be applicable whatever the final solution adopted at the end of the seven-year period. Turks and Greeks will learn again to live together, and this is equally indispensable whether under the status of an independent country or any other international régime to be agreed upon. Cyprus, the bitter apple of discord which threatens to undermine the whole structure of Atlantic defense in Southeastern Europe, should be a link between three allied countries bound together by a common destiny. Given statesmanship and creative imagination, this may yet be possible.

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POLITICAL DIVORCE IN BURMA

By Frank N. Trager

BURMA has just completed a decade of independence. The tenth year began auspiciously.

To all appearances there was a high degree of political unity. A government formed in 1948 by the dominant party, the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (A.F.P.F.L.), had won huge parliamentary majorities in the two national elections of 1951 and 1956 and could look forward with confidence to the next. In the first month of 1958, it concluded its third All-Burma National Congress by approving, in an apparent burst of unity, a resounding four-hour speech by the Prime Minister, U Nu, which dedicated the party to democratic socialism and Buddhism and opposed Communism and Marxism, identified as synonymous.

The economic outlook was not unpromising. An economy based largely on the production and export of rice and a few other primary products had weathered the recession that followed the Korean War; was slowly being diversified; and was responding to a moderated industrial program adopted in 1956 after the first expansive planning spree had been sobered by the realities of economic development.

Domestic order was improving. A series of insurrections, started by assorted groups of Communists in 1948 and followed the next year by the rising of a major ethnic minority, the Karens, was close to attrition and liquidation. At one time these rebellions had threatened the very existence of the republic. By October 1957 nearly 30,000 rebels had surrendered. An amnesty campaign in conjunction with a steady increase in the strength of the Burma Defense Services supported the hopes for internal peace.

And finally, a neutralist foreign policy, cautiously directed toward friendship with all countries but unafraid to take independent stands on such issues as the Korean War, Suez and Hungary, had served the government well, gradually gaining for it genuine respect in many world capitals and in the United Nations.

The tenth year of Burma's independence, however, proved to be a troubled one, disturbing to her citizens and to her friends abroad.

In April 1958, the ruling coalition party, the A.F.P.F.L., irretrievably split into two bitterly hostile factions. Each side was

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led by two of the country's four most prominent political figures, who had been in constant association since the early days of the struggle for independence. Prime Minister Nu and a Deputy Prime Minister, Thakin Tin, headed the faction known as the "clean A.F.P.F.L." group. Deputy Prime Ministers Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein commanded the other group, known as the "real A.F.P.F.L."

This political crisis severely tested constitutional and democratic continuity. Until October 28, U Nu retained control of the government by a slim majority of eight votes, including those of erstwhile opponents, the crypto-Communists in Parliament parading under a variety of labels. Many citizens in Burma feared that the verbal violence of the conflicting factions would deteriorate into physical violence. Public and private industrial and commercial activity slowed down because of the uncertainty of the political situation. In addition, drought and flood conspired to diminish the 1957 harvest and consequently the 1958 export of rice, while lower world prices for other primary (mineral) products further impaired foreign exchange earnings.

Finally, U Nu resigned in favor of a new government headed by the Chief of Staff, General Ne Win, and the scheduled elections were postponed. The advent of the army contributes stability to the country at a time of political conflict and ensures against Communist subversion; but its assumption of control, however temporary and legal, inevitably gives rise to other anxieties about the future of parliamentary democracy in Burma.

II

Contrary to news reports as well as to partisan accusations, the cause of the political split was not doctrinal or ideological. Rather, the break occurred as the climax of prolonged irritation and suspicion among the leaders of the A.F.P.F.L. These men (and their often politically active wives) had worked together for almost two decades in which too many burdens had been carried by too few of them. They did not know how to broaden their ranks and lighten their loads, or they were reluctant or did not take the time to do so. Frequently they merged their rôles as cabinet officers and policy-makers with the daily tasks of operating the regular departments of government and the public sector of the economy. Although they still were comparatively young (U Nu was born in 1907, most of the others about 1915), they had been engaged

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in active daily leadership of the nationalist struggle, the war and independence without interruption for 20 years. They had been together too long.

What precipitated the split was a conflict over the appointment of the secretary of the A.F.P.F.L. This post has always been regarded as an essential control point for patronage, electoral manœuvrability and ultimate power in Parliament and in the cabinet. U Nu supported a candidate whom he regarded as completely loyal to him and who had resolved henceforth to be morally good in Buddhist fashion. U Kyaw Nyein rejected this candidate as excessively partisan and otherwise incompetent.

This was merely the final incident in a long train of personal and organizational abuses. What became the issue, though it was never clearly articulated, was the very nature and character of a one-party democracy in which provision for change was institutionally available but not in fact used. True, in the 1956 elections a sizable vote was cast for a new coalition, the National Unity Front (N.U.F.), composed of two parts crypto-Communists and one part dissatisfied groups and individuals led by a former non-Marxist Supreme Court judge. In fact, however, the parliamentary power of the A.F.P.F.L. was not seriously threatened. The same leadership which won the 1947 constituent assembly elections and the 1951 elections was still in command. But the strains and stresses were dangerously evident in 1956, and by 1957 there was the fight over an alleged ouster move against U Nu. Unless the inner cabinet group, the big four, found ways to dilute the intensity of their living together, to broaden the bases of actual power, to divest decision and policy-making from administration and execution, they would inevitably break apart. In the spring of 1958, they did.

One-party democracy has given some evidence in India and Burma of being able to operate democratically where the party represents a coalition of functional and geographical units. But when the operation is confined to the "top" few, the strain becomes intolerable; the base becomes flabby; the few at the top wear out. They no longer can stand each other; they seek separation. This is the conclusion to which U Nu had come early in 1958. He would no longer compromise with other cabinet leaders, even over an appointment to a party post. The time had come for a divorce.

In view of the socialist character of the A.F.P.F.L., it might be

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thought that the foregoing explanation is not enough. After all, socialists in Asia and elsewhere are supposed to be concerned with ideology and, as in Japan and India, have split their organizations as a result of ideological disputes. Why should Burma be an exception? Some Western reports suggested—and the acrimonious name-calling, mud-slinging campaign adopted by both sides supported the suggestion—that one faction was "pro-Communist," the other "pro-West." But this impression is quite wrong.

There were and are minor differences among the A.F.P.F.L. leaders—differences in Marxist vocabulary and definition—which were evident even at the Third All-Burma A.F.P.F.L. Conference in January 1958. But these differences in no way account for the split. U Nu's strongest political ally, Thakin Tin, regards himself as a Marxist of socialist persuasion. He did not like U Nu's equating Communism and Marxism. Similarly, U Ba Swe, the leader of the Swe-Nyein faction, did not like U Nu's assertion that Marxism and Buddhism are irreconcilable, for he had expounded a view which combined the two. And U Kyaw Nyein, U Nu's sharpest opponent in the present conflict, completely and vigorously supported U Nu's defense of democratic socialism without Marxism. To be sure, U Nu accepted crypto-Communist parliamentary support to defeat his rivals, and thereby suffered the charge of "pro-Communist," but this was acknowledgedly "politics" at the crass, nose-counting level. It no more represented the basic philosophy of the Nu-Tin faction than their cry that Swe-Nyein were "tools of American imperialism." And, as we shall see, it was largely to escape from political dependence on the Communists that U Nu stepped out of power.

Among all the principal leaders of the A.F.P.F.L. the ultimate reaction to their exposure to Communism has been quite similar. In the 1930s, during their struggle against British power, they read and absorbed an anti-colonial ideology somewhat indiscriminately. When they organized the A.F.P.F.L. in 1944 they did not distinguish too finely between socialists, Communists and other Marxists. However, such political innocence was not to last long. As early as 1946, the present A.F.P.F.L. leadership voted the Burma Communist Party (B.C.P.) out of the coalition. After independence they were severely tried by the Communist insurrection which began in 1948 and by the overt and covert support tendered to the B.C.P. by the Sino-Soviet axis, overtly before Stalin's death in 1953, since then in more subtle ways. For exam-

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ple, Burmese Communists are known to have been in Moscow and Peking at least through the summer of 1958, when this writer revisited Rangoon. Communist China had been a training ground for Burmese Communist cadres, and the Chinese Embassy in Rangoon has been charged indirectly with helping the crypto-Communists in the elections of 1956. There has been no final settlement of the troublesome border issue with China or of the problem of illegal Chinese immigration.

Gradually the Burmese leaders came to realize that no matter how "Marxist" they considered themselves, they were socialists and not Communists. They set about the task of clarifying their socialist outlook while retaining their anti-colonial orientation. The top four undertook extensive travel in Europe and elsewhere in Asia to confer with their peers and comrades. Burma became a founder of the Asian Socialist Conference (A.S.C.), which first met in 1953 and has since been directed from Rangoon, and leaders of the present Nu-Tin and Swe-Nyein factions have vigorously participated in all its meetings. At these A.S.C. meetings the emerging ideological agreement of the leaders made possible their effective and united stand on international questions and problems of socialist development. Gradually they espoused a philosophy of "democratic socialism" in concert with the humanist approach of such comrades as Sjahrir of Indonesia, Asoka Mehta of India, Sharrett of Israel and Djilas of Jugoslavia—all of whom had attended the opening Rangoon conference.

Thus the split, when it came, was as personal as it was demoralizing. Extravagant charges and counter-charges of corruption and maladministration, the whole panoply of alleged scandal, character-assassination and unfaithfulness filled the newspapers in the bitterness of a divorce between long-time political partners. The principals seemed almost to find some psychological release in exposing the weaknesses and foibles of their former friends. In disgust and sadness, a non-partisan newspaper noted the "blind vindictiveness" of the leaders and called for a "halt to the reciprocal recrimination . . . in the interest of the nation."[1] In this it was expressing the hope of a nation.

III

It was in an atmosphere of mounting excitement, dismay and worry over the potential violence that the armed forces under

[1] *The Guardian,* October 20, 1958.

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General Ne Win began to play a rôle which led finally to the formation of a new government. It was approved on October 28 by "unanimous" vote of Parliament—that is, no negative votes were registered.

Several times during 1958 the armed forces, speaking through Chief of Staff General Ne Win and his close associates, had declared that they were determined to assist any government in keeping law and order, would impartially carry out their duties as policemen to ensure peaceful elections, and would refrain from "playing politics." General Ne Win had warned both factions against the use of violence, had cautioned Prime Minister Nu against accepting parliamentary political support from the Communists, and had rejected all attempts to induct any of the surrendering rebels into the armed forces. Further, it was an open secret in Rangoon that the army was disturbed by the latitude of the general amnesty order of last August, which completely exonerated all surrendering rebels, including criminals. Among the 7,420 rebels who had laid down their arms between October 1957 and June 1958, 2,000 Communists and 2,200 crypto-Communists had been welcomed as they "came out into the light," a popular euphemism for surrender. On August 15, another group surrendered and promptly formed the People's Comrades Party (P.C.P.) with an overtly Communist program. It was widely asserted that they had not turned in their arms and that they were contemplating the use of such arms during the pre-election period.

On the surface, therefore, Prime Minister Nu's broadcast of September 26, and his exchange of letters with Ne Win, in which he asked the General to form a new government, made it appear as though the army had forced the so-called "invitation" and had staged a coup in order to thwart any danger from the "legal" Communists. Such an interpretation, though correctly reflecting the anti-Communist stance of the armed forces and the state of apprehension which pervaded Burma because of the verbal violence of the campaign, fails to account for the political facts.

The leaders of both factions had reason to want the elections postponed and both agreed in advance to General Ne Win's assumption of power. For during the summer and early fall of 1958 it had become increasingly evident to them that neither side was assured of victory if the elections were held on the November–December schedule. It seemed quite probable that the inspirational leadership of U Nu pitted against the organizational abili-

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ties of Swe-Nyein would cause a deadlock in which neither side obtained a majority. A determined minority, Communist or ethnic in composition, might easily acquire the balance of power in Parliament. U Nu had already had the unpleasant experience of paying dearly for an eight-vote majority, won in the special parliamentary session in June. However much he might desire to hold on to the premiership, he did not look forward with relish to being a minority premier. Given time, however, he might build a new party capable of winning a majority in a later election. The Swe-Nyein group, which in any case could never get the support of the crypto-Communists in the N.U.F., also believed that time was on its side in order to build a more coherent and stable political organization.

Finally, it was clear in August and September that the National Unity Front could no longer maintain its electoral unity. It, too, was coming apart, and indeed the Justice Party, which controlled 16 of the N.U.F. parliamentary constituencies, formally disassociated itself from the N.U.F. on October 27. The People's Comrades Party also gave some evidence of fragmentation. As a result, both the Nu-Tin and Swe-Nyein factions hoped to bolster their respective organizations by absorbing some of these elements, thereby strengthening their electoral chances. To both sides, the army appeared to provide the best assurance of a fair political fight and a stable interregnum. There is therefore little reason to doubt that U Nu did indeed invite General Ne Win, "as an individual," to assume the premiership in order to insure the peace and "to hold free and fair elections" at a later date. The General was to be elected to the premiership for a "six months' period" as head of a caretaker government of non-partisan, respected civilians, including the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Secretary of Government. Nor was the army called in to forestall a Communist coup. There was no chance of this unless foreign forces were used—and everyone knew it.

It should be borne in mind that the armed forces in Burma have achieved a most respected position. Unlike in Pakistan and Thailand, the military leaders have never evidenced dictatorial ambitions. In contrast to Indonesia, there has never been any serious contest between services or groups within a service. Hence it is a serious mistake to bracket the Ne Win government with that of any other Asian country. Pakistan avowedly presents

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the picture of a military coup complete with dictatorship. In Burma, entirely constitutional means were used to establish an interim government, headed by a general, but with an all-civilian cabinet, zealously guarding the conditions for democracy.

All non-Communist elements in Burma seem relatively content with the present arrangements. U Nu has made political capital out of his "invitation" to General Ne Win. By stepping down voluntarily he appears to have given the country into firm, quieting hands. At the same time, he has demonstrated his willingness to compete for victory on even terms with his opponents. The former fear of campaign violence is dissipated. The Swe-Nyein group, on its side, approved U Nu's solution and helped to elect a respected member of the Nu-Tin faction as Speaker. That is, they voted *with* the Nu-Tin group whom they had otherwise planned to defeat by every possible means had U Nu remained Prime Minister. Without the change in government the Swe-Nyein group would probably have voted to defeat U Nu even on a motion to ratify the United States loans and other aid which they had helped to negotiate.

IV

The advent of General Ne Win's government closes the dismal tenth year of Burma's independence with a promise of stability and renewed hope for its democratic future.

In an interesting way the solution not only saves "face" for all parties involved in the factional conflict but also ensures the continuation of that variety of neutralism which has slowly but steadily found sympathetic understanding in the United States and in other Western countries. The Nu-Tin group gains at home from having patriotically stepped down, yielding the advantage of contesting the next election from the superior position of being the government. The Swe-Nyein group avoids the necessity of repudiating international loan and aid agreements to which they had given assent while members of U Nu's cabinet. Though Prime Minister Ne Win has already pledged his government to continue Burma's policy of "strict and straightforward neutrality," he declared in an opening statement to Parliament that remaining Communist insurgents would be hunted down relentlessly and treated as criminals. Once again the Burma Defense Services could feel that their sacrifices while pursuing the insurgents in the field would not be vitiated by a dangerously generous amnesty.

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After months of fear and instability the people of Burma could see their Parliament meeting in regular session in late October and November to pass the annual budget and otherwise provide for the normal operations of government.

The new Prime Minister reduced the size of the cabinet from 30 to 15, eliminated all the politically-appointed parliamentary secretaries (there had been 38 in the Nu-Tin cabinet), and thoroughly reshuffled 18 of the top-level civil servants who administer various ministries and departments of government. He then announced that his cabinet, pledged "to uphold the Constitution and democracy," would address itself primarily to four major tasks: the restoration of law and order; preparation for free and fair elections within six months, conditional upon "restoration of law and order and the coöperation of the political parties;" lowering the cost of living; and seeking remedies "for the economic chaos into which the country has fallen."

What are the prospects that Burma may achieve these goals under General Ne Win's caretaker government? All sections of Burmese opinion as reflected in the non-Communist press have apparently rallied to his support. The shake-up in the civil service may bring a fresh approach to the execution of policy, although it is not in itself sufficient to restore to the civil servants a sense of security from political reprisal. Revision of pay scales, better recruitment, in-service training and opportunity for advancement on merit are long overdue in the civil service. It may well be that a caretaker government cannot attend to all these reforms, but it may be able to make a start.

There is little doubt that the new government will make every effort to bring to Burma the law and order which it has sorely lacked. The remaining Communist and Karen insurgents can expect no quarter if they persist in rebellion. And, if at long last they elect "to come out into the light," they can expect no garlands and other special treatment such as they were previously accorded.

The loophole which has been left for postponing the elections beyond next spring is not without justification, for thorough and honest preparation of the electoral rolls is in itself a big job, requiring nationwide machinery. At most, the election may be moved from just before, to just after, the monsoon of 1959, thereby extending the term of the present government to one year.

The interim period is likely to determine the future political

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organization of the leading factions. Here there is latitude for a variety of eventualities. More than likely the A.F.P.F.L. must be permanently buried. Two parties may emerge, separated more by personality than by their domestic and foreign programs; and there will remain a Communist group. During these months both the Nu-Tin and Swe-Nyein groups will undertake a major recruiting campaign. But time may also heal some of the wounds that the leaders have inflicted on each other, leaving open the possibility of a new, consolidated democratic socialist party. The personality and leadership of U Ba Swe would be decisive in such a development.

The "economic chaos" to which General Ne Win referred at the opening of Parliament will be more difficult to resolve in basic fashion in any short-run period. In attempting to hurry the process of development, there has been waste of resources, some bad advice and planning and some extremely inadequate management. However, Burma has not yet suffered from an inability to finance her development program.[2] Foreign exchange earnings, largely from rice but also from minerals and teak, reparations from Japan ($250 million), and foreign grants, loans and credits[3] have together been adequate for the pace of economic investment in the public sector. But implementation of the *Pyidawtha,* or Eight-Year Welfare State Plan, 1952–1960, has suffered from inefficiency and lack of managerial and other skills. The political wrangling of 1958, coupled with a decline in the rice crop for export from 1.9 million to 1.6 million tons, highlighted these shortcomings in the national economy. Industrial development had been deliberately moderated after the Eight-Year Plan was overhauled in 1956; and this past year it was either curtailed or stopped because there was little time for making decisions or because projects identified with factional leaders, *eo ipso*, became political game for partisan criticism.

Despite these errors of omission and commission the "chaos" of 1958 may yield to some order in 1959. The aggregate national output has grown at a rate of 5 percent during the past five years and per capita output has increased more than 4 percent—"a remarkably high rate," according to the World Bank, and more

[2] See the author's descriptive analysis of Burma's successes and failures of economic development in "Building a Welfare State in Burma, 1948–1956" (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958).

[3] United States $118 million; Sino-Soviet bloc $42 million; World Bank $20 million; also Colombo Plan, United Nations and Ford Foundation.

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than twice that of Burma's population growth. Two major factors combine further to lighten the economic clouds. Growing security in the countryside has encouraged farmers and farm labor to work the land, while the very good harvest at the end of 1958 will immediately help to improve Burma's financial position and will probably lead to a perceptible seasonal drop in the urban cost of living. Rice exports, according to preliminary estimates for 1959, may climb to approximately 2.5 million tons—the best postwar year. General Ne Win's government will also reap the first considerable benefits of a $5.4 million loan from the United States successfully applied to the expansion of irrigated paddies. The agreement was signed in late 1957 and most of the earth-moving and related equipment was delivered by April 1958. Reclamation of land and increase of yields on land improved by new embankments and drainage canals have added approximately 800,000 acres during the past two years. This is a key item in the agricultural improvement program, supporting the sturdy hard-working cultivators, who were often overlooked in planning before 1956.

The small rice crop available for export in 1958 further diminished Burma's use of the unpopular barter trade agreements with the Sino-Soviet bloc into which she had been forced by the glut of 1954–1955; and as she has been finding a steadier and expanding market for her chief export it is more than likely that this form of trading will further decline in 1959. This was confirmed by a Burmese delegate to the Colombo Plan Conference in Seattle at the end of October, and his remarks were quoted in Rangoon. But it is quite clear already that, barring "accidents," General Ne Win will concentrate on domestic problems, leaving Burma's foreign relations as undisturbed as possible.

Thus far the new government is off to a good start. Six months (or twelve) is a very short time; but it may be enough to determine whether Burma has purchased stability at the price of democracy or whether after this year of "troubles" she will again move forward effectively on the path of political maturity. The General, as Prime Minister, has pledged himself and his government to the second alternative. There is a good chance it will prevail.

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INSIDE OUTER MONGOLIA

By Robert A. Rupen

THE Mongolian People's Republic, better known as Outer Mongolia, a purportedly independent country of over 600,000 square miles and less than a million people, is not administratively a part of either the Soviet Union or Communist China, and its location between these two countries lends it special political importance.

Direct Russian influence in Outer Mongolia has clearly declined, but major legacies remain of the many years of Soviet dominance. Most important are the single Communist Party (called the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party) which dominates the political life of the country, and other concomitants of a Communist system: high degree of centralization and discipline; an official line of interpretation of history, art and other aspects of life; a tightly-controlled press, with Mongolian equivalents of *Pravda, Red Star, Krokodil,* etc. Terror, too, has in the past been an instrument of government, nor has Mongolia been spared the curse of secret police and purges. An internal passport system does not now exist, but is being seriously discussed, and labor books have become important documents for many Mongols. The Party comprises 3 to 4 percent of the total population, and it operates an extensive set of mass youth organizations with nearly universal membership.

Molotov still serves officially as the Soviet Ambassador in Mongolia, although he has apparently been absent much of the time. The U.S.S.R. also maintains a consulate in the city of Choibalsan (formerly Bayan-tümen) in the eastern part of the country, where direct Russian-Mongolian trade makes use of the rail cutoff from the Trans-Siberian line constructed for military operations against the Japanese in the late 1930s. Russian-Mongolian trade also employs shipping on Lake Khubsugul in northwestern Mongolia (personal observation confirms this) and the old Kobdo-Biisk-Barnaul route in the far west also reportedly continues to operate. Russian goods are sold in Mongolian shops, although Chinese-made clothing and textiles occupy an important place, along with increasing amounts of products from East European countries. Russian machinery is the rule in the few industrial enterprises.

Few Russians live in Mongolia now, and the number of Russian advisers has greatly decreased in the last few years. The Mongolian middle schools require Russian as the only foreign language, but surprisingly few Mongols speak the language well, and those who do have generally studied in the Soviet Union. School textbooks are usually Mongolian translations of Russian originals. The Cyrillic script is in use, although there is opposition to it, along with related pressure to return to the old native alphabet. New school texts for the study of Mongolian literature employ the old script as a deliberate attempt to keep it alive, for Mongols consciously recognize that use of Cyrillic cuts them off from their past. Furthermore, the Cyrillic script has been abandoned in Inner Mongolia, and a strong pan-Mongolist sentiment survives. Almost all of the more than 1,000 Mongols who study abroad pursue higher education in the Soviet Union, but Mongolian educational institutions have been deliberately expanding to reduce the need for foreign education.

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Chinese influence, dominant in the country until practically eliminated by Russian pressure in the 1920s, has returned to a limited extent since the People's Republics of China and Mongolia established diplomatic relations in July 1950. Some 10,000 Chinese construction workers scattered throughout Mongolia now constitute an important foreign population element, but these workers stay only two or three years and then return to China, to be replaced by others. Very few of them have families in Mongolia, and few choose to settle there permanently.

At present there is no evidence that China is aggressively trying to exert influence in Outer Mongolia, and there is no particular trend of growing Sinification. For example, only 30 Mongolian university students and a handful of scholars are studying in Peking. The number of Chinese studying in Outer Mongolia is even less, although Küke Khoto, capital of Inner Mongolia, operates as a center of some Mongolian historical and linguistic studies. Here, too, Outer Mongolia maintains its only consulate within China. Also, China has withdrawn from participation in a proposed joint Chinese-Russian-Mongolian "History of Mongolia." Planning congresses for preparation of this history were held in Ulan Bator, the capital of Outer Mongolia, in 1956 and Moscow in 1957, but the one to be held in 1958 in Peking has been cancelled.

Clearly, Mongols do run their own internal affairs and retain a strong feeling of independence. Just as clearly, they cannot pursue an independent foreign policy, and must follow the Russian lead, but Mongols apparently hold all positions of direction and authority in the country. The native language, unrelated to either Russian or Chinese, remains vigorously alive and serves as the means of communication at all levels and in all circles. Although the top political leadership has been educated in the Soviet Union, the bulk of the administration and single dominating Party is now Mongolian-trained, usually having graduated from the Sukhe Bator Higher Party School or the State University in Ulan Bator.

A flourishing and independent-minded intelligentsia pursues scholarship and study in a wide variety of fields, especially in archæology and history. They publish many books and articles in their own language, whereas they used to publish in Russian. Archæological work in progress indicates the existence of highly developed urbanism at a very early date, which will probably lead to extensive revision of present ideas of "nomadic society" and the nature of the Empire of Chinggis Khan and his immediate successors. Modern urbanism in relation to nomadism is also the subject of serious study. Original work proceeds on close analysis of the period of Manchu control in the country. This is all independent Mongolian work, the type of work which not long ago was done only in coöperation with Russians, or by Russians alone.

An impressive educational system differentiates contemporary from traditional Mongolia, and constitutes one of the main Communist achievements in the country. The network of schools handles nearly 100,000 students, so that 10 percent of the Mongolian population now goes to school. Four-year primary schools, of which there are 333, take all Mongols in the 8–12 age group, and seven-year schooling is obligatory in the principal population centers. Ten-year schools also exist, and graduation from these qualifies students for entrance to the State University in Ulan Bator, which now boasts 2,100 students. Two thousand additional students attend the other higher educa-

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tional institutions of Ulan Bator: the Agricultural Institute, the Higher Party School, and the evening Finance Institute and evening University of Marxism-Leninism. The State University offers foreign-language instruction in Russian, English, Chinese, classical Tibetan (the language of Buddhism), and Manchu. The new Agricultural Institute illustrates the growth of specialized technical training in the country, obviating the need for foreign specialists or foreign training of natives. This Institute is well equipped for both research and training, and pursues detailed scientific study of livestock and potential agricultural resources. Similarly, engineering personnel for the coal mines at Nalaikha now study in Ulan Bator rather than somewhere in the U.S.S.R. For some time, the schoolteachers have been mainly Mongolian graduates of local teacher-training institutes. A Scientific Committee, an Association of Historians, an impressive State Library, a fine State Museum, and other museums in Ulan Bator and other centers, complement the educational system. A Party Research Institute of the Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party comprises some 40 specialists working on the compilation of a Party history.

II

Most Mongols continue to follow a nomadic life, herding livestock, and living in tents called *yurts* or *ger*. These are beehive-shaped, perhaps 12 feet in diameter, and are constructed of white felt over a wooden latticework frame. An iron stove in the center, with a stovepipe running up out of the top, provides heat and cooking facilities. Iron bedsteads serve for both sleeping and sitting. Most of the *yurts* have a wooden floor, at least for the winter, and many people own battery radios and sewing machines. A wooden chest holds clothing and belongings. Just outside the *yurt* stands a galvanized steel container for water. Almost no one outside the cities has any electricity. A great advantage of the *yurt* is its portability, since it can be put up or taken down in 15 or 20 minutes and loaded on a camel.

Outside of Ulan Bator the life of the Mongols seems to the casual observer to be nearly unchanged from that of centuries preceding. This is misleading: the long arm of the Government in Ulan Bator does reach to the nomad on the steppe in ways it never did before. Local administrations are staffed by Party members who have very often been trained at the Higher Party School or similar institutions, and who frequently come from parts of the country other than that in which they work. These local officials form an important group subject to Party discipline and command, and constitute an army at key points, manipulated and controlled by the Party Central Committee. The Central Committee amounts to a kind of general staff directing all phases of political, economic and even cultural life. The principal control points are: (1) the administrative centers of *aimaks,* the 17 major Mongolian territorial divisions; (2) *somon* centers, subdivisions of *aimaks;* and (3) State farms and livestock coöperatives. Through officials nominally elected but actually almost certainly chosen by the Party, practically no *arat* (livestock-herding nomad) can escape production quotas, forced deliveries to the State, veterinary controls and calls to special labor tasks.

Some 24,000,000 head of sheep, goats, cattle and yaks, horses and camels comprise the main wealth of the country and its principal economic base; the

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livestock and the nomads who tend them have to a considerable extent been united into coöperatives, although the economy remains perhaps 50 percent private. The livestock coöperatives occupy an ever larger part in the national economy, and the number of required labor days is also increasing. Indirect and subtle pressure to join the coöperatives operates through State ownership of practically all equipment and machines, control of the distribution and marketing system, use of veterinary services, etc. The State has simply made it economically more attractive to join a coöperative, and economically disadvantageous to retain private ownership of livestock.

The city of Ulan Bator boasts 150,000 inhabitants, and has almost doubled in population since 1945. It constitutes the key to control of Outer Mongolia, dominating every phase of life. Outside of the capital city, there are only a



few towns, the largest of which, Choibalsan, has a population of 20,000. These towns are much larger in winter than in summer, for in summer many of their inhabitants move their *yurts* out into the steppe. But the smaller towns do show significant changes from the traditional past. All include at least a few permanent buildings, and all have some small-scale production. Local industry now makes many items of domestic economy, such as standard wooden *yurt*-frames, wooden doors for the tents, boots and shoes and other clothing items, galvanized steel water-containers and iron stoves. Officials usually live in the towns, which serve as centers of political, administrative and economic control. The considerable number of officials, factory workers, teachers and scholars may now account for as much as 25 percent of the total population.

A typical Mongolian town might have a population of 1,000 in winter and 500 in summer. The few permanent buildings have probably been built since 1945 and include a four-year or seven-year school, a Party headquarters and government administration building, a small communications center com-

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prising some radio, telegraph and telephone equipment, a building for local handicrafts and small-scale industry, a general store, and often a small restaurant and hostel. There are a few wooden huts for winter use, and sheds for storing agricultural implements. People use horses, bicycles and motorcycles, but camels continue to serve for most domestic transport. A very large fleet of Russian trucks, driven by Mongols, operates in public transport of both goods and people over longer distances. Paved roads are practically nonexistent and dirt tracks across the steppe provide the usual routes. Air transport now connects the major population centers and the Trans-Mongolian Railroad, in operation since 1956, runs from the Trans-Siberian Railroad south to the Chinese border, where the gauge narrows.

A city in the 10,000-population class (there are only four of these: Choibalsan, Tsetserlik, Kobdo, Sukhe Bator) possesses a large ten-year school, many buildings, including some apartments, large children's nurseries, a hospital, and governmental and industrial buildings. Centers of livestock coöperatives and State farms also include administrative office buildings, restaurants and often some permanent housing. Taking into account the considerable number of apartment dwellers in Ulan Bator, and the increasing number of permanent houses and apartments in towns and on collective and State farms, perhaps 15 percent of the population no longer lives in *yurts*.

Habits in dress, entertainment, and many other facets of contemporary Mongolian life are also changing. The *del*, or robe, which constitutes traditional dress in the country has in many cases been replaced by Russian clothing, especially among the men. Even those who still wear the *del* often combine it with European trousers and shoes, and the women very often wear the traditional *del* with socks and sandals instead of the old heavy boots. Higher officials and leading scholars almost invariably wear European clothing. Movies are shown widely and the Mongolian theatre and music include both indigenous and European products.

The present lowly and disfranchised position of the Buddhist Church also distinguishes contemporary from traditional Mongolia. While freedom of religion officially prevails and openly practising Buddhists can be found, the official Church today operates in an extremely restricted and closely controlled manner. Most of the monasteries which have not been closed or completely destroyed serve secular purposes such as grain-storage or warehousing. Neglect threatens many fine Buddhist buildings. Former temples now functioning as museums often display valuable Buddhist relics and manuscripts, but such fine things appear haphazardly and without identification among many less noteworthy objects. The principal religious museum in Ulan Bator mixes without discrimination the valuable and the worthless, the old and the new. At the very famous and historically important Erdeni Dzu monastery, largely destroyed by the Russians in 1937–38, the Mongols work at restoration but many buildings remain in ruins.

The official Buddhist Church in Outer Mongolia today is a travesty, maintained mainly to impress foreigners and particularly for Communist propaganda in other Buddhist countries of Asia. The principal showplace to impress visitors is the Gandan of Ulan Bator, one of the few operating monasteries in Outer Mongolia today. Beautifully maintained, the monastery comprises a priceless museum of Buddhist art. About 100 lamas sit in rows and intone

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Tibetan chants; the air is heavy with incense; beautiful statues and lovely tapestries and paintings set the scene. The Government cynically exploits this truncated and tame Buddhism not only to appeal to other Asian Buddhists, but also to use the lamas in its "Peace Committee." Exploitation of Buddhism for political purposes obviously constitutes a new line of the Soviet Government, too. It recently opened a new Buddhist monastery near Ulan Ude in Buryat Mongolia, and has repaired and refurbished the wrecked monastery at Goose Lake, south of Ulan Ude.

Destruction of monasteries and construction of schools represent major results of Communist power in Outer Mongolia. De-Stalinization has given Mongolia greater freedom and more control over its own affairs. Chinese influence has returned to the country but has not overtaken Russian influence and does not appear to be increasing. Indigenous Mongolian intellectuals and scholars do significant work and the inherent advantages of Ulan Bator as a center of Mongolian studies are being exploited by the Mongols themselves. The Mongols try sincerely and aggressively to extend their contacts beyond the Communist world. So far, however, official foreign relations include exchange of full-time diplomats only with the Soviet Union, China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and North Korea. Mongolia assigns an ambassador to India, but that country accredits its Peking representative also to Mongolia. Foreign diplomats accredited secondarily to Mongolia and primarily to Russia or China include those from North Viet Nam, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Jugoslavia, Indonesia and Burma.

The Mongols struggle with considerable success to maintain and strengthen their national identity. They continue to press for admission to the United Nations; certainly all Mongols support this major point of Mongolian foreign policy. They feel that they are victims of unfair discrimination and vehemently deny that they are Russian puppets. They undoubtedly want recognition by the United States as well, in large part to strengthen their independent position. They probably feel that admission to the United Nations and recognition by the United States would help them to ensure their territorial integrity against any designs by the Soviet Union or Communist China. They comprise, after all, one million people sandwiched between 200 million Russians and 600 million Chinese. They must move with circumspection. But they ardently desire contacts with the West, and plainly many well educated and highly intelligent Mongols would profit from such contact. Recognition by the United States and admission to the U.N. would greatly encourage them, and while it is unthinkable that at the present time they could pursue a truly independent foreign policy, Mongols do think for themselves and are jealous of such independence as they have. We should certainly go as far as we can (even to Mongolia!) to meet these just desires.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political, Military and Legal

A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. By RUTH B. RUSSELL Assisted by JEANNETTE E. MUTHER. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1958, 1,140 p. $10.00.

This volume, one in a series of Brookings Institution studies on the United Nations, is a very substantial account of the planning and negotiation, between 1940 and 1945, that led to the United Nations Charter. Based in good part upon unpublished State Department materials, it clearly demonstrates, among other things, that the so-called "veto power" was an indispensable feature of the organization if it were to come into existence at all and still be authorized to maintain peace and security.

THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHAL THE VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN, K.G. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1958, 508 p. $6.00.

In this forthright and impressive autobiography Field-Marshal Montgomery, as one would expect, expresses himself quite sharply about many of his political and military associates, British and American. There is no rancor, however, but evidence of real warmth and affection in this formidable soldier. While much of the book deals with the war years it also has something of interest to say about the postwar period when he was Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE REPORT ON THE BALLISTIC MISSILE. Edited by Lt. Col. KENNETH F. GANTZ. Garden City: Doubleday, 1958, 338 p. $4.00.

A useful review by a number of U. S. Air Force officers of the ballistic missiles program. The material appeared initially in issues of the *Air University Quarterly Review*.

THE ARMS RACE. By PHILIP NOEL-BAKER. New York: Oceana Publications, 1958, 579 p. $6.00.

For many years Mr. Noel-Baker has been a vigorous advocate of world disarmament. In the present book, the fruit of much thought and experience, he stresses the deadend of a continuing arms race, especially with nuclear armaments, traces the history of disarmament proposals, and sets down some proposals both for nuclear and conventional disarmament.

ARMEE UND SOLDAT IM ATOMZEITALTER. By FRITZ BELOW. Karlsruhe: Stahlberg, 1957, 213 p. DM. 8.80.

An effort to redefine the rôle and place of the army and the citizen soldier in the contemporary technological and international situation.

NO MORE WAR! By LINUS PAULING. New York: Dodd, 1958, 254 p. $3.50.

Dr. Pauling, an eminent chemist, here presents his case against continued nuclear

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stockpiling and testing, and also his side of the debate with Edward Teller on the dangers of radiation and fall-out.

BRIGHTER THAN A THOUSAND SUNS. By Robert Jungk. New York: Harcourt, 1958, 369 p. $5.00.

In effect this is a severe but hardly fair or well-balanced criticism of American physicists for having put their talents to the creation of the atomic and the thermonuclear bomb during and after the war.

THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By A. Appadorai. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1958, 124 p. Rs. 5.75.

Lectures dealing with the problems of achieving peaceful change, coexistence and collective security. The author is director and professor of international relations of the Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi.

EAST TO WEST. By Arnold J. Toynbee. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958, 243 p. $4.50.

In 1956 and 1957 Arnold Toynbee and his wife made a journey around the world. These informal sketches, chiefly in relatively out-of-the-way places, of what he saw, felt and recalled (a vast stock of historical lore) are both perceptive and informative. Indeed, one could wish that at least some of these travels had preceded the writing of his "A Study of History."

DEMOCRACY AND THE CHALLENGE OF POWER. By David Spitz. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958, 228 p. $5.00.

The author of this very thoughtful and sober book puts his problem in the following terms: "While democracy is, in principle, a way of controlling abuses of power, such abuses nevertheless persist in the practices of democratic states. And it is this persistence of oppressive power in a democracy that constitutes what I here call the challenge of power."

THE REPRESENTATIVE REPUBLIC. By Ferdinand A. Hermens. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1958, 578 p. $7.50.

Starting with a vigorous "protest against the fallacy that constitutional government is necessarily weak," Professor Hermens proceeds to give both an examination of theoretical concepts and an analysis of "constitutionalism in the concrete," in Britain, Western Europe and the United States. A serious contribution.

LENINS RÜCKKEHR NACH RUSSLAND 1917. By Werner Hahlweg. Leyden: Brill, 1957, 139 p. Guilders 16.

A well-edited collection of the German documents dealing with the much discussed issue of Lenin's return to Russia in 1917 and the rôle played by Germany.

THE POLITICS OF DESPAIR. By Hadley Cantril. New York: Basic Books, 1958, 269 p. $5.00.

A study in social psychology, based on interviews in France and Italy, of the attitudes and outlook of the "Communist protest voter" (not Party member). Part of the attitude is reflected in the remark of a French toolmaker: "I don't care if the workers get a good standard of living under capitalism or socialism. . . . I don't want a revolution; I just want change. . . . All I want is to enjoy myself in this life. For all I know it may be the only one I have."

COMMUNISM AND THE THEOLOGIANS. By Charles C. West. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1958, 399 p. $6.00.

In pursuit of his central purpose—to examine the "living response of Christians

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to the living force of Communism in the present-day world, as it is illuminated by the theologies which have had most to do with this response"—the author makes a thoughtful and significant appraisal of the writings of Emil Brunner, Josef Hromadka, Paul Tillich, Reinhold Niebuhr and Karl Barth.

DOCUMENTS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT. Edited by T. E. Utley and J. Stuart Maclure. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1958, 276 p. $3.75.

A selection of texts relating to representative democracy, Communism, Papal political theory and Protestant political thought.

MEXICO AND THE UNITED NATIONS. By Jorge Castaneda. New York: Manhattan Publishing Co. (for El Colegio de Mexico and the Carnegie Endowment), 1958, 244 p. $3.00.

URUGUAY AND THE UNITED NATIONS. New York: Manhattan Publishing Co. (for the Uruguayan Institute of International Law and the Carnegie Endowment), 1958, 129 p. $3.00.

Two further volumes in the series of national studies on international organization initiated by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

HANDBUCH DER NATO. By Franz-Wilhelm Engel. Frankfurt/Main: Agenor, 1957, 985 p. DM. 28.

A richly documented reference work giving the background to development of the treaty organization, its structure and strategic basis.

TROTSKY'S DIARY IN EXILE, 1935. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958, 218 p. $4.00.

This diary, apparently the only one extant, covers the period February 7 to September 8, 1935, months when Trotsky was in exile in France and Norway. Relatively little about his political activities, but quite revealing as a personal document.

PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY. By Hans W. Weigert and Others. New York: Appleton, 1957, 723 p. $7.95.

A textbook which undertakes to present a blend of geographical and political analysis.

EFFORTS OF RAYMOND ROBINS TOWARD THE RECOGNITION OF SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE OUTLAWRY OF WAR, 1917–1933. By Sister Anne Vincent Meiburger. Washington: Catholic University, 1958, 225 p. $2.50.

A doctoral dissertation.

THE ZIMMERMANN TELEGRAM. By Barbara W. Tuchman. New York: Viking, 1958, 244 p. $3.95.

A most interesting and skillful reconstruction of the way the famous Zimmermann telegram was discovered, decoded and exploited in precipitating the American decision to enter the First World War.

IN FLANDERS FIELDS: THE 1917 CAMPAIGN. By Leon Wolff. New York: Viking, 1958, 308 p. $5.00.

A vivid account and serious appraisal of the disastrous and costly 1917 Flanders offensive around Ypres and Passchendaele.

UN ITALIANO A VERSAILLES. By Angelo Gatti. Milan: Ceschina, 1958, 461 p. L. 3000.

A diary, covering the weeks from December 1917 to February 1918, at which time the author was a member of the Italian Military Mission at Allied Headquarters.

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DEUTSCHLAND UND DER ENGLISCH-RUSSISCHE GEGENSATZ 1900-1914. By Oswald Hauser. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1958, 288 p. DM. 22.50.

German historians have long been preoccupied with the deterioration of German-British relations in the years before 1914. In the present book the author relates this problem to the British-Russian rapprochement after 1907 and the German fear, probably unjustified and unwisely proclaimed, of encirclement.

A HISTORY OF ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS. VOLUME II: 1943–1950. By W. P. and Zelda K. Coates. London: Lawrence, 1958, 463 p. 37/6.

This second volume (Volume I was published in 1944) is absolutely undeviating in its support of the Soviet position in all the disputes of these years.

A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA. By René Albrecht-Carrié. New York: Harper, 1958, 736 p. $7.50.

A thoughtful general history from the Vienna settlement to the Hungarian and Middle Eastern crises of 1956. The periodization is the familiar one: an era of relative stability, 1871–1914, between protracted periods of transition and disequilibrium.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD. Edited by Allan Nevins and Howard M. Ehrmann. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958, 4 v.

The first four volumes of this projected series of general histories deal with areas of particular contemporary interest: "Russia and the Soviet Union," by Warren Bartlett Walsh (640 p. $10.00); "The Near East," by William Yale (485 p. $7.50); "The Far East," by Nathaniel Peffer (489 p. $7.50); "Latin America," by J. Fred Rippy (579 p. $10.00).

ASPECTS OF HUMAN EQUALITY. Edited by Lyman Bryson and Others. New York: Harper (for the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life), 1957, 431 p. $5.00.

Papers prepared for the Fifteenth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

STABILITY AND PROGRESS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY. Edited by Douglas Hague. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958, 266 p. $5.00.

These proceedings of the First Congress of the International Economic Association, held in Rome in September 1956, include papers by Sir Dennis Robertson, Jacob Viner, François Perroux, Gottfried Haberler and Erik Lundberg.

AMERICAN INVESTMENT IN BRITISH MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY. By John H. Dunning. Fair Lawn (N.J.): Essential Books, 1958, 365 p. $6.30.

This pioneering study provides new information on the extent and character of American-owned firms in Britain. It examines the contributions these companies make, for instance, to exports, management methods and research, and judiciously weighs the advantages, to England, the United States and the companies, of the rather extensive American participation in British industry.

WIRTSCHAFTLICHE INTEGRATION. By Rolf Sannwald and Jacques Stohler. Basel: Kyklos-Verlag; Tübingen: Mohr, 1958, 245 p. DM. 17.

Free trade, regional trading arrangements, discrimination, customs unions, functional integration, currency and balance of payments problems, fiscal questions and the international movement of capital and labor are all reviewed in this useful

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volume. The approach is fairly theoretical but not difficult and takes account of some features of Europe's recent experience.

ZUKUNFT DER WELTWIRTSCHAFT. By Karl L. Herczeg. Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag, 1958, 326 p. DM. 16.80.

The two principal themes of the author, who has served with the O.E.E.C., are the need to achieve a common European market, and to achieve a working partnership with the underdeveloped lands.

PRICING IN BIG BUSINESS. By A. D. H. Kaplan and Others. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1958, 344 p. $5.00.

What every schoolboy knows about what determines prices is no longer regarded as accurate by most economists, especially when it applies to large corporations. Using questionnaires and interviews as well as published records, the Brookings team accumulated and analyzed a great deal of interesting material on the pricing practices of a number of large companies and the factors affecting price decisions among the producers of a variety of important commodities.

BALANCES AND IMBALANCES OF PAYMENTS. By Geoffrey Crowther. Boston: Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, 1957, 70 p. $2.00.

Lectures by the managing director of *The Economist* dealing with postwar international monetary arrangements, the sterling and dollar areas and the problem of the "dollar shortage."

LA BALANCE DES PAYEMENTS: ÉTUDE MÉTHODOLOGIQUE. Paris: Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques, 1957, 352 p. Fr. 1500.

A study based chiefly on the French experience from 1910 to 1956.

MINORITIES IN THE NEW WORLD: SIX CASE STUDIES. By Charles Wagley and Marvin Harris. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958, 320 p. $6.00.

Six illuminating case studies: the Indians in Brazil and in Mexico, the Negroes in Martinique and in the United States, the French Canadians, and the Jews in the United States.

SLAVERY. By C. W. W. Greenidge. New York: Macmillan, 1958, 235 p. $4.75.

A report on chattel slavery and peonage in the contemporary world, by the Director of the Anti-Slavery Society.

The Second World War

LOST VICTORIES. By Field-Marshal Erich von Manstein. Chicago: Regnery, 1958, 574 p. $7.50.

This important study, by a leading staff officer, of the German campaigns in the Second World War is a somewhat abridged translation of "Verlorene Siege," noted here October 1956.

THE BUSINESS OF WAR. By Major-General Sir John Kennedy. New York: Morrow, 1958, 370 p. $5.00.

These memoirs by Britain's wartime Director of Military Operations are of interest chiefly for the light they throw on the relations between Winston Churchill and the military, who were hard pressed "to chase all the butterflies conjured up and released by his limitless fancy."

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LEYTE: JUNE 1944–JANUARY 1945. By Samuel Eliot Morison. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1958, 445 p. $6.50.

The twelfth volume in Admiral Morison's vast "History of United States Naval Operations in World War II" culminates in the battle for Leyte Gulf, October 24–25, 1944, which the author considers the greatest naval battle of all time. In this huge operation 216 American, 2 Australian and 64 Japanese ships were engaged.

THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II. VOLUME VII: SERVICES AROUND THE WORLD. Edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958, 666 p. $8.50.

This final volume of an official war history deals with certain general services throughout the various theaters: air transport, aviation engineers, weather and communications, medicine, morale and air-sea rescue, women in the A.A.F., and the task of redeployment and demobilization.

LES CAMPAGNES D'AFRIQUE. By Robert Jars. Paris: Payot, 1957, 249 p. Fr. 1200.

The author of a history of the campaigns in Poland and Italy here provides a relatively concise account of the fighting in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia in 1940–1943.

THE ISLAND CAMPAIGNS. By Allan S. Walker. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957, 426 p. (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 35/.)

The third volume in the medical series of the official Australian war history deals with the very difficult tasks of the medical service in Papua, New Guinea, the Solomons and Borneo.

THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY. By D. P. Mellor. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1958, 738 p. (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 30/.)

This is the fifth volume in the civil series of the official "Australia in the War of 1939–1945."

ITALY. VOLUME I: THE SANGRO TO CASSINO. By N. C. Phillips. Wellington (N.Z.): Department of Internal Affairs, War History Branch, 1957, 387 p. (Christchurch: Whitcombe, 25/.)

This volume in the "Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–45" covers the winter of 1943 and spring of 1944, including the fighting around Monte Cassino.

THE NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN 1940–1943. By Major P. C. Bharucha. New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section (India and Pakistan), 1956, 567 p. (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 50/.)

EXPANSION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND DEFENCE ORGANISATION 1939–45. By Sri Nandan Prasad. New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section (India and Pakistan), 1956, 546 p. (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 45/.)

The third and fourth volumes of the series, "Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War, 1939–45," under the general editorship of Bisheshwar Prasad.

THE DIVINE WIND: JAPAN'S KAMIKAZE FORCE IN WORLD WAR II. By Captain Rikihei Inoguchi and Commander Tadashi Nakajima with Roger Pineau. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1958, 240 p. $4.50.

A most absorbing account of the Kamikaze special attack corps. Although unable,

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at the late stage of the war, to turn the tide, and of debatable military value, the suicide divers demonstrated a quite unique form of personal heroism: men looking forward to a death "as sudden and clean as the shattering of crystal."

ALLIED INTELLIGENCE BUREAU. By Colonel Allison Ind. New York: McKay, 1958, 305 p. $4.95.

An account of the Allied Australian-based espionage and sabotage activities in the Pacific Theater.

IL MONTE ROSA È SCESO A MILANO: LA RESISTENZA NEL BIELLESE, NELLA VALSESIA E NELLA VALDOSSOLA. By Pietro Secchia and Cino Moscatelli. Turin: Einaudi, 1958, 655 p. L. 3000.

A detailed account of the wartime resistance movement in a section of Piedmont.

LA DRÔLE DE GUERRE 1939–1940. By Roland Dorgelès. Paris: Michel, 1957, 324 p. Fr. 790.

Contemporary reporting on the "phony war" of 1939–40, by a correspondent of the weekly *Gringoire*.

LA DÉLÉGATION FRANÇAISE AUPRÈS DE LA COMMISSION ALLEMANDE D'ARMISTICE. TOME IV: 19 JANVIER–21 JUILLET 1941. Paris: Costes, 1957, 734 p. Fr. 1200.

A collection of documents published by the French Government.

The United States

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY. By Harry Howe Ransom. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958, 287 p. $4.75.

A concise account and critical appraisal, based on good use of public sources, of the development, organization and responsibilities of the contemporary intelligence system in the United States.

RAW MATERIALS: A STUDY OF AMERICAN POLICY. By Percy W. Bidwell. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1958, 403 p. $5.95.

The United States imports in great quantity raw materials which it also produces at home. Problems ensue. What protection, if any, should be provided for domestic producers? Is it in the national interest to maintain domestic capacity even if production costs are high? Does stockpiling provide the answer? What account must be taken of the interests of foreign countries and American political interests abroad? This book does much to answer all these questions. Its core is a series of case studies of lead and zinc, copper, nickel, wool, rubber, oil, and the raw materials of the steel industry. Taking full account of the interests and attitudes of domestic and foreign producers, importers and exporters, Mr. Bidwell keeps the national interest firmly in view in drawing his conclusions from the sharply-focused investigation of each product.

EISENHOWER: CAPTIVE HERO. By Marquis Childs. New York: Harcourt, 1958, 310 p. $4.75.

This critical appraisal by a leading columnist is concerned less with evaluating President Eisenhower's performance than with tracing the quite extraordinary public image of him that emerged in the space of a decade. As the title suggests the popular idolization of the man, leading to expectations beyond anyone's capacity to realize, has not really been beneficial to the President and accounts for some of the malaise and dissatisfaction since 1956.

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INSIDE THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY. By Jack Redding. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958, 319 p. $4.50.

A lively account of Harry Truman's unexpectedly victorious 1948 campaign. The author was publicity director of the Democratic National Committee.

ALL IN ONE LIFETIME. By James F. Byrnes. New York: Harper, 1958, 432 p. $5.00.

An informal autobiography by a man who may hold a record for the variety of high executive, legislative and judicial posts which he has occupied. Chiefly interesting for information on domestic political manœuvrings in the 1940s.

BARUCH: MY OWN STORY. By Bernard M. Baruch. New York: Holt, 1957, 337 p. $5.00.

As Mr. Baruch observes, it is not easy to compress into one volume "a narrative that begins with the Reconstruction period and extends past the splitting of the atom." This first volume of his autobiography deals chiefly with the years before the First World War—his boyhood in South Carolina and New York, and his experiences in Wall Street.

THE PHILOSOPHY AND POLICIES OF WOODROW WILSON. Edited by Earl Latham. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958, 266 p. $5.00.

Essays appraising various facets of Woodrow Wilson's thought and career.

Western Europe

THE UNITING OF EUROPE. By Ernst B. Haas. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958, 552 p. $8.00.

The operation of the European Coal and Steel Community provides Professor Haas with the material for a first-rate study that has wider implications. He is concerned, for instance, with the ways in which "integration" takes place, the extent to which a supranational community develops through the activities of pressure groups that cut across national lines, and how national policies are influenced by the process. The material he has gathered on the rôle of industry and labor in the workings of the Coal and Steel Community, on the interplay among governments and between governments and the High Authority and other organs of the Community is largely new and of the utmost interest.

THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET. New York: American Management Association, 1958, 220 p. $6.00.

In these useful papers experts and businessmen describe and analyze the new European common market arrangements, giving special attention to the problems and possibilities it presents to American businessmen.

THE VICHY REGIME, 1940–44. By Robert Aron in Collaboration with Georgette Elgey. New York: Macmillan, 1958, 536 p. $7.50.

A somewhat abridged translation of an able history, first published in France in 1954 (noted here April 1955).

THE FRENCH ECONOMY AND THE STATE. By Warren C. Baum. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958, 391 p. $7.50.

Among the various difficulties France has encountered in recent years, the spotty performance of the economy has been the subject of considerable concern, though relatively little research. The present book, a RAND Corporation Research Study, is chiefly concerned with the pervasive rôle of the state in the French economy.

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The chapters deal with such topics as reconstruction and modernization, control of economic fluctuations, the tax system, the state as entrepreneur and as regulator.

LES GROUPES DE PRESSION EN FRANCE. By Jean Meynaud. Paris: Colin, 1958, 371 p. Fr. 1300.

A systematic presentation of the organization and function of pressure groups in French political life.

LES PAYSANS ET LA POLITIQUE DANS LA FRANCE CONTEMPORAINE. By Jacques Fauvet and Others. Paris: Colin, 1958, 531 p. Fr. 1800.

A symposium of essays dealing with political representation, agricultural organization and religious problems.

NORWAY: THE PLANNED REVIVAL. By Alice Bourneuf. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958, 233 p. $5.00.

A careful analysis of Norway's experience with economic planning for recovery and stabilization after the Second World War. The author was senior economist in the E.C.A. Mission to Norway from 1948 to 1951.

HAAKON: KING OF NORWAY. By Maurice Michael. New York: Macmillan, 1958, 207 p. $5.00.

A brief biography of the late King who reigned from 1905 to 1957.

THE BUILDING OF MODERN SWEDEN: THE REIGN OF GUSTAV V, 1907–1950. By O. Fritiof Ander. Rock Island (Ill.): Augustana, 1958, 271 p. $5.75.

A brief political, social, economic and diplomatic history, including a discussion of emigration and "Americanization."

THE BANKING SYSTEM OF SWITZERLAND. By Hans J. Bär. Zurich: Schulthess, 1957, 82 p. (New York: Hafner, $2.75.)

A useful, brief description.

THE FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. By John Ford Golay. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958, 299 p. $5.00.

An essay on the constitutional background and political circumstances that contributed to the forming of the Bonn constitution. The author, now Dean of Faculties at Roosevelt University, Chicago, spent the years 1948–53 as an American official in West Germany.

RUHRBERGBAU: GESCHICHTE, AUFBAU UND VERFLECHTUNG SEINER GESELLSCHAFTEN UND ORGANISATIONEN. Edited by Gerhard Gebhardt. Essen: Glückauf, 1957, 580 p. DM. 28.

This large, useful volume sponsored by the Ruhr coal trade association provides a brief history of the industry followed by fairly detailed accounts of the development and present status of major companies. It has convenient statistics and other information plus a bibliography.

DIE EINHEIT DEUTSCHLANDS. By Ernst Deuerlein. Frankfurt/Main: Metzner, 1957, 349 p. DM. 15.50.

A discussion, with documents, of the problem of German unity as it was handled in the various wartime and postwar Allied conferences.

UNKNOWN GERMANY. By Bernard Newman. London: Jenkins, 1958, 221 p. 21/.

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A pleasant report on travels through some of the less tourist-frequented parts of Germany.

VON BONN NACH BERLIN. By Willy Brandt. Berlin: Arani, 1957, 175 p. DM. 8.90.

Documentation relative to the anomalous position in the postwar years of the capital city, Berlin.

REICHSWEHRPOLITIK IN DER WEIMARER ZEIT. By Otto Gessler. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1958, 582 p. DM. 29.50.

These memoirs are quite important for the history of the Weimar Republic, especially the much discussed question of German defense and rearmament. Gessler, who died in 1955, was Reichswehrminister in 14 cabinets from 1920 to 1928. The material is well edited, and benefits from an extensive biographical introduction.

DIE LINKEN IN DER DEUTSCHEN SOZIALDEMOKRATIE IM KAMPF GEGEN MILITARISMUS UND KRIEG. By Walter Bartel. Berlin: Dietz, 1958, 640 p. DM-Ost. 10.

An extended Communist interpretation of the rôle of the Left Wing of German Social Democracy in the First World War.

DEUTSCHLANDS OSTPROBLEM. Würzburg: Holzner, 1957, 220 p. DM. 9.

A collection of brief studies on Germany's relations—historical and contemporary—with her Slavic neighbors to the east.

L'ALLEMAGNE ET LE MOYEN-ORIENT. By Yves Famchon and Maurice Leruth. Paris: Éditions des Relations Internationales, 1957, 206 p. Fr. 950.

A study of Germany's increasing postwar economic and commercial activity in the Middle East.

THE ITALIAN LOCAL ELECTIONS 1956. By Roy Pryce. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958, 132 p. $3.00.

This third volume of St. Antony's Papers applies to an Italian local election the methods used in the Nuffield studies of British general elections.

LA DEMOCRAZIA NEL MEZZOGIORNO. By Giorgio Amendola. Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1957, 446 p. L. 1200.

Articles and speeches on the achievements of the Communists in southern Italy between 1946 and 1953, by the director of the southern commission of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION. By Alan Moorehead. New York: Harper, 1958, 301 p. $5.00.

A popular yet admirably written and absorbing narrative of the Tsarist background, the disastrous war years, the outbreak of the Revolution and the Bolshevik seizure of power. Based in part upon the researches of Dr. Possony and associates.

SMOLENSK UNDER SOVIET RULE. By Merle Fainsod. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958, 484 p. $8.50.

An important study of Soviet life on the local and regional level. It is based on the unique Communist Party files for the years 1917–1938, which were acquired by the Germans following their occupation of Smolensk in 1941 and later captured by the Americans.

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SOVIET ECONOMIC AID: THE NEW AID AND TRADE POLICY IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES. By Joseph S. Berliner. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1958, 232 p. $4.25.

Coolly and carefully, Professor Berliner examines a subject that has given rise to some excited prose. He shows what the Soviet bloc is doing in its aid and trade agreements with underdeveloped countries and makes the statistics meaningful by comparing them with the free world's aid and trade, with the underdeveloped countries' growth and plans and, perhaps most important of all, with Soviet production and capacity. The author, who is a specialist in the Soviet economy, puts together evidence from Communist and other sources to explain some of the features of the program and to interpret its rationale. He writes suggestively about Soviet aims, capabilities and risks, and looks cautiously into the future.

EASTERN EXPOSURE. By Marvin L. Kalb. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1958, 332 p. $4.50.

A very informative personal account of the Soviet Union in 1956 by a former U. S. press attaché. That critical year witnessed the height of the "thaw" and the abrupt reversal.

BIOGRAPHIC DIRECTORY OF THE USSR. New York: Scarecrow Press (for the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., Munich), 1958, 782 p. $16.00.

A substantial Who's Who of some 2,000 living Soviet citizens in various fields of activity. Prepared outside the U.S.S.R. and without direct access to the persons concerned, it is, nonetheless, a useful work of reference.

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This German edition of a Soviet work includes material through 1955.

LA FORMATION DE LA MAIN-D'OEUVRE QUALIFIÉE EN UNION SOVIÉTIQUE DE 1917 À 1954. By Marcel Anstett. Paris: Rivière, 1958, 245 p. Fr. 800.

A study of the strenuous efforts made by the Soviet leaders to recruit, train and effectively utilize a body of skilled technicians in science and industry.

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A useful study of the financial and trading practices involved in trade, chiefly bilateral, between Sino-Soviet bloc countries and the rest of the world.

CONVENTIONS COLLECTIVES ET RÉALITÉS OUVRIÈRES EN EUROPE DE L'EST. By Paul Barton. Paris: Éditions Ouvrières, 1957, 287 p. Fr. 750.

A study of collective bargaining in the U.S.S.R., based in part upon the contracts, which appear as annexes, drawn up for several factories.

THE BALKANS SINCE 1453. By L. S. Stavrianos. New York: Rinehart, 1958, 970 p. $12.00.

An excellently written and much needed general history of the Balkan Peninsula since the period of Ottoman conquest. Includes a useful annotated bibliography.

DIE ROTE SPRINGFLUT: SOWJETRUSSLANDS WEG INS HERZ EUROPAS. By Hendrik van Bergh. Munich: Isar Verlag, 1958, 528 p. DM. 24.50.

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An extended account of the Soviet Communist advance into Central and East Europe during and after the Second World War. The book is an expansion of a series of radio broadcasts in 1956.

MAAN ALLA JA PÄÄLLÄ. By Arvo Tuominen. Helsinki: Tammi, 1958, 390 p. M. 1100.

The third volume of a leading Finnish ex-Communist's memoirs covering the years 1921–1933.

KULJIN SKP:N TIETÄ. By S. Hj. Rantanen. Helsinki: Otava, 1958, 200 p. M. 550.

A former Finnish Communist functionary tells the story of his 17-year activity for the Party.

POLAND: ITS PEOPLE, ITS SOCIETY, ITS CULTURE. By Clifford R. Barnett and Others. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1958, 470 p. (New York: Taplinger, $7.50.)

This volume is one of the handbooks in the series surveying world cultures, under the auspices of the Human Relations Area Files.

JEUNESSE D'OCTOBRE. By Nicolas Baudy. Paris: Éditions de la Table Ronde, 1957, 443 p. Fr. 950.

Chiefly eyewitness accounts of the Hungarian Revolution of October 1956 by nine participants.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

LORD NORMAN. By Sir Henry Clay. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957, 495 p. $7.50.

Between the wars Sir Montagu Norman (as he was for much of the time) was one of the outstanding personalities of international finance, a figure around whom legends grew more profusely than is usual for a Governor of the Bank of England. Here a leading British economist, who died before he finished the book, examines the man and his work, with the aid of unpublished papers and personal knowledge.

GOVERNMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN, THE EMPIRE, AND THE COMMONWEALTH. By L. W. White and W. D. Hussey. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1958, 292 p. $3.00.

An able, general presentation.

PARLIAMENT. By Sir Ivor Jennings. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1957, 573 p. $8.50.

This second edition of a standard work, first published in 1939, incorporates new material on elections, nationalized industries and delegated legislation.

COMMONWEALTH PERSPECTIVES. By Nicholas Mansergh and Others. Durham: Duke University Press (for the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center), 1958, 214 p. $4.50.

A symposium of seven essays, including pieces on Ghana and the sterling area.

DISARMAMENT AND PEACE IN BRITISH POLITICS, 1914–1919. By Gerda Richards Crosby. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957, 192 p. $4.00.

A posthumously published inquiry into the development of various peace and disarmament proposals in Britain during World War I.

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GOOD FENCES MAKE GOOD NEIGHBORS: WHY THE UNITED STATES PROVOKES CANADIANS. By Joseph Barber. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958, 280 p. $4.00.

Based in part upon some very effective travelling, interviewing and informal conversation, Mr. Barber's effort to discover just what makes the Canadians fretful or explosive when the subject of the United States comes up—or they bring it up—has led to a book that is both serious and entertaining. The trouble in part is our massive indifference and disregard, in part the Canadians' own difficulty in deciding just what constitutes Canadianism.

MONETARY AND FISCAL THOUGHT AND POLICY IN CANADA, 1919–1939. By Irving Brecher. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957, 337 p. $5.25.

A monograph focusing on "stabilization" thought and policy.

The Middle East

THE PASSING OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY: MODERNIZING THE MIDDLE EAST. By Daniel Lerner. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1958, 466 p. $7.50.

This sociological inquiry into modernization and shifting attitudes in the countries of the Middle East is based upon analyses of extensive field interviews undertaken eight years ago, supplemented and up-dated by more recent visits to the area. The study is sponsored jointly by the Center for International Studies at M.I.T. and the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University.

DESERT ENTERPRISE: THE MIDDLE EAST OIL INDUSTRY IN ITS LOCAL ENVIRONMENT. By David H. Finnie. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958, 224 p. $5.00.

An able and well-written discussion centering on the business problems confronting oil companies in the Middle East in the dual necessity of getting on with the Arab authorities and maintaining themselves as enterprises.

JORDAN: ITS PEOPLE, ITS SOCIETY, ITS CULTURE. By George L. Harris and Others. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1958, 246 p. (New York: Taplinger, $5.50.)

This handbook is one of the series of cultural and social surveys prepared under the auspices of the Human Relations Area Files.

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A rather technical dissertation.

SUEZ AND AFTER: YEAR OF CRISIS. By Michael Adams. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958, 225 p. $4.50.

Dispatches on the Suez crisis and its aftermath by the Middle East correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian.*

South and Southeast Asia

MAJOR GOVERNMENTS OF ASIA. Edited by George McTurnan Kahin. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958, 607 p. $7.25.

Five substantial national studies: China, by Harold C. Hinton; Japan, by

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Nobutaka Ike; India, by Norman D. Palmer; Pakistan, by Keith Callard; Indonesia, by George McT. Kahin. The importance of the topic is reflected in the fact that these countries, in population, rank first, second, fifth, sixth and seventh among the nations of the world.

THE DIPLOMACY OF INDIA. By Ross N. Berkes and Mohinder S. Bedi. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958, 221 p. $5.00.

A critical but not angry assessment of India's foreign policy in the United Nations, based chiefly on the official records of the General Assembly and its committees. On the whole the authors find the Indian position best explained by two themes: "India's climate of war theory . . . and its compulsive egalitarianism."

POVERTY AND CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA: CONTEMPORARY INVESTMENT PATTERNS, PROBLEMS AND PLANNING. By D. K. Rangnekar. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1958, 316 p. $6.75.

An able survey of the course of recent capital development in India with particular emphasis on the investment pattern in the various development efforts.

PILOT PROJECT, INDIA. By Albert Mayer and Associates in Collaboration with McKim Marriott and Richard L. Park. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958, 367 p. $5.50.

An extensive account of what appears to have become a prototype for many rural development programs: the Pilot Project at Etawah in Uttar Pradesh.

THE ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN. By J. Russell Andrus and Azizali F. Mohammed. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958, 517 p. $8.50.

A solid and informative study of every aspect of Pakistan's economic life.

MY BURMA: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A PRESIDENT. By U Ba U. New York: Taplinger, 1958, 210 p. $4.50.

An informal but quite revealing personal narrative.

THE CRESCENT AND THE RISING SUN. By Harry J. Benda. The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1958, 320 p. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, $5.50.)

A history of Indonesian Islam, with particular emphasis on the years of Japanese occupation, 1942–1945.

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MISSIONARIES, CHINESE, AND DIPLOMATS. By Paul A. Varg. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958, 335 p. $6.00.

A history of the Protestant missionary movement in China from 1890 to the victory of the Communists. On the whole the author is doubtful of the wisdom of these well-intended ventures, though certain permanent benefits can be registered.

THE INFLATIONARY SPIRAL: THE EXPERIENCE IN CHINA, 1939–1950. By Chang Kia-Ngau. Cambridge: Technology Press; and New York: Wiley, 1958, 394 p. $10.00.

A former cabinet minister of the Nationalist Government examines the causes and effects of runaway inflation in China during the war years and after. In the author's view inflation was the direct and immediate cause of the political collapse.

JAPAN AND HER DESTINY. By Mamoru Shigemitsu. New York: Dutton, 1958, 392 p. $6.50.

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A discussion of Japan's ultimately disastrous foreign policy from the Manchurian Incident of 1931 to the surrender of 1945, by the late statesman and foreign minister, who died in 1957. While the book, an able translation of the Japanese edition which appeared in 1952, covers ground that by now is largely familiar, it is valuable in presenting the point of view of a cautious nationalist whose hopes were blighted by the military extremists.

THE POPULATION OF JAPAN. By Irene B. Taeuber. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958, 461 p. $15.00.

This is an outstanding and detailed study of the changing demographic pattern of Japan accompanying shifting social and economic conditions. Such a work, based on Asian rather than Western experience, will be of great value to all students of this important field.

PHILIPPINE FREEDOM: 1946–1958. By Robert Aura Smith. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958, 375 p. $5.00.

A sympathetic and informal review of the achievements and tribulations of the independent Philippines, by a member of the editorial council of *The New York Times*. While the author finds the economic prospect bad for the short view if good for the long run, he regards the political outlook as "exceptionally bright" despite the untimely death of Magsaysay.

Africa

COMUNISMO E NAZIONALISMO IN AFRICA. By Teobaldo Filesi. Rome: Istituto Italiano per l'Africa, 1958, 368 p. L. 2500.

A study of the mounting tide of nationalism throughout Africa and of Communist efforts to control or exploit it.

AUJOURD'HUI, L'AFRIQUE. By L. Aujoulat. Tournai: Casterman, 1958, 400 p. Belgian Fr. 120.

An informed discussion of colonial questions by a doctor with long experience in the Cameroons.

NIGERIA: BACKGROUND TO NATIONALISM. By James S. Coleman. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958, 510 p. $7.50.

A solid study of the development of nationalism and the nationalist movement in Nigeria, based in good part upon field work and interviews in the country.

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A brief survey of recent economic developments in tropical Africa, by a Senegalese deputy.

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A study of the effect of cyclical and non-cyclical fluctuations upon the economy of an underdeveloped area.

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A very useful, detailed political, economic, social and cultural survey.

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Latin America and the West Indies

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A useful annotated bibliography.

DIE INTERAMERIKANISCHEN BEZIEHUNGEN UND DER GEDANKE DER GLEICHBERECHTIGTEN PARTNERSCHAFT. By Hans Joachim Dunker. Hamburg: Institut für Auswärtige Politik, 1957, 344 p. DM. 25.

A dissertation treating the development of inter-American relations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

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A history of the Mexican central banking system from 1864 to 1940.

FROM COMMUNITY TO METROPOLIS: A BIOGRAPHY OF SÃO PAULO, BRAZIL. By Richard M. Morse. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1958, 341 p. $7.50.

In this solid contribution to the study of urban development Professor Morse traces the history of the fastest growing city and leading industrial center of Latin America. Its population in 1957 was over 3,000,000 and may reach 4,700,000 by the mid-1960s.

DIE EISENSCHAFFENDE INDUSTRIE BRASILIENS. By Ernest Arthur Boas. Berlin: Duncker, 1957, 184 p. DM. 18.

A monograph on the development of Brazil's iron and steel industry.

CATHOLICISM, NATIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA. By John J. Kennedy. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1958, 219 p. $4.75.

An informed and thoughtful effort to measure the rôle of Catholicism in the life of the Argentine nation, with particular reference to specifically Catholic elements in Argentine social and political thought. The author is associate professor of political science at Notre Dame.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D.C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, 45 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *United Nations, International Court of Justice, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2966 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 1262 New Hampshire Ave., Washington 6, D.C. *European Coal and Steel Community:* 220 Southern Bldg., Washington 5, D.C Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 85th Congress, 2d Session. London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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